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How the Supreme Court Has Mangled American
Sentencing Law and How It Might Yet Be Mended
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This Article argues that the line of Supreme Court Sixth Amendment jury right
cases that began with McMillan v Pennsylvania in 1986, crescendoed in Blakely v
Washington and United States v Booker in 2004-2005, and continues in cases such as
Oregon v Ice, is a colossal judicialfailure. First,the Court has failed to provide a logically coherent, constitutionally based answer to the fundamental question of what limits
the Constitution places on the roles played by the institutionalactors in the criminal
justice system. It has failed to recognize that defining, adjudicating, and punishing
crimes implicates both the Sixth Amendment Jury Clause and the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clauses,and it has twisted the Jury Clause into an insoluble
logical knot. Second, the practical effect of the Court's constitutional malpractice has
been to paralyze the generally beneficial structured sentencing movement, with the result that promising avenues toward improved substantive and procedural sentencing
justice have been blocked. Even the most widely applaudedconsequence of these cases,
the transformation of the federal sentencing guidelines into an advisory system, proves
on close inspection to be a decidedly mixed blessing. The Court has made the Constitution not a guide, but an obstacle,to a desirable distributionof authority among the criminal justice system's institutionalactors.
The Article provides a comprehensive analysis of all the opinions in the McMillan-Apprendi-Blakely-Booker-Ice line, considering both their constitutional reasoning
and their practicalimpact on federal and state sentencing systems. It builds on a careful
dissection of the defects in the Court's Sixth Amendment sentencing decisions to develop an alternative constitutional analysis that combines Sixth Amendment and due
process principles to suggest a more intellectually coherent and practically desirable
constitutionalsentencing jurisprudence.
INTRODUCTION

The set of institutions we refer to as the criminal justice system
performs three basic functions. It defines what a "crime" is. It adjudicates guilt of crimes. It imposes punishment for crimes. In the United
States, the responsibility for performing these three functions is distrif Floyd R. Gibson Missouri Endowed Professor of Law, University of Missouri School of Law.
With thanks to Kate Stith for her customarily insightful comments and to my research assistant, Bradley R. Dixon, for his careful review of the manuscript.

367

368

The University of Chicago Law Review

[77:367

buted among the legislature, the judiciary (trial and appellate), the
executive branch in the persons of the prosecutor and the prison and
parole authorities, the defense bar, the jury, and in recent years and in
some places, quasi-independent administrative bodies called sentencing commissions. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, the way
these institutions interacted to generate criminal punishments
changed dramatically. The dominant theory of punishment shifted,
deemphasizing rehabilitation and embracing deterrence, incapacitation, and just deserts. Legislatures raised penalties and became enamored of mandatory minimum sentences for recidivists, drug offenders, and a growing list of crime types. Prison populations surged. Simultaneously, a structured sentencing movement arose and sought to
guide the sentencing discretion of trial judges through rules tied to
post-conviction judicial factfinding. Many jurisdictions abandoned
parole boards and with them the idea that correctional experts should
have significant back-end release authority. The federal government
embraced all these trends. It raised penalties, imposed lots of mandatory minimum sentences, abandoned parole, and embarked on a stillcontroversial foray into guidelines sentencing.
These developments created a thicket of knotty issues. Some
were plainly constitutional questions requiring resolution by the Supreme Court. Some implicated the balance of power between the federal judiciary and its coordinate branches and thus tempted the Court
to use its constitutional interpretative powers in institutional selfdefense. Others were legislative policy problems that the Court had, at
best, only an indirect warrant to address, particularly at the state level.
That the Court would participate in the national sentencing debate was
inevitable. That it would botch the assignment so badly was not.
The sequence of Supreme Court decisions running from McMillan v Pennsylvania' in 1986, through Apprendi v New Jersey' in 2000,
Blakely v Washington' in 2004, United States v Booker4 in 2005, and

culminating in Oregon v Ice' in January 2009, has been a debacle in
two major ways. First, the Court has failed to provide a logically coherent, constitutionally based answer to the fundamental question of
what limits, if any, the Constitution places on the roles played by the
institutional actors in the criminal justice system. It failed to recognize
1
2
3

4
5

477 US 79 (1986).
530 US 466 (2000).
542 US 296 (2004).
543 US 220 (2005).
129 S Ct 711 (2009).
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that defining, adjudicating, and punishing crimes implicates both the
Sixth Amendment Jury Clause and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses, and it has twisted the Jury Clause into an
insoluble logical knot. Second, the practical effect of the Court's constitutional bungling has been to paralyze the generally beneficial
structured sentencing movement with the result that promising avenues toward improved substantive and procedural sentencing justice
have been blocked. Even the most widely applauded consequence of
the Apprendi-Booker line, the transformation of the Federal Guidelines into an advisory system, proves on close inspection to be a decidedly mixed blessing. The Court has made the Constitution not a
guide, but an obstacle, to a desirable distribution of authority among
the criminal justice system's institutional actors.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I describes the rise of the
structured sentencing movement and the constitutional and institutional challenges that movement created for the federal judiciary.
Part II analyzes the Supreme Court's initial efforts to reconcile constitutional jury trial and due process protections with emerging structured sentencing mechanisms, from the seminal case on the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt for elements of a crime, In
re Winship,' to the case which launched the current spate of Sixth
Amendment jury trial cases, Apprendi. The Part focuses particular
attention on McMillan as an underappreciated source of many of the
errors that have since ensnared the Court. Part III discusses the critical period after Apprendi when, in Harrisv United States7 and Blakely,
a Court obsessed with the interbranch struggle over federal sentencing fell under the spell of Justice Antonin Scalia's love of simple,
bright-line rules and went irrevocably astray. Part IV addresses the
Court's increasingly incoherent efforts to apply the flawed Blakely
rule, most particularly to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in Booker
and its numerous progeny. Part V assesses the convoluted Sixth
Amendment sentencing structure the Court has erected and concludes that it is a monumental failure. This final Part offers a comprehensive alternative model, based on both the Sixth Amendment right
to a jury trial and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due
process, and suggests that the accession of Justice Sonia Sotomayor to
the Supreme Court may provide an opportunity for the Court to rethink and to move in the direction of the model I suggest.

6

7

397 US 358 (1970).
536 US 545 (2002).
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I. THE STRUCTURED SENTENCING MOVEMENT AND
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY

A set of interlocking developments transformed the American
criminal justice system at the end of the twentieth century. For decades prior to the 1970s, American criminal practice was dominated by
a model of punishment that emphasized individualized sentences, rehabilitation of offenders, and judicial and administrative discretion.! In
this rehabilitative or "medical" model, the roles of the institutional
actors in defining, adjudicating, and punishing crime were well understood as a matter of customary practice, if not much scrutinized in constitutional theory.
First, legislatures defined crimes.! Second, legislatures set the punishment for each crime they created, customarily prescribing an array of possible sanctions including a range of fines and a range of restrictions on the defendant's liberty. Thus, for the legislature to define
a crime was to identify a set of facts, commonly called "elements,"
which, if proven, subjected the defendant to criminal liability and exposed him to a specified range of punishments.
Third, once a defendant was convicted of a crime by trial or plea,
the judge set a sentence somewhere within the legislatively prescribed
range of punishments after receiving information about the particulars
of the crime, the victim, and the defendant's background. The judge was
to individualize the sentence of each offendero after weighing a variety
of recognized sentencing objectives, among which rehabilitation was at
least theoretically predominant." The judge's choice of sentence within

8 See Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained, and Other Lessons
in Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 Wis L Rev 679, 680-89. See also
Kate Stith and Steve Y Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the
FederalSentencing Guidelines,28 Wake Forest L Rev 223,227 (1993); Pamala L. Griset, Determinate Sentencing: The Promiseand Reality of Retributive Justice 11-12 (SUNY 1991).

9 The ancient common law power of judges to define new crimes through adjudication
had essentially vanished by the late twentieth century. John Calvin Jeffries, Jr, Legality, Vagueness,and the Constructionof PenalStatutes, 71 Va L Rev 189, 195 (1985) ("Judicial crime creation

[in the United States] is a thing of the past.").
to See, for example, Williams v New York, 337 US 241, 248 (1949) (discussing "[tioday's
philosophy of individualizing sentences").
11 Bowman, 1996 Wis L Rev at 684 (cited in note 8). In 1981, one commentator observed that
"rehabilitation ... seen as the exclusive justification of penal sanctions ... was very nearly the stance
of some exuberant American theorists in the mid-twentieth century." Francis A. Allen, The Decline
of the Rehabilitative Ideal 3 (Yale 1981) ("[T]he nature of the rehabilitative ideal is profoundly
affected by whether rehabilitation is seen as the exclusive justification of penal sanctions (as was
very nearly the stance of some exuberant American theorists in mid-twentieth century).").
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the statutory parameters for the crime(s) of conviction was largely unconstrained by either procedural rules or appellate review.l
Fourth, the judge's sentence was not the last word. Virtually all
state and federal systems vested some back-end release authority in a
parole board or similar body." In many systems, the parole board had
an equal or even greater voice than the judge in determining how
much time defendants would really serve." Nonetheless, parole boards
could not impose punishment exceeding the range legislatively authorized by the original conviction.
In this setting, "element" facts were, and seemed, very important.
They both created liability and set the outside limits of judicially imposed punishment. By contrast, judicial determinations of nonelement facts at sentencing neither created liability nor set the limits
of punishment. Non-element facts had no necessary effect on the sentence, even presumptively. Of course, judicial determinations of nonelement facts had huge impacts on individual defendants. After all, as
discussed below," even in a purely discretionary sentencing system, the
only way for a judge rationally to distinguish one defendant from others who have committed the same statutory crime is to ascertain facts
other than the fact of conviction that suggest a sentence at, above, or
below the norm for that crime. But during the criminal procedure revolution that began in the 1960s, this logically inescapable process of
imposing different sentences on defendants convicted of the same
"crime" based on factual differences in their situations never suggested itself to the Supreme Court as requiring constitutional regulation or response.
The Court's indifference to sentencing was understandable because its criminal procedure revolution sprang from the soil of the
mid-twentieth century's experience of, and assumptions about, the
12 See Koon v United States, 518 US 81, 96 (1996) ("Before the Guidelines system, a federal
criminal sentence within statutory limits was, for all practical purposes, not reviewable on appeal.").
13

See, for example, Ronald F.Wright, Counting the Cost of Sentencing in North Carolina, 29

Crime & Justice 39,43 (2002) (describing North Carolina sentencing practices prior to 1981, which
involved largely unconstrained front-end judicial sentencing discretion combined with a back-end
parole release mechanism, as "typical for the times"). See also Sandra Shane-DuBow, Alice P.
Brown, and Erik Olsen, Sentencing Reform in the United States: History, Content, and Effect 4 (Na-

tional Institute of Justice 1985) (outlining the development of states' probation and parole policies,
and noting that "[b]y 1922,... forty-four states" had instituted parole mechanisms).
14 Beginning in 1910, federal prisoners became eligible for parole release after serving onethird of the term imposed by the court. Parole boards had discretion in release determinations.
Peter B. Hoffman, History of the

Federal Parole System

http://www.usdoj.gov/uspc/history.pdf (visited Dec 11, 2009).
15 See notes 344-45 and accompanying text.
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nature of a criminal trial. The Bill of Rights confers on criminal defendants the general right to due process of law before being deprived of
life or liberty, as well as a specific list of procedural rights. Most of
them, particularly the Sixth Amendment rights to a speedy and public
trial by a jury of one's peers," confrontation, and compulsory process,
and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' due process guarantee of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt,"' are (either by obvious textual
mandate or settled judicial interpretation) trial rights. To the extent
they apply outside of trial, they protect primarily against government
abuses in the process of gathering evidence in preparation for trial."
Because a "trial" is, at its core, a mechanism for determining the existence of facts," the reach of constitutional trial rights turns on which
facts are to be determined by the trial.
Unsurprisingly, the Court's thinking about a defendant's constitutional protections developed contingent on the prevailing idea that a
criminal trial was the process of adjudicating guilt of a "crime," which
consisted of legislatively designated, punishment-limiting facts called
"elements," and that (with a few geographic" or subject matter exceptions) an American "trial" did not include the determination of the
punishment appropriate for a particular offender. Thus, constitutional
16

US Const Amend V.

17 US Const Amend VI. See, for example, Duncan v Louisiana, 391 US 145, 149 (1968)
(holding that the Fourteenth Amendment provides defendants with the right to a trial by jury in
state criminal proceedings whenever such a right would be granted in federal court).
18 See Pattersonv New York, 432 US 197,210 (1977); Winship, 397 US at 361-64.
19 See, for example, Mirandav Arizona, 384 US 436,461,465 & n 35,467 (1969) (extending
to the setting of police interrogation the Fifth Amendment right not to be compelled to be a
"witness" against oneself and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
20
One might quibble with this characterization, noting, for example, that juries are asked
not only to determine whether particular events occurred, but also to make mixed judgments of
law and fact, such as whether or not given congeries of behavior and attendant circumstances
amount to "negligence." But lawyers refer to such judgments as determinations of fact, and in
any case, juries are at most asked to determine whether certain combinations of facts fit within
predefined legal categories and not to define the categories themselves.
21
In 1960, roughly 25 percent of all states maintained jury sentencing for non-capital felonies. Note, Statutory Structures for Sentencing Felons to Prison, 60 Colum L Rev 1134, 1154

(1960) (canvassing various jurisdictions' jury sentencing provisions and noting that the practice
"is authorized for all crimes in ten states and for a limited number in three others"). As of 2000,
Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia still allowed juries to sentence the
defendant in non-capital cases. Frank 0. Bowman, III, Fearof Law: Thoughts on 'Fearof Judging'
and the State of the FederalSentencing Guidelines,44 SLU L J 299,311 (2000).
22 The Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence created mandatory jury sentencing
phases in capital trials See Gregg v Georgia,428 US 153, 190-91 (1976). But see Walton v Arizona,
497 US 639, 648 (1990) (noting that judges may make sentencing decisions because "the Sixth
Amendment does not require that the specific findings authorizing the imposition of the sentence
of death be made by the jury"), quoting Hildwin v Florida,490 US 638,640-41 (1989) (per curiam).
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trial rights attached only to legal proceedings for determining elements. In post-conviction sentencing proceedings, defendants not only
had no trial rights, but they had, at best, only minimal rights to any
form of procedural due process.
These arrangements made sense given the dominant sentencing
model and its attendant assumptions. Until quite recently, it was generally easy to figure out what the "elements" of a "crime" were. Legislatures enacted criminal codes that customarily identified crimes by
name (murder, robbery, rape), subdivided them into degrees where
appropriate (first degree murder, second degree murder, manslaughter), and defined them by writing into the statute language like, "the
defendant commits the crime of X if he does act A, with mental state
B, under circumstance C." As a matter of practice, judges had become
accustomed to legislative delegation of substantial sentencing discretion. They thought of themselves as sentencing experts, and, unsurprisingly, trusted themselves to find sentencing-related facts accurately
and to use the facts they found wisely. As a matter of theory, considerations of due process seemed inapposite given the prevailing, if not
very closely examined, assumption that judges were not really "doing
law" when they passed sentence. Some conceived of sentencing judges
as performing a quasi-medical evaluation and treatment function.6
Others maintained that sentencing judges were performing a sui generis form of "moral reasoning" that could not be cabined within the
fact-and-rule-bound strictures of adversarial due process.3 After all,
23 See, for example, Williams, 337 US at 249-51 (holding that due process allows judges
broad discretion as to sources and types of information relied upon at sentencing and does not
require confrontation or cross-examination at sentencing).
24 To say that late twentieth-century judges had become used to substantial front-end
sentencing discretion is not the same thing as suggesting, as Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, and others sometimes do, that largely unfettered judicial discretion within broad statutory limits had, until recently, been the nearly invariable practice in American law
since soon after the nation's Founding. See Apprendi, 530 US at 481-82 (2000); id at 544-45
(O'Connor dissenting) (relying on past Court precedent "approv[ing] of-and the significant
history in this country of-discretionary sentencing" in asserting that the majority's rule need
not necessarily invalidate the Guidelines). To the contrary, the center of gravity for sentencing
discretion among judges, juries, and legislatures has varied considerably from time to time and
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See Bowman,44 SLU L J at 311-15 (cited in note 21).
2

See Kate Stith and Jos6 A. Cabranes, FearofJudging: Sentencing Guidelines in the Federal

Courts 28-29 (Chicago 1998) (discussing sentencing ethos of pre-Guidelines federal judges).
26
Griset, Determinate Sentencing at 11 (cited in note 8) (discussing the rise of the rehabilitative
"juggernaut" between 1877 and 1970 and noting that "[a] medical analogue was frequently invoked").
See Stith and Cabranes, Fearof Judging at 78-79 (cited in note 25) (noting that "adjudi2
cation has more in common with scientific than with moral reasoning," but arguing that the latter
concept is more consistent with what they see as the sentencing judge's duty to perform a sort of
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one would scarcely insist on due process in the doctor's examining
room or the tower of the philosopher-king.
So long as legislatures continued to define crimes in the traditional way and prevailing sentencing practices conformed to the conventional rehabilitative, discretionary model, the decisions of the criminal procedure revolution created no dissonance in the sentencing
context. However, at the same time the criminal procedure revolution
was unfolding, other trends were converging to produce dramatic
changes in sentencing practice and procedure.
A. The Structured Sentencing Movement
Violent crime and property crime rates increased steadily
through the 1960s and 1970s. Accompanying this trend were myriad
other changes to American society, ranging from the women's and
civil rights movements, to the anti-war movement, to the emergence of
a widespread drug subculture. The real increase in crime, in tandem
with more general social upheaval, unsettled and frightened voters
and their representatives, who demanded more social controls.n That
demand produced a national movement toward tougher, more definite, less discretionary criminal sentences for both drug offenses and
traditional crimes against persons and property.
These broad social movements gathered strength at the same
time as a powerful critique of the dominant American sentencing
model took hold among criminal justice insiders. Many observers
doubted the ability of the rehabilitative sentencing model to rehabilitate,1 and urged that sentences be based more on considerations of

Aristotelian equity judgment). See also Bowman, 44 SLU L J at 319-26 (cited in note 21) (critiquing the Stith and Cabranes discussion of moral reasoning by sentencing judges).
28
See Frank 0. Bowman, III, Murder, Meth, Mammon and Moral Values: The Political
Landscape of American Sentencing Reform, 44 Washburn L J 495, 498-99 (2005) (discussing the

novelty of modern American recreational drug use). See also Frank 0. Bowman, III, Playing
"21" with NarcoticsEnforcement:A Response to Professor Carrington,52 Wash & Lee L Rev 937,

951-55 (1995) (recounting Americans' use of cocaine, opiates, and marijuana in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, and characterizing the stages of Americans' reactions as "discovery,
excitement, abuse, disillusionment, and prohibition, all crammed into a few short decades");
Steven B. Duke and Albert C. Gross, America's Longest War: Rethinking Our Tragic Crusade
againstDrugs 43-46 (Putnam 1993).
29 See David Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary

Society 89-102 (Chicago 2001).
3o See Bowman, 52 Wash & Lee L Rev at 972 (cited in note 28).
31 Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and ProsecutorialPower: A Critique of Recent
Proposalsfor "Fixed" and "Presumptive"Sentencing, 126 U Pa L Rev 550,552 (1978) (noting the

practical difficulty proponents of rehabilitation encounter when they attempt "[t]o probe a per-
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just desert, deterrence, and (where necessary) incapacitation. Critics
also complained that unconstrained front-end judicial sentencing discretion produced unjustifiable disparities of outcome and was open to
infection by racial and other biases, whether conscious or unconscious.32 They argued that the back-end release authority of parole
boards was too arbitrary and too shielded from public view, providing
yet another avenue for unjust and unreviewable disparity." These and
other concernsm coalesced into a general movement toward "structured sentencing."
The term "structured sentencing" covers an array of different
sentencing arrangements, but broadly speaking, it refers to regimes
that seek to guide judicial sentencing discretion within the range of
punishments permitted by the fact of conviction for a particular crime
or group of related crimes. This guidance can vary in complexity, from
very simple arrangements in which conviction creates a presumptive,
aggravated, and mitigated range and requires a sentence within the presumptive range absent judicial findings of aggravating or mitigating
facts, 35 to intricate systems like the Federal Guidelines. Likewise, the
idea of "structured sentencing" can embrace a spectrum of systems
ranging from definite rules absolutely binding on judges to voluntary
son's psyche and predict his future behavior"). See also Bowman, 1996 Wis L Rev at 688-89
(cited in note 8).
32 Bowman, 1996 Wis L Rev at 686-88 (cited in note 8). See also Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984, S Rep No 98-225, 98th Cong, 2d Sess 38 (1983), reprinted in 1984 USCCAN
3182, 3221 (concluding that the unreformed sentencing rules permitted "an unjustifiably wide
range of sentences" even among similar offenders).
33 See Bowman, 1996 Wis L Rev at 688 (cited in note 8). See, for example, Jonathan D.
Casper,DeterminateSentencing and Prison Crowding in Illinois, 1984 U Ill L Rev 231, 235-36.
3
For example, some critics argued that delegating to parole boards so much power to
determine real sentence length made judicial sentencing more ceremonial than real; they wanted
"truth in sentencing," that is, a stronger correlation between the sentence announced by the
judge and the time actually served by the defendant. See Bowman, 1996 Wis L Rev at 686-89
(cited in note 8).
35 See, for example, Colo Rev Stat Ann § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A) (West) (establishing six
presumptive classes of sentencing ranges for defendants sentenced after July 1993, from the
minimum of twelve to eighteen months, to the maximum of life imprisonment or death); Colo
Rev Stat Ann § 18-1.3-401(6) (West):
If the court finds ... extraordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances, it may impose a
sentence which is lesser or greater than the presumptive range; except that in no case shall
the term of sentence be greater than twice the maximum nor less than one-half the minimum term authorized in the presumptive range for the punishment of the offense.
See also Lopez v People, 113 P3d 713, 723-25 (Colo 2005) (describing Colorado's aggravated
sentencing scheme under § 18-1.3-401(6) as allowing for judicial factfinding, and holding that the
US Constitution requires that the jury find aggravated facts beyond a reasonable doubt, except
in limited situations where the judge may do so).
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guidelines that judges are at liberty to accept or reject.3 Common to all
structured systems, however, is some set of standards,guidelines,or rules
that correlate required,preferred, or suggested sentencing outcomes to
non-element facts determined by the sentencingjudge.

Structured sentencing is often associated with the creation of sentencing commissions or analogous bodies of experts to study sentencing and corrections, to advise judges and legislators on sentencing policy, and in some cases to draft statutes, rules, or guidelines. In the context of the present discussion, a key function of sentencing commissions is to identify non-element facts that ought (or ought not) to influence the type and severity of punishment imposed on convicted
defendants. Finally, the structured sentencing systems that arose beginning in the 1970s and 1980s commonly eliminated or drastically
restricted the back-end release power of prison and parole officials."
B.

Mandatory Minimum Sentences and Other Legislative Factual
Add-ons

At the same time as the structured sentencing movement was
gaining national traction, legislatures grew increasingly fond of two
other kinds of sentencing mechanisms that are commonly, but erroneously, lumped into the category of structured sentencing: (1) mandatory minimum sentences and (2) other sentence-enhancing devices
that might be called "factual add-ons.""
1. Mandatory minimum sentences.
Some mandatory minimum sentencing was, of course, a longfamiliar feature of criminal codes. When a legislature sets the penalty
for second degree murder as a range of ten to twenty years imprison36 See, for example, Va Code § 19.2-298.01 (establishing rules governing use of discretionary sentencing guidelines).
37 See, for example, Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 § 218(a)(5), Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat
1837, 2027, repealing 18 USC § 4201 et seq (providing for federal parole system). Structured
sentencing need not be coupled with elimination of parole release authority. For a powerful
argument in favor of reviving back-end release authority in structured sentencing systems, see
Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 Emory L J 377,433 (2005).
38 These devices are not mechanisms of structured sentencing, properly understood, and
can subvert its aims. Structured sentencing seeks a set of rules that guide, but do not eliminate,
the exercise of judicial discretion, while mandatory minimums place absolute limits on judicial
discretion. Likewise, the structured sentencing movement is as much about the process by which
rules are made as about the substance of the rules le process is supposed to be a collaboration
among interested institutions that blends considerations of politics and professional judgment.
Mandatory minimum sentences and factual add-ons tend to be legislative diktats imposed with
little consideration of how they fit into the sentencing structure on which they are imposed.
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ment, the lower end of that range is both a minimum sentence and
mandatory inasmuch as judges are barred from imposing a sentence
of less than ten years. The novelty that appeared with increasing frequency in the 1970s and 1980s was the introduction of statutes that
imposed a mandatory minimum sentence higher than the minimum
prescribed for conviction of a particular crime based on proof of some
fact not required for conviction of the crime itself. An example of this
new type of mandatory minimum sentence would be a statute that set
the sentencing range for unlawful possession of a controlled substance
at zero to ten years, but in a separate provision required that the defendant be sentenced to not less than five years if he possessed a specified quantity of drugs. Sometimes, as in some federal drug laws,
proof of a fact like drug quantity increases both the required minimum sentence and the potential maximum sentence.3 9
2. Other factual add-ons.
In addition to creating mandatory minimum penalties, legislatures began attaching other kinds of penalty enhancements to proof of
facts that would not conventionally have been seen as elements of a
crime. Among the most common of these factual add-ons have been
proximity provisions enhancing penalties for committing certain offenses (most commonly drug crimes) on or within a specified distance
of particular kinds of facilitiesi gun and injury enhancements, 4' and
recidivist enhancements.42 Some such statutes increase maximum sen39
See, for example, 21 USC §841(b) (setting the penalty range for manufacturing, distributing, dispensing, or possessing with intent to distribute a Schedule I or II controlled substance
at zero to twenty years, but increasing the penalty range to five to forty years where specified
amounts were involved, and to ten years to life imprisonment where larger specified amounts
were involved).
4o Federal law doubles the maximum penalty for distributing, manufacturing, or possessing
controlled substances on or within one thousand feet of all public and private schools, colleges,
public housing authority playgrounds, public swimming pools, or video arcade facilities. 21
USC § 860(a). Federal law also doubles the maximum punishment for drug offenses committed
in, on, or within 1,000 feet of a truck stop or safety rest area. 21 USC § 849(b)(1). Proof of the
requisite proximity sometimes also triggers a minimum sentence in addition to the enhanced
maximum. See, for example, 21 USC § 860(a) (imposing one-year mandatory minimum sentence
for distribution near the specified child-related facilities).
41 Many jurisdictions have enacted statutes increasing penalties for offenders who cause
injury or use firearms, even if the underlying offense of conviction does not have weapon use or
injury as one of its elements. See, for example, McMillan, 477 US at 84-85 (upholding a Pennsylvania statute imposing five-year mandatory minimum sentence for "visible possession" of a
firearm in connection with certain enumerated offenses).
42
Such recidivist enhancements can take the form of so-called "three strikes" laws that impose
substantial minimum sentences on defendants convicted of a specified number of prior offenses. See,
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tences." Some impose or increase minimum sentences." Some do
both." And sometimes they require the imposition of an additional
punishment to run consecutive to the punishment imposed for the
underlying offense.
C.

Structured Sentencing, Juries, and Due Process

Every structured sentencing system by definition requires some
post-conviction judicial findings of fact. Creating binding rules or even
advisory guidelines that differentiate rationally among defendants convicted of the same offense requires correlating non-element facts to preferred sentencing outcomes. 47 But the more factually specific and legally
binding a structured system becomes, the more judicially found facts will
begin to rival the elements of the crime itself in their impact on a defendant's actual sentence. This phenomenon, which in its extreme form has
been characterized by the Supreme Court as the "tail which wags the
dog," 48 was felt by some to be suspect and perhaps illegitimate."
Some critics complained that according judicially found facts so
much sentencing weight denigrated the constitutionally guaranteed
role of the jury.0 Others were concerned less about the identity of the
factfinder than about the sufficiency of procedural protections in sentencing proceedings." Structured sentencing presents a mixed due
for example, Ewing v California,538 US 11, 15 (2003) (describing and upholding a California "three
strikes" statute imposing sentence of twenty-five years to life for theft of golf clubs).
43 See, for example, 21 USC § 860(c) (tripling maximum sentence for one who employs a
minor to distribute drugs near schools or playgrounds).
44 See, for example, McMillan, 477 US at 88 (noting that Pennsylvania's law proscribing
"visible possession" of a firearm while engaged in certain other felonious conduct "'ups the ante'
for the defendant only by raising to five years the minimum sentence which may be imposed").
45 See, for example, Colo Rev Stat Ann § 18-1.3-406 (West) (prescribing a minimum sentence at the midpoint of the presumptive range and doubling the maximum of the presumptive
range for crimes involving the use of a deadly weapon or causing serious bodily injury or death).
46 See, for example, 18 USC § 924(c) (imposing a term of years consecutive to the sentence
for the underlying offense upon defendant who "during and in relation to any crime of violence
or drug trafficking crime ... uses or carries a firearm").
47
See notes 349-50 and accompanying text.
48 McMillan,477 US at 88.
49
See, for example, Susan N. Herman, The Tail That Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated FactFindingunder the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S Cal L Rev

289,334-37 (1992).
50
Id at 304-05.
51 Id at 307-10 (proposing that the "true reason" why legislatures allow for sentencingphase factfinding is that it opens the door for the judge to consider "conduct that has not been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt"). See generally Frank 0. Bowman, III, Completing the Sentencing Revolution: Reconsidering Sentencing Proceduresin the Guidelines Era, 12 Fed Sent Rptr

(Vera) 187 (2000).
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process picture. On the one hand, by identifying in advance the facts
that will matter most in determining a defendant's sentence within the
statutory range and requiring that judges make specific findings of
those facts, structured sentencing regimes represent a clear improvement over the traditional model of unreviewable judicial sentencing
discretion." On the other hand, most structured sentencing regimes
have afforded minimal procedural protections to the adjudication of
sentencing factors. As I wrote of the federal system in 2000:
Although judges must now make findings of fact as an integral
part of the task of guidelines application, those findings are the
product of a process in which the government's burden of proof
is only a preponderance of the evidence, defendants have limited
rights to the discovery of evidence germane to sentencing factors,
much of the true fact-finding is done (at least preliminarily) by
probation officers without the benefit of formal evidentiary presentation, and the sentencing hearing itself is not subject to the
rules of evidence.
II. WINSHIP THROUGH APPRENDI:THE PROBLEM OF LEGISLATIVE
EVASION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS

A.

Winship, Mullaney, and Patterson

The agonizing doctrinal train wreck the Supreme Court has engineered at the intersection between the structured sentencing movement and the Sixth Amendment jury right exploded into the national
conversation with the 2004 decision in Blakely. But the story begins in
1970 with the Court's holding in Winship that due process requires the
government to prove each and every element of a crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.4 This succinct formulation is by now so familiar to
the American legal mind that real effort is required to remember that
the Court failed to define its two essential terms-"element" and
"crime." To be sure, an "element" is a fact and a "crime" is established
52 See Kevin R. Reitz, Reporter's Introductory Memorandum, Model Penal Code: Sentencing (Tentative Draft No 1) xxxiii-xxxvii (ALI 2007). See also Bowman, 44 SLU L J at 325-26
(cited in note 21); Julie R. O'Sullivan, In Defense of the US. Sentencing Guidelines Modified Real
Offense System, 91 Nw U L Rev 1342,1386-87 (1997).
53 Bowman, 12 Fed Sent Rptr at 187 (cited in note 51).
54
397 US at 364. Because Winship was a juvenile case, it did not implicate the Sixth
Amendment jury trial right. See In re Gault, 387 US 1, 13 (1967) (holding that the Constitution
does not grant juveniles in the juvenile court system the panoply of rights adults are guaranteed
in analogous criminal proceedings, and noting that "the juvenile is not entitled to bail, to indictment by grand jury, to a public trial or to trial by jury").
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once the government proves all of its constituent factual elements. But
is a "crime" simply a name ("burglary" or "robbery" or "rape") given
to a designated set of factual elements, or is it instead an array of required or permitted punishments (which may or may not bear a special name) authorized by proof of a set of factual elements? And is a
fact an "element" only if a legislature designates it as such, or does a
fact become an "element," regardless of the legislature's intentions, if
proving it has a particular effect on the nature and severity of the defendant's punishment?
The answers to these questions matter because they determine
the degree to which legislatures can circumvent Winship's proofbeyond-a-reasonable-doubt rule, and would come to matter even
more once the Court tied the Sixth Amendment jury trial right to the
"element" concept." The Court first confronted the problem of legislative circumvention of the reasonable doubt requirement in Mullaney v
Wilbur," a case involving the traditional distinction between murder
and the lesser crime of manslaughter- the presence or absence of
heat of passion on the part of the defendant. In Mullaney, the Maine
statute defined murder as an unlawful and intentional killing." The
jury was instructed that, if the prosecutor proved that the defendant
killed unlawfully and intentionally, it should find him guilty of murder
unless the defendant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that
he acted in the heat of passion." Concerned that this arrangement improperly relieved the prosecution of its constitutional burden to prove
what the Supreme Court saw as a traditional feature of murder, the
Court overturned the defendant's conviction by construing the statutory requirement of an unlawful killing to mean a killing not in the
heat of passion." Thus, absence of heat of passion became an "element" the government bore the burden of proving under Winship.
Two years later, in Patterson v New York," the Court reversed
field." In Patterson,the New York statute defined murder as an inten55 See McMillan, 477 US at 93 (rejecting petitioners' argument that they were entitled to a
jury trial on the question of "visible possession" which triggered a five-year mandatory minimum
sentence because this fact was a sentencing factor and not an element of a crime).
56 421 US 684 (1975). See generally Ronald J. Allen, Mullaney v. Wilbur, the Supreme
Court, and the Substantive Criminal Law-An Examination ofthe Limits ofLegislative Intervention, 55 Tex L Rev 269 (1977).

57 421 US at 686 n 3, quoting 17 Me Rev Stat Ann § 2651 (1964) ("Whoever unlawfully
kills a human being with malice aforethought, either express or implied, is guilty of murder and
shall be punished by imprisonment for life."), repealed by 1975 Me Laws 499 § 15.
58 Mullaney, 421 US at 686-87.
59
Id at 694-96.
6o 432 US 197 (1977).
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tional killing, and designated "extreme emotional disturbance" (the
Model Penal Code phrase that embraces common law heat of passion") as an affirmative defense which, if proven by the defendant,
reduced the homicide to manslaughter.3 Functionally, the Maine and
New York laws were indistinguishable. Both required the government
to prove only intentional killing to establish murder and both placed
on a defendant who sought mitigation to the lesser crime of manslaughter the burden of proving heat of passion. Yet in Patterson,the
Supreme Court upheld the New York conviction on the theory that it
is permissible for legislatures to shift the burden of proof to the defendant as to some facts by designating them "affirmative defenses"
rather than "elements.""4
Many, including Justice Lewis Powell in dissent," have found this
formalistic distinction logically unsatisfactory and unduly deferential
to legislatures." But the Court's retreat in Patterson is unsurprising.
affirmative defenses have a long teThe Court recognized both that
67
nure in Anglo-American law -a fact that detracts materially from
the argument that affirmative defenses must necessarily offend the
Constitution -and that the affirmative defense device serves very useful functions, particularly when used, as it customarily is, for facts of
which the defendant would have unique knowledge (heat of passion,'
self-defense,6' insanity, and so on).'0 Mullaney placed affirmative defenses in constitutional jeopardy. Accordingly, the Patterson Court
allowed legislatures to impose evidentiary burdens on defendants
61 As numerous commentators have observed, in Patterson,the Court "signal[ed] that it
had erred in Mullaney." Ronald I Allen, Montana v. Eglehoff-Reflections on the Limits of
Legislative Imagination and JudicialAuthority, 87 J Crim L & Criminol 633, 645 (1997). See also

Joshua Dressler, UnderstandingCriminal Law 68 (LexisNexis 3d ed 2001).
62

Dressler, Understanding CriminalLaw at 542 (cited in note 61).

63 Patterson,432 US at 198, quoting NY Penal Law § 125.25(1)(a) (McKinney 1975).
64

Patterson,432 US at 210.

65 Id at 221-25 (Powell dissenting) (deriding the Court's jurisprudence concerning affirmative defenses as indefensibly "formalistic").
66 See, for example, Joshua Dressler, Kent Greenawalt, Criminal Responsibility, and the
Supreme Court: How a Moderate Scholar Can Appear Immoderate Thirty Years Later, 74 Notre
Dame L Rev 1507, 1515 (1999); Linda S. Eads, From Capone to Boesky: Tax Evasion, Insider
Trading,and Problems of Proof,79 Cal L Rev 1421,1469 n 243 (1991).
67 Patterson,432 US at 202-03,211.

68 See, for example, Commonwealth v Webster, 59 Mass 295, 304 (1850) (requiring a murder
defendant to prove heat of passion when the prosecution proves intentional killing).
69 See, for example, Martin v Ohio, 480 US 228, 233 (1987) (upholding a placement of the
burden on defendant to prove the elements of self-defense).
70 I take this to be the Court's point when it opines that a state need not place on the government the burden of proving mitigating facts as to which "proof would be too difficult." Patterson, 432 US at 207.
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through affirmative defenses designated as such, with the caution that
"there are obviously constitutional limits beyond which the States
may not go in this regard.""
In one important respect, Mullaney and Patterson were simpler
than later cases. Both involved ancient categories -murder and manslaughter- immediately recognizable to any lawyer as separate
"crimes." If pressed to articulate why the two categories are meaningfully distinct, the Mullaney and Patterson litigants might have pointed
to differing mental states or the obvious fact that "murder" carried
different and more severe consequences than "manslaughter," but in
neither case was there a need to think very hard about what precise
differences in definition or consequences made each category a separate "crime." Everyone accepted without question that the difference
between murder and manslaughter was a matter requiring pleading,
proof, and jury resolution.
B.

McMillan v Pennsylvania

McMillan, decided in 1986, was the first case to raise squarely the
question of how to recognize "crimes" and "elements" when the bundle of facts that generates the defendant's penalty range has no special
name and is not immediately recognizable as a separate "crime." Dynel McMillan was convicted in a jury trial of the felony of aggravated
assault" which carried a maximum ten-year sentence." At sentencing,
the government asked the judge to apply Pennsylvania's Mandatory
Minimum Sentencing Act," which required imposition of a five-year
minimum term when the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant "visibly possessed a firearm" during the
commission of specified offenses.75 McMillan argued that because
proof of visible possession raised the minimum sentence applicable to
aggravated assault alone, visible possession became an element of a
separate and more serious crime and, under Winship, had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Id at 210.
477 US at 82. McMillan's appeal was consolidated with those of three other similarly
situated defendants. Id.
73
Id at 87.
74 Id at 82.
75 Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act, 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 9712 (Purdon 1982). See
71
72

also McMillan,477 US at 81 n 1.
76
McMillan, 477 US at 87-88.
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The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that a fact triggering a
mandatory minimum sentence is not an element, but a mere "sentencing factor," at least so long as the required minimum is below the maximum of the otherwise applicable range." Justice William Rehnquist's
majority opinion not only gets the immediate issue-how to distinguish an element from a sentencing factor-wrong, but in the process
enshrines in precedent a tangle of fundamental conceptual errors
from which the Court has never entirely escaped.
To give Rehnquist his due, he confronted very real difficulties.
The Mullaney-Pattersontwo-step demonstrated how tricky it could be
to apply the tenets of the criminal procedure revolution even to traditional sentencing systems in which conviction under well-understood
categories like murder and manslaughter generated a broad discretionary sentencing range. McMillan was even trickier because it involved
limitations on the judge's discretion to select a sentence within a range
created by conviction of a conventionally recognized "crime." By 1986,
when McMillan was decided, unfettered judicial sentencing discretion
was in bad odor, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984" ("SRA") was on
the books, the US Sentencing Commission was hard at work writing
guidelines for federal judges, and across the country structured sentencing was the coming thing-new and intriguing, but not yet well
understood. Rehnquist did understand, correctly, that determining a
sentence in either traditional, broadly discretionary systems or the
new structured systems required finding two categories of facts, those
minimally necessary to conviction and a set of additional facts relevant only to punishment." McMillan raised the question of whether a
legislature could contract the penalty range available to a sentencing
judge without providing trial-like procedural protections for the
process of finding range-contracting facts, a question that implicated
broader questions of how to distinguish between a conviction fact and
a sentencing fact, and what procedural protections are constitutionally
required for each. A poorly considered resolution of McMillan might
either infringe on established legislative or judicial prerogatives or
preempt desirable sentencing innovations.

77 Id at 88-90.
78 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 ("SRA"), Pub L No 98-473,98 Stat 1837.
79 Rehnquist repeatedly alludes to the difference between element facts and facts relevant only
to sentencing. See, for example, McMillan, 477 US at 92-93 (noting that in arriving at a sentence judges
consider the "circumstances" of an offense, but insisting that the Court has never required that proof of
those circumstances or other "related" facts surpass the reasonable doubt threshold).
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In McMillan, Rehnquist cautiously pursued the double objective
of preserving constitutional space both for traditional, broadly discretionary, sentencing systems and for emerging sentencing mechanisms
that use post-conviction factfinding to guide judicial discretion. To
protect traditional sentencing systems, he reaffirmed the Court's endorsement of statutes conferring broad judicial sentencing discretion
with approving references to Williams v New York," and to the fact
that "[s]entencing courts have traditionally heard evidence and found
facts without any prescribed burden of proof at all."" To shield structured sentencing innovation, Rehnquist upheld Pennsylvania's mandatory minimum statute. He first invoked Patterson'steaching that, when
faced with the question of whether a fact is an element, the Court
should generally defer to legislative definitions of crime,"' and he emphasized that the Pennsylvania legislature "expressly provided that
visible possession of a firearm is not an element.," Rehnquist was
nonetheless bound to acknowledge that legislative characterizations
are not definitive because "there are constitutional limitations to the
State's power" to define crime," and thus was obliged to decide the
question of whether Pennsylvania exceeded those limitations in the
present case.

a 337 US 241, 250-52 (1949) (upholding as constitutional sentencing systems in which
judges impose sentences within the range set by the crime of conviction as an exercise of discretion without formal findings of fact subject to any burden of proof). One might also fairly surmise that Justice Rehnquist rejected Justice Stevens's proposed rule that if a fact will "give rise
both to a special stigma and to a special punishment," it "must be treated as a 'fact necessary to
constitute the crime' within the meaning of our holding in In re Winship," in part because its
imprecise terms were open to the construction that any fact relied upon by a judge to justify a
higher sentence than he would impose in its absence would have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See McMillan,477 US at 103 (Stevens dissenting).
81 McMillan, 477 US at 91.
8
This institutional deference was particularly congenial to Justice Rehnquist in cases
involving state statutes because of his affinity for a revitalized federalism. Id at 85 (emphasizing
that Pattersonrests in part on the premise that "preventing and dealing with crime is much more
the business of States than it is of the Federal Government"). For Justice Rehnquist's views on
federalism, see generally Marci A. Hamilton, What Is Rehnquist Federalism?,155 U Pa L Rev
PENNumbra 8 (2007), online at http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/09-2006/Hamilton.pdf
(visited Dec 11, 2009); Richard A. Epstein, The Federalism Decisions of Justices Rehnquist and
O'Connor: Is Half a Loaf Enough?, 58 Stan L Rev 1793 (2006); Ann Althouse, Chief Justice
Rehnquist and the Search for JudiciallyEnforceable Federalism, 10 Tex Rev L & Pol 275 (2006).
8
McMillan, 477 US at 85.
8

Id at 86.
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1. Crimes, elements, directionality, and the centrality of judicial
discretion.
The petitioners in McMillan argued that the distinguishing feature of the Pennsylvania statute is that a fact found by a mere preponderance completely removes the sentencing court's discretion to impose

any sentence less than the minimum five years." Rehnquist rejected
their argument by baldly mischaracterizing it. He wrote:
Petitioners apparently concede that Pennsylvania's scheme
would pass constitutional muster if only it did not remove the
sentencing court's discretion, i.e., if the legislature had simply directed the court to consider visible possession in passing sentence. We have some difficulty fathoming why the due process
calculus would change simply because the legislature has seen fit
to provide sentencing courts with additional guidance.6
To describe a flat prohibition on judicial imposition of a particular range of punishment as "guidance" to judges is willful torture of
the English language. To "guide" a judge is to seek to influence his
choices among options he has the legal power to choose. Placing absolute outside limits on the range of punishments a judge has the legal
power to impose is not providing "guidance," but is instead making
positive law. Indeed, the legislative correlation of designated facts to
hard limits on judicial sentencing power is-or ought to be-what we
mean by defining a crime, a point that becomes clear if one focuses on
what the penalty section of a criminal statute does.
No criminal statute is self-executing. Legislatures write statutes
that condition the imposition of penalties on the existence of certain
facts. But legislators neither find facts nor impose sentences. Judges
and juries perform those roles. At bottom, all criminal penalty statutes
are nothing more than conditional, fact-activated authorizations to
judges telling them what penalties they may and may not impose." In
effect, a criminal statute says to judges, "If facts A, B, and C are found,
you are authorized to impose any punishment within the range Y to Z,
85 Id at 92. The Court did not disagree with petitioners' characterization of the statute.
Justice Rehnquist wrote in the second paragraph of his opinion that "[tihe Act operates to divest

the judge of discretion to impose any sentence of less than five years for the underlying felony." Id

at 81-82 (emphasis added).
86 Id (emphasis added).
In systems with back-end release mechanisms, administrative bodies like parole boards
8
may be granted the power to ameliorate the severity of the judge's initial sentencing pronouncement, but this does not change the basic relationship of criminal penalty statutes to judicial sentencing power.
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but you are not authorized to impose any punishment outside of that
range." The essence of the authorization does not change if the statute
prescribes only a single penalty, or requires rather than permits the
judge to impose a penalty within the authorized range. What matters
is the statute's correlation of certain facts with hard limits on judicial
sentencing power.
Therefore, a sensible core definition of a "crime" would be "a
bundle of facts that, once proven, establishes hard limits on judicial
sentencing discretion." Rehnquist may have rejected this definition
because it seems in tension with Winship, Mullaney, and Patterson.

Winship holds that the government must prove every "element" of a
"crime" beyond a reasonable doubt. - In both Mullaney" and Patterson," heat of passion (or its absence) is plainly one of the facts that
defines the crimes of murder and manslaughter and thus sets limits on
judicial sentencing discretion, yet in Mullaney the government is required to prove absence of heat of passion, while in Patterson it is
not. Under these precedents, then, the government is apparently not
required to prove every fact in the bundle that distinguishes one
"crime" from another. Therefore, if both Winship and Patterson are to
remain good law, not all facts that distinguish one crime from another
can be "elements" for due process purposes and the term "element"
has to take on some special meaning.
The solution to this difficulty is to assign elements a directional
effect on penalties. Thus, an "element" is a fact that, when proven
alone or in combination with other facts, both sets hard limits on judicial discretion and increases the defendant's punishment. This definition reconciles Mullaney and Patterson because, in Mullaney, the ab-

sence of heat of passion was treated as a fact that changed the crime
from manslaughter to murder and so increased the maximum sentence a judge could give, while in Patterson, the presence of heat of
passion was construed to be a fact that reduced murder to manslaughter and so decreased the maximum sentence a judge could give.
Justice Stevens in dissent argued powerfully for this approach,
contending that elements are facts that either expose a defendant to
2 Rehnquist refused to
criminal liability or increase his punishment.9
acknowledge that, for purposes of identifying "elements" and allocat88 397 US at 364.
421 US at 691-92.
432 US at 216.
91 See notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
9
McMillan, 477 US at 96-98 (Stevens dissenting).
89

90
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ing burdens of proof, there is a dispositive difference between mitigating and aggravating facts." He insisted, unconvincingly, that the statute
at issue in McMillan, which increased punishment upon proof of a
designated fact, was consistent with the holding in Patterson, a case
about proving a fact that decreased punishment." But the result in
Pattersonwas supported by history and constitutional logic,95 the result
in McMillan by neither.9
Anglo-American criminal law has long placed the burden of
proving some mitigating facts on defendants," but has no history of
allowing a fact not proven by the government beyond a reasonable
doubt to increase the range of legally permissible penalties. Moreover,
as noted above, the kinds of mitigating facts the common law customarily cast as affirmative defenses (heat of passion, self-defense, insanity) were those intimately concerned with the defendant's state of
mind and thus especially hard for the government to disprove. Such
considerations simply do not apply to an aggravating fact like display
of a weapon, which does not require government disproof of a matter
uniquely within the defendant's knowledge.
These traditional patterns of Anglo-American criminal law are
entirely consistent with the basic logic of the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which erect procedural barriers when the government seeks to deprive a defendant of life, liberty,
or property." In the context of penalty-related facts, due process logic
suggests that the government should be obliged to prove a fact that, if
established, "deprives" the defendant of something in the sense of
putting him in a worse sentencing position than he occupied absent
proof of that fact. But, the government should not have to prove a fact
that improves the defendant's sentencing position.

93 Id at 84 (majority) (noting that in Patterson, "we rejected the claim that whenever a
State links the 'severity of punishment' to 'the presence or absence of an identified fact' the State
must prove that fact beyond a reasonable doubt").
94
"We believe that the present case is controlled by Patterson,our most recent pronouncement on this subject, rather than by Mullaney." McMillan, 477 US at 85.
95 See notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
96 See notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
9
Even in modern law, defendants bear the burden of production with respect to virtually
all affirmative defenses. Dressier, UnderstandingCriminalLaw at 64 (cited in note 61) ("Almost
always, the defendant has the burden of producing evidence pertaining to any affirmative defense she wishes to raise."). Defendants also bear the burden of persuasion as to some such
defenses. MPC § 2.13 (ALI 1962) (allocating the burden of proving defense of entrapment to the
defendant).
98 US Const Amend V, US Const Amend XIV.
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Rehnquist was having none of it. He grudgingly conceded that
the position of the McMillan petitioners "would have at least more
superficial appeal if a finding of visible possession exposed them to
greater or additional punishment."9 But he insisted that, even if due
process were to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt of any fact
that increases a defendant's punishment, punishment is only increased
for constitutional purposes when, as in Mullaney, the fact increases the
defendant's maximum possible punishment and not, as in McMillan,
when the fact merely narrows the range of permissible punishments
by raising the minimum required penalty." For Rehnquist and the
other members of the McMillan majority, the Pennsylvania law lacked
the feel of legislative evasion of constitutional requirements that so
agitated the Court in Mullaney and Patterson.Employing a metaphor
that would shape debate for the next twenty years, Rehnquist wrote,
"The statute gives no impression of having been tailored to permit the
visible possession finding to be a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense."''
The obvious criticism of the McMillan rule is that it accords due
process protections to determinations of facts that increase the sentence a defendant might get and no protection to determinations of
facts that increase the sentence he must get. What has not been fully
appreciated is that McMillan's rule feels wrong not only because it is
contrary to our intuitive understanding of what makes one criminal
statute more punitive than another, but because it rests on a fundamental misapprehension of the institutional roles of legislatures and
judges in the making and administration of criminal laws.
Suppose Statute A provides that, upon conviction, the judge may
impose a sentence of zero to five years in prison, while Statute B provides that the judge may impose a sentence of zero to ten years. Any
rational person would recognize Statute B as more punitive than Statute A, not simply because Statute B permits a judge to impose a high
sentence between five and ten years, but because Statute A prohibits
him from imposing such a sentence.

9

477 US at 88.

100 Id:

Petitioners' claim that visible possession under the Pennsylvania statute is "really" an element of the offenses for which they are being punished-that Pennsylvania has in effect defined a new set of upgraded felonies-would have at least more superficial appeal if a finding of visible possession exposed them to greater or additional punishment.
101 Id. See also notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
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Likewise, if Statute C provides for a sentence of zero to ten years
upon conviction, while Statute D provides a sentence of five to ten
years, any rational person would consider Statute D the more punitive
of the two. Again, it is not simply the fact that Statute C permits a judge
to impose a low sentence of zero to five years, but that Statute D prohibits the judge from imposing such a sentence. In both hypotheticals,
intuition produces the same result as careful institutional analysis-we
instinctively recognize that what makes one statute more punitive than
the other are the differences in hard limits on judicial power.
Thus, our working definition of an element can be further refined.
An "element" is a fact that, when proven alone or in combination with
other facts, (1) exposes the defendant to criminal liability; (2) sets hard
limits on judicial sentencing discretion; and (3) increases the defendant's punishment in the sense that it increases either the penalty a
judge may impose or the penalty he must impose.
In McMillan, Rehnquist's cautious determination to preserve
space for structured sentencing impelled him to reject any "bright line
rule" for identifying "crimes" and "elements,"'0 and to limit his decision to upholding the validity of the Pennsylvania statute at issue. Regrettably, remaining doctrinally noncommittal impelled the Court to
reject the arguments of the petitioners and the dissent, which had correctly identified the second and third tenets of our working definition
of an element.
2. McMillan and due process in finding sentencing factors.
The damage done by McMillan goes deeper still. The constitutional challenge posed by structured sentencing is not limited to the
question of what facts are "elements" and are thus subject to proof to
a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. In virtually all American sentencing
systems, proof of a set of elements, however defined, not only limits
available punishments, but also leaves space inside those limits within
which judges have discretion to choose among an array of punishments. As discussed in greater detail below,'" those discretionary
choices will necessarily be based on non-element facts-what Rehnquist labeled "sentencing factors.""' In traditional discretionary sentencing regimes, judicial determination of sentencing factors was attended by no due process protection because no particular fact had
102
103

Id at 91 (noting "our inability to lay down any 'bright line' test").
See notes 349-50 and accompanying text.

104

McMillan, 477 US at 86.
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any mandatory or even presumptive sentencing consequence. However, once legislatures started using structured sentencing mechanisms
to correlate non-element sentencing factors with mandatory or presumptive constraints on judicial sentencing choices within the statutory range, this presented the question of whether proof of these now
legally consequential facts should be attended by some due process
protections, even if not full jury trial rights.
In McMillan, the petitioners' fallback argument was that, even if
"visible possession of a firearm" was a sentencing factor rather than
an element, due process should nonetheless require proof by the
heightened standard of clear and convincing evidence (rather than the
preponderance standard dictated by Pennsylvania law) for a fact that
would raise a defendant's minimum sentence. 05 Rehnquist not only
rejected petitioners' claim, but in doing so seemed to reject the principle that sentencing factors could ever be subject to heightened due
process protection.'" This was a critical turn. I describe below how the
Court could have combined Sixth Amendment jury trial protections
for properly defined elements and enhanced due process protections
for sentencing factors to create a constitutional regime more intellectually coherent and more practically useful than what they have given
us.ln For now, it is sufficient to note that when Rehnquist categorically
rejected the option of some enhanced due process (at least for sentencing factors legally correlated to constraints on judicial sentencing
discretion), he moved the Court away from considering sentencing
factfinding as a due process problem with a variety of possible practical solutions and towards a binary understanding of sentencing as a
Sixth Amendment choice -a fact commands either full jury trial rights
or no constitutionally based procedural rights at all.

105 Id at 91-92.

106 Justice Rehnquist cited Williams, 337 US 241, for the proposition that "[slentencing
courts have traditionally heard evidence and found facts without any prescribed burden of proof
at all." McMillan, 477 US at 91. He went on to observe that "embracing petitioners' suggestion
that we apply the clear-and-convincing standard here would significantly alter criminal sentencing, for we see no way to distinguish the visible possession finding at issue here from a host of
other express or implied findings sentencing judges typically make on the way to passing sentence." Id at 92 n 8.See also Williams, 337 US at 246.
107 See Part V.B.
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The Effect of McMillan on Subsequent Cases
1. United States v Almendarez- Torres and Californiav Monge.

The distorting effects of McMillan began to emerge in 1998, in
United States v Almendarez-Torres." In the dozen years since McMil-

lan, there had been important changes in both the American legal environment and in the Court's membership. Structured sentencing mechanisms of various kinds had become common in state and federal
courts. For both trial and appellate judges in the federal system, the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, adopted in 1987, had become an everpresent feature of daily life. At the Supreme Court, the panel which
decided Almendarez- Torres included two critical new players, Justices
Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer.
Justice Scalia joined the Court in the fall of 1986,0' the term after
McMillan was decided. Justice Scalia is a brilliant originalist, a textualist, always on the hunt for simple tests to resolve complex constitutional issues, and is often aggressively, even contemptuously, uninterested in the systemic consequences of the simple rules he espouses.no
He has never been a fan of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, having
filed a caustic dissent from the Court's ruling upholding the constitutionality of the Guidelines in Mistretta v United States."'

By contrast, Justice Breyer, who joined the Court in 1994,H2 is an
administrative law specialist with a nuanced and evolutionary philosophy of constitutional interpretation."' He is tolerant of complexity
and ambiguity in the Court's rulings,"' and acutely conscious of the
1os

523 US 224 (1998).

109 Supreme Court of the United States, The Justices of the Supreme Court *1 (2009), online

at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf (visited Dec 11, 2009).
110 One of the most striking Scalian expressions of disregard for the real-world consequences of his constitutional stylings appears in Blakely, where he writes, "[u]ltimately, our decision cannot turn on whether or to what degree trial by jury impairs the efficiency or fairness of
criminal justice." 542 US at 313. See also Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56
U Chi L Rev 1175, 1187 (1989) (suggesting that judges who do "no more than consult the totality
of the circumstances" act "more as factfinders than as expositors of the law").
111488 US 361, 413, 421, 425 (1989) (Scalia dissenting) (arguing that authorizing the US
Sentencing Commission to promulgate the Federal Guidelines is unconstitutional because the
Commission would then be "an independent agency exercising government power on behalf of
[the legislative] Branch where all governmental power is supposed to be exercised personally by
the judges of courts").
112
113

The Justices of the Supreme Court at *3 (cited in note 109).
See generally Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution

(Knopf 2005).
114 See Breyer, Active Liberty at 127-28 (cited in note 113) (noting that the "clear rules"
favored by textualist judges are both overly broad and excessively restrictive). See, for example,
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practical consequences of the Court's work.' Critically, Breyer came
to the Court after serving as a member of the first United States Sentencing Commission and thus as one of the drafters of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines."'
In Almendarez- Torres, petitioner was convicted of violating
8 USC § 1326(a), which prohibits reentering the United States after
deportation."' Violation of this section carries a sentence of up to two
years in prison."' Section (b)(2) of the same statute authorizes a term
of up to twenty years if the initial "deportation was subsequent to a
conviction of an aggravated felony.""9 Petitioner admitted his illegal
reentry and that his deportation was subsequent to three convictions
for aggravated felonies." However, he argued at sentencing that, because his prior felony convictions increased the maximum sentence to
which he was subject, they constituted "elements" of a different and
more serious crime and thus had to be alleged in the indictment pursuant to Hamling v United States."' The district court rejected his argument and imposed a sentence of eighty-five months imprisonment,m
more than triple the twenty-four-month statutory maximum of his
offense of conviction.
Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice Breyer also rejected petitioner's claim, finding that his prior convictions were not elements, but
were mere "sentencing factors" of the McMillan sort and thus need
Morse v Frederick,551 US 393,428 (2007) (Breyer dissenting in part) (noting that a bright-line rule
permitting school officials to censor student speech reasonably interpreted as advocating drug use
does not define the scope of permissible restrictions, and explaining that "school officials need a
degree of flexible authority" that is inconsistent with the judicial prescription of school disciplinary
policies); Georgia v Randolph, 547 US 103, 125 (2006) (Breyer concurring) (observing that since
"no single set of legal rules can capture the ever-changing complexity of human life," the Court's
tendency to reject bright-line rules in Fourth Amendment cases isjustified).
115 See Breyer, Active Liberty at 120-31 (cited in note 113) (advocating for consequentialist
reasoning because such reasoning "can help us determine whether our interpretations promote
specific democratic purposes and general constitutional objectives"). See, for example, Booker, 543
US at 262 (Breyer) (explaining his interpretive method for determining Congressional intent in the
sentencing statute, and concluding that the Court must "evaluat[e] the consequences of the Court's
constitutional requirement in light of the Act's language, its history, and its basic purposes").
116 Consider The Justices of the Supreme Court at *2-3 (cited in note 109); Stephen Breyer,
The FederalSentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon which They Rest, 17 Hofstra

L Rev 1, 8-31 (1988).
117 523 US at 226-27.
118 8 USC § 1326(a). See also Almendarez-Torres,523 US at 226.
119 8 USC
120

§ 1326(b)(2).

See also Almendarez-Torres,523 US at 226.

Id at 227.

121 Almendarez-Torres, 523 US at 227. See Hamling v United States, 418 US 87, 117 (1974)
(holding that a "sufficient" indictment alleges all elements of a crime because listing those elements "fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend").
122 Almendarez-Torres,523 US at 227.
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not have been alleged in the indictment.'2 ' Breyer's objective is easy to
imagine. He, like Justice Rehnquist before him, probably feared that
the wrong definition of the term "element" might endanger structured
sentencing mechanisms-like his cherished Guidelines -which

de-

pended on post-conviction judicial findings of fact to adjust sentencing
ranges both up and down. Moreover, it may be that Breyer's administrative law background makes him unusually receptive to factfinding
procedures that are less cumbersome-or, as Justice Scalia would later
say, less protective of constitutional rights24 -than a full adversarial trial. Whatever Breyer's objectives, the result in Almendarez-Torres is
wrong and the Court's reasoning dispiritingly lax.
Justice Breyer first argued, in accord with Rehnquist's approach
in McMillan, that the Court should defer to legislatures in identifying
elements of a crime, and that in 8 USC § 1326 Congress intended prior
convictions to be sentencing factors, not elements." But unlike the
New York statute in Patterson and the Pennsylvania statute in McMillan, both of which specifically stated that the fact at issue was not an
element,' § 1326 was silent on the question. Breyer's effort to find
evidence of legislative intent in a threadbare record was both labored and largely beside the point. Patterson.. and McMillan" held
that courts owe deference to clearly expressed legislative determinations that a fact is or is not an element. Neither case suggested that
legislative intent should matter when it is so obscure that it has to be
judicially invented.
Breyer's opinion is in tension with precedent in other ways.
Most notably, Pattersonis only reconcilable with Mullaney if there is a
Id at 226-27, 235.
Apprendi, 530 US at 498-99 (Scalia concurring).
125 Almendarez- Torres,523 US at 228-29.
126 Compare Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act, 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 9712(b) (providing
explicitly that the sentencing enhancement in subsection (a), a "[p]rovision[] of this section[,] shall
not be an element of the crime") with NY Penal Law § 125.25(1)(a) (defining extreme emotional
distress as an "affirmative defense" rather than defining a lack thereof as an element).
127 Justice Breyer's parsing of 8 USC § 1326 and its legislative history in Almendarez-Torres
is so strained as to be almost unreadable. The only thing plain from the relevant materials is that
Congress never gave a moment's thought to whether the penalty enhancement provisions of the
statute were elements or sentencing factors, or whether they should be alleged in the indictment,
proven to a judge or a jury, or established beyond a reasonable doubt or some lower standard.
128 432 US at 211 n 12.
129 477 US at 86.
130 For example, in Patterson,the Court justified giving the defendant the burden of proving
heat of passion on the grounds that the fact was mitigating, particularly within the knowledge of
defendant, and hard for the government to disprove. 432 US at 211 n 13, quoting People v Patterson, 347 NE2d 898, 909 (NY 1976) (Breitel concurring). In striking contrast, Almendarez-Torres
123

124

394

The University of Chicago Law Review

[77:367

constitutional difference between aggravating and mitigating factors.
In McMillan, although Justice Rehnquist refused to explicitly concede
the general principle that directionality matters, he was obliged to
admit that petitioners' case would have been stronger "if a finding of
visible possession exposed them to greater or additional punishment."... In Almendarez- Torres, Breyer evaded the obvious implication
of the differing results in Pattersonand Mullaney, ignored Rehnquist's
concession in McMillan, and then did Rehnquist one better by holding
that even a fact which increases a defendant's maximum sentence tenfold is not an element.13 According to Breyer, whether a fact is an element has no necessary relation to the effect that proving it has on a
judge's sentencing power or a defendant's sentence.
Like Justice Rehnquist before him, Breyer offered no generally
applicable test for identifying an element. He justified categorizing
prior convictions as sentencing. factors primarily on two grounds: first,
by claiming that "recidivism is a traditional, if not the most traditional,
basis for a sentencing court's increasing an offender's sentence";'33 and
second, by denying that the statute at issue amounts to improper legislative manipulation of elements to evade constitutional protections (in
McMillan's phrase, the tail wagging the dog)."
The claim that recidivism is a "traditional" ground for increasing
punishment is true, but largely irrelevant. Recidivism has commonly
been a factor judges rely on in imposing sentences, but the same is
true of all sorts of factors such as mental state, injuries to victims, or
amount of loss, which are sometimes made elements by legislatures
and sometimes not." In any event, the question is not whether judges
relieves the government of the obligation to charge and prove to a jury the defendant's prior
record-a fact that is aggravating, not specially within knowledge of defendant, and easy for the
government to prove.
131 477 US at 88. See also notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
132 Almendarez-Torres, 523 US at 245.
133 Id at 243.
134 Id at 246.
135 For example, at common law and in many modern statutes, the value of the property
taken is the decisive element distinguishing misdemeanor and felony larceny (or theft, in modern
statutes). Roger D. Groot, Petit Larceny,Jury Lenity, and Parliament,in John Cairns and Grant
MacLeod, eds, The Dearest Birth Right of the People of England 47 (Hart 2002) (describing
elements of grand and petit larceny). See, for example, MPC §§ 223.1(2)(a)-(b) (setting the
dividing line between felony and misdemeanor theft at $500). In some modern statutes, the
amount of loss now distinguishes different grades of felony larceny, or misdemeanor theft. Id
§ 223.1(2)(b) (setting the dividing line between ordinary or petty misdemeanor theft at $50). In
these cases, loss amount is plainly an "element." On the other hand, the US Sentencing Guidelines use loss as a mere sentencing factor to determine the now-advisory sentencing range for
federal economic criminals. USSG § 2B1.1(b)(1) (loss table).
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have traditionally relied upon a bad criminal history to increase a defendant's sentence, but whether a judge can increase a defendant's
sentence above the otherwise applicable statutory maximum sentence

based on criminal history if the particulars of that history are not alleged in the indictment and are found by a judge applying a standard
less than beyond a reasonable doubt.
Justice Breyer adduced no evidence that any such tradition exists.
Indeed, the authorities he cited suggest the reverse. For example, he
cited Graham v West Virginia' and Oyler v Boles"' for the proposition
that recidivism need not be alleged in the indictment in cases where
proof of a prior record would enhance a sentence, but (as Breyer admitted) the state statutes in both cases required jury determination of
disputed convictions."' To the extent these cases demonstrate any
"tradition," it is one of states recognizing that facts which increase
statutory maxima operate like traditional "elements" and therefore
must be proven to juries beyond a reasonable doubt."9
Establishing tradition rather than effect as the key to identifying
a fact as an element has the additional drawback of making the element/sentencing factor distinction vague and manipulable. And Breyer's treatment of the McMillan tail-wags-dog metaphor further obfuscates the point of that already amorphous and almost infinitely malleable standard. Breyer declares that the statute at issue is acceptable
because it does "not change a pre-existing definition of a wellestablished crime," and because Congress, in his opinion, did not intend to evade the Constitution by presuming guilt or restructuring the
elements of an offense. One might have thought that a statute providing that a post-conviction finding of fact raising the defendant's
statutory maximum sentence from two years to twenty was as good an
example of the sentencing tail wagging the conviction dog as could be
imagined. But apparently legislatures can only violate the Constitution by rearranging the anatomy of old, "traditional," "well224 US 616,624-25 (1912).
368 US 448, 452-53 (1962) (explaining both that recidivism is "essentially independent"
from guilt as to the underlying offense in "habitual criminal" cases and that due process is not
violated where facts relevant to the question of recidivism are found by a judge "in open court"
and against defendants "represented by counsel," even though state statute requires a jurydetermination of recidivism where defendants "den[y]" their identity or "remain[] silent").
136
137

138

Almendarez-Torres,523 US at 244.

Justice Scalia's dissent contributes to the doubtfulness of Justice Breyer's argument by
listing numerous cases in which state supreme courts have found that "a prior conviction which
increases maximum punishment must be treated as an element of the offense under either their
State Constitutions ... or under common law." Id at 256-57,261-62 (Scalia dissenting).
140 Id at 246. See note 134 and accompanying text.
139
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established" dogs, but are free to attach huge tails to tiny dogs so long
as the dog is a new statutory breed.
Breyer's opinion found no favor with Justice Scalia, who authored a scathing dissent joined by Justices Stevens, David Souter, and
Ruth Bader Ginsburg."' Scalia focused particularly on the conflict between the majority's result and what he takes to be the plain implication (if not the express holding) of McMillan-that facts which increase maximum sentences are elements, while facts that merely narrow the range of permissible punishments by increasing minimum
sentences are not.14 Scalia was not only dismissive of both the majority's results and its reasoning, but decried the absence of any clear
standard for lower courts to employ when trying to identify an "element."' Because he thought the question was not squarely presented
in Almendarez-Torres, Scalia took no definitive position on whether
the implication of McMillan should become a constitutional rule."
However, three months later, in California v Monge,'W he took the
plunge, opining that a fact which increases the statutory maximum
sentence is necessarily an "element" triggering constitutional pleading
and proof requirements."

Although Justice Scalia was in the minority in both AlmendarezTorres and Monge, his dissents in those cases (joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg) represent a critical juncture in the developing debate over how to define crimes and elements. While Scalia
disagreed with the outcome in Almendarez-Torres, he did so on the
basis that Breyer was deviating from what Scalia took to be the rule of
McMillan-facts that raise only minimums can be sentencing factors,
while facts that raise statutory maximums must be elements. The problem, of course, is that both McMillan and Almendarez-Torres are

wrong. In both cases, the facts at issue alter the hard statutory limits
on judicial sentencing discretion to the disadvantage of the defendant,
either by barring the judge from imposing certain low sentences or by
See, for example, Almendarez-Torres,523 US at 253 (Scalia dissenting).
"[N]o one can read McMillan ... without perceiving that the determinative element in
our validation of the Pennsylvania statute was the fact that it merely limited the sentencing
judge's discretion within the range of penalty already available, ratherthan substantially increasing the available sentence." Id at 256.
143 Id at 262.
144 Id at 258-60, 270-71. Justice Scalia argued that, because the statute in AlmendarezTorres is so unclear on the question of whether the enhancement provisions are intended by
Congress to be sentencing factors or separate crimes, the doctrine of constitutional doubt and
the rule of lenity should move the Court to construe them as separate crimes. See id.
145 524 US 721 (1998).
146 Id at 740-41 (Scalia dissenting).
141
142

2010]

How the Supreme Court Has Mangled Sentencing Law

397

permitting the judge to impose high sentences that would otherwise
be prohibited. In the decade since Monge, Justice Scalia has never seriously wavered in his allegiance to McMillan, a fact that, as we will
see, ultimately had disastrous consequences.
2. Jones v United States.
The year after Almendarez-Torres and Monge, Justice Breyer's

majority was already beginning to crack. In Jones v United States,"' the
Court considered the question of whether the federal carjacking statute-which imposed a fifteen-year sentence for conviction of the offense simpliciter, and more severe sentences if serious bodily injury or
death resulted-was one offense with two sentence-enhancing factors
that could be proven to a judge to a preponderance, or three separate
crimes the elements of which must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."s The Court, in an opinion by Justice Souter, found that
it was the latter.49
Formally, Souter's opinion broke no new ground. He based the
outcome on statutory interpretation, concluding that Congress intended the construction he placed on the carjacking law. But the crux
of the opinion was Souter's conclusion that a contrary reading would
raise serious doubt about the constitutionality of the statute."D As he
put it, "It is at best questionable whether the specification of facts sufficient to increase a penalty range by two-thirds, let alone from
15 years to life, was meant to carry none of the process safeguards that
elements of an offense bring with them for a defendant's benefit."15 1
As tentative as this statement seemed, it turned Almendarez- Torres
upside down. There, Justice Breyer had assembled five votes for an
opinion in which he vigorously denied that the constitution required
designating a sentence-enhancing fact as an element or even that the
issue posed a serious constitutional question." In Jones, Justice Clarence Thomas, who had voted with Breyer in Almendarez-Torres,
switched sides. Although Jones decided nothing definitively, its prevailing coalition of Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Stevens, Scalia, and
147

526 US 227 (1999).

148 Id at 229-31. See also 18 USC
149 Jones, 526 US at 236.

§2119.

150 Id at 239 ("[W]here a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave
and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by other of which such questions are avoided,

our duty is to adopt the latter."), quoting United States Attorney General v Delaware & Hudson

Co, 213 US 366,408 (1916).
151 Jones, 526 US at 233.
152 See note 132 and accompanying text.
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Thomas-an unlikely alliance of the Court's most conventionally liberal and conventionally conservative members-would control the
Court's sentencing cases for the next decade.'53
3. Apprendi v New Jersey.

The Jones majority wasted little time. The very next term, the
Court decided Apprendi v New Jersey. The case arose when Charles
Apprendi, Jr, was charged in New Jersey state court with a bundle of
felony firearms charges for shooting at the house of his AfricanAmerican neighbors.'" He pleaded guilty to three of these charges.'
The prosecution dismissed the rest, but pursuant to the plea agreement,
reserved the right to seek an enhanced sentence based on the New Jersey hate crimes statute.'" This statute provided that the sentencing judge
could impose a sentence greater than the statutory maximum sentence
of the crime of conviction if he found by a preponderance of the evidence, in a hearing held after conviction, that the crime was motivated
by racial bias.' The judge accepted the plea. The government sought the
enhanced sentence. The judge held a lengthy hearing, found racial bias,
and imposed a sentence higher than the statutory maximum for the
count on which the sentence was imposed.
The Supreme Court split 5-4, aligning exactly as it had in Jones,
and found a violation of Apprendi's rights under the Due Process
153Jones is interesting, as well, in that the separate concurrences of Stevens and Scalia
presage their enduring disagreement over whether a fact increasing a minimum sentence must
be an element. Compare Jones, 526 US at 252-53 (Stevens concurring) (advocating for a rule
treating as elements not only those facts that increase the statutory maximum penalty but those
"that increase the minimum as well") with id at 253 (Scalia concurring) (declining to resolve the
constitutional question in this case, but noting his belief that criminal defendants are constitutionally entitled to a jury adjudication of those "facts that alter the congressionally prescribed
range of penalties").
154 530 US at 469.
155 Id at 470.

156 "[T]he State reserved the right to request the court to impose a higher 'enhanced' sentence on count 18 (which was based on the December 22 shooting) on the ground that that
offense was committed with a biased purpose, as described in [NJ Stat Ann] § 2C:44-3(e)." Apprendi,530 US at 470.
157NJ Stat Ann § 2C:44-3(e) (West 2000), repealed by An Act Concerning Bias Crimes,
2001 NJ Laws 443 § 8.
158Apprendi, 530 US at 470-71. The sentence was lower than the maximum sentence the
defendant could have received had the court stacked the unenhanced maxima of the counts of
conviction. The government argued that this fact made the outcome harmless error, but the
Supreme Court disagreed. The judge imposed the sentence on a single count, and the imposed
sentence was higher than the unenhanced maximum sentence available for that count. Hence,
the error was not harmless. Id at 474 (explaining that the bias enhancement "convert[ed] what
otherwise was a maximum 10-year sentence" for the firearm count "into a minimum sentence").
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of trial by jury. Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, held
that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."...
Stevens not only left Almendarez-Torres intact," but declined to overrule McMillan's holding regarding mandatory minimum sentences."
Justices Scalia" and Thomas added concurrences, Thomas arguing that
the necessary implication of the Court's ruling was abandonment of
both Almendarez- Torres and McMillan.'" Both Justices O'Connor'6
and Breyer wrote dissents.

Justice Stevens's majority opinion is a peculiar production, constantly on the verge of announcing a clear principle with a clear theoretical rationale, and just as constantly muddying the waters with a
qualifier, an odd turn of phrase, or a refusal to follow the argument to
its obvious conclusion. Stevens began with a brief argument from Anglo-American legal history, contending that during the period of the
Founding, judicial sentencing power was directly linked to pleading
and proof to a jury of legally prescribed facts.'" Stevens followed his
history lesson with a revisitation of the Court's cases from Winship to
Monge.1 His essential (and I think irrefutable) contention is that, if
Winship's due process guarantee, and by extension the Sixth Amendment jury trial right at issue in Apprendi, are to have any meaning, the
term "element" must be defined primarily in terms of effect on punishment severity and judicial sentencing power.
Id at 490.
Id at 489-90.
Apprendi, 530 US at 487 n 13 ("We do not overrule McMillan."). See also text accompanying note 77.
162 Id at 498-99 (Scalia concurring) (arguing that the Sixth Amendment "has no intelligible
content" without the right to have a jury find "all the facts which must exist in order to subject
the defendant to a legally prescribed punishment"). See also note 124.
163 Apprendi, 530 US at 499 (Thomas concurring). Justice Thomas's opinion is in many
respects the best of the Apprendi menagerie. Professor Stephanos Bibas has suggested that, based
on its structure, it was originally written as a majority opinion. Stephanos Bibas, Back from the
159

160
161

Brink-The Supreme Court Balks at Extending Apprendi to Upset Most Sentencing, 15 Fed Sent Rptr

(Vera) 79, 81 (2002) ("Thomas's dissenting opinion is unusual in including a facts section, which
suggests that it may have been a draft majority opinion until it lost Justice Scalia's vote.").
164 Apprend, 530 US at 523 (O'Connor dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, Breyer, and Kennedy).
165 Id at 555 (Breyer dissenting, joined by Rehnquist).
166 Id at 482-83 (emphasizing the "historic link between verdict and judgment and the consistent limitation on judges' discretion to operate within the limits of the legal penalties provided").
Justice Thomas's concurrence augments Stevens's historical argument with a lengthy disquisition on
American law from the founding to the Civil War. Id at 499-520 (Thomas concurring).
167 Id at 484-90.
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The problem with Stevens's opinion is its waffles. First, Stevens
emphasized repeatedly that elements are facts that set limits on judicial sentencing discretion.'" Yet he declined to overrule AlmendarezTorres, a case in which a judge-determined fact dramatically expanded
the judge's sentencing authority. Although he labeled AlmendarezTorres "a narrow exception" to the general rule announced in Apprendi, he justified it by repeating Breyer's. diversionary claim that
recidivism is a "traditional" basis for increasing sentences,'69 and by
noting (not once, but twice) that recidivism is a fact that relates not to
the offense, but to the offender."o The result is to cast doubt on what
seemed to be Stevens's primary point-that elements are to be identified by their effect on the limits of judicial sentencing power-and to
lay false trails that would distract commentators, and some of his fellow justices, for years."
Second, despite leaving Almendarez- Torres standing, Stevens finally prevailed on the basic point he made in dissent in McMillan -there is
a constitutional difference between aggravating and mitigating facts,
and the Constitution attaches procedural protections to the proof of
facts that increase a defendant's punishment. 2 Unfortunately, Stevens
then artfully obfuscated what is meant by increasing a defendant's
punishment. Stevens's personal views on the point had been clear
since McMillan: a fact increases a defendant's punishment, and is thus
an element, if it increases the defendant's sentencing "range" by raising either the maximum punishment a judge might impose or the minimum punishment a judge must impose." If this view is right, then a
168 Apprendi, 530 US at 483 n 10 ("The judge's role in sentencing is constrained at its outer
limits by the facts alleged in the indictment and found by the jury.").
169 Id at 488.
170 Id at 488, 496 (rejecting New Jersey's reliance on Almendarez-Torres
because,
"[w]hereas recidivism 'does not relate to the commission of the offense' itself, New Jersey's
biased purpose inquiry goes precisely to what happened in the 'commission of the offense')
(citations omitted).
171 For example, the offense-offender distinction has piqued the interest of academics,
see
Douglas A. Berman and Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible,4 Ohio St J Crim L 37,55-57
(2006), and the interest of at least one Supreme Court justice, see Cunningham v California,549 US
270,297 (2007) (Kennedy dissenting) (noting that judicial determination is appropriate for "factors
exhibited by the defendant" and that these factors would include "prior convictions; cooperation or
noncooperation with law enforcement; remorse or the lack of it; or other aspects of the defendant's
history bearing upon his background and contribution to the community").
172 Apprendi, 530 US at 490. See McMillan, 477 US at 96 (Stevens dissenting).
173 477 US at 95-104 (Stevens dissenting) (arguing that there is no danger of
a legislature
passing legislation that allows suspects to prove mitigating circumstances by a mere preponderance of the evidence, but that it is very conceivable to imagine a legislature passing laws to relieve its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt); Jones, 526 US at 253 ("[I]n my view, a
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fact that raises a mandatory minimum sentence must be an element
and McMillan was wrongly decided. Yet Stevens expressly declined to
overrule McMillan.'

This forbearance might be explained by the fact that Apprendi
did not specifically raise the issue of minimum sentences, but it is clear
that more than judicial incrementalism was at work. On the one hand,
Stevens not only left McMillan intact, but pointedly intimated that
considerations of stare decisis might "preclude reconsideration" of its
holding on minimum sentences.' On the other hand, Stevens summarized Apprendi's holding in this notably odd passage:
Other than the fact of prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. With that exception, we endorse the rule set forth in the
concurring opinions in [Jones]: "[lit is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal de-

fendant is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt."..
What makes this passage odd is the juxtaposition of a first sentence narrowly limiting Apprendi's reach to facts that increase statutory maximum sentences with a second sentence endorsing a "rule"
concerning facts that increase a "range of penalties." Given that a
"range" necessarily has both a top and a bottom, Stevens's general
rule certainly seems inconsistent with McMillan's survival.
The explanation for all these elaborate head fakes in McMillan
seems plain: Stevens needed Justice Scalia's vote to maintain a 5-4
majority. Justice Scalia agreed with Stevens about facts that trigger
increases in maximum sentences, but in 2000, when Apprendi was being decided, he had not (and has not to this day) receded from his embrace of McMillan in his Almendarez- Torres dissent.'" So, to keep Scaproper understanding of this principle encompasses facts that increase the minimum as well as
the maximum permissible sentence.").
174 Apprendi, 530 US at 487 n 13.
175

Id.

Id at 490, quoting Jones, 526 US at 252-53 (emphasis added). See text accompanying
notes 147-53.
177 Scalia had been signaling that he and Stevens were not in accord on the definition of an
element since Jones. There, Stevens filed a concurrence emphasizing that, as a constitutional
matter, facts that increase a defendant's range of penalties are elements, and that this principle
includes facts that increase maximum sentences, those that increase minimum sentences, and
those that trigger the death penalty. Jones, 526 US at 253 (Stevens concurring). Scalia filed a sepa176
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lia in the tent, Stevens limited the specific holding of Apprendi and
made conciliatory noises about McMillan, while at the same time articulating a general rule that would reverse McMillan if Scalia could be
brought around.
The dissents by Justices O'Connor and Breyer are disappointing.
They are both actuated by the fear (entirely reasonable as it turned
out) that Stevens's approach would hamstring the beneficial reforms
of the structured sentencing movement."' But they provide no persuasive counter to the majority's arguments and no useful alternative to
its rule. Justice O'Connor nitpicked Stevens's and Thomas's historical
analysis,'" but as Justice Thomas pointedly observed, offered no historical evidence of her own.O She argued that the majority's conclusion is a
departure from the Court's own precedent,"' but the only prior decision
involving non-capital sentencing with which Apprendi really conflicts is
Justice Breyer's ineffectual effort in Almendarez-Torres."' As for Justice
Breyer, his Apprendi dissent correctly points out the manifold difficulties posed by the majority's rule, but is so insensitive to the institutional
roles and constitutional values at issue that he seems to suggest there is
no constitutional difference between facts a judge relies upon to determine a sentence within a legislatively designated range and facts specified in a statute as controlling the extent of the range.13

rate concurrence saying the same thing, with the conspicuous omission of Stevens's embellishment
on the meaning of "range." Id (Scalia concurring). In Apprendi, Scalia filed a concurrence which
concludes by asserting that the constitution guarantees "the right to have a jury determine those
facts that determine the maximum sentence the law allows." 530 US at 498-99 (emphasis added). In
addition, Scalia joined Parts I and II, but not Part III, of Justice Thomas's concurrence. Part III was
Thomas's conclusion that Almendarez- Torresand McMillan should be overruled.
178 See Apprendi, 530 US at 549-52 (O'Connor dissenting); id at 565 (Breyer dissenting).
179 Justice O'Connor quibbles with Justice Stevens's quotation to a particular treatise, id at
526-27, and denigrates Justice Thomas's reliance on nineteenth-century case law as evidence for
the meaning of the term "element" at common law at the time of the founding. Id at 528.
1a Apprendi, 530 US at 502 n 2 (Thomas dissenting).
181 Id at 529-39.
182 Justice O'Connor's best argument from precedent rests on Walton v Arizona, 497 US
639 (1990), in which the Court upheld against a Sixth Amendment challenge the Arizona practice of requiring that a judge determine whether a capital murder defendant should receive the
death penalty based on a weighing of post-conviction judicial findings of aggravating and mitigating facts. Id at 679. She is right that Walton is irreconcilable with Apprendi, but by 2000 the
Court's capital sentencing jurisprudence had diverged so far from its rulings in non-capital contexts that the point had little impact. Recognizing the force of her argument, the Court overturned Walton in Ring v Arizona, 536 US 584, 589 (2002) (holding that "capital defendants ... are

entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in
their maximum punishment").
183 Justice Breyer described his "basic problem with the Court's rule" as follows: "A sentencing
system in which judges have discretion to find sentencing-related factors is a workable system and
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Ultimately, the biggest defect in the dissents is that they offer no
useful definitions of "crime" or "element" and no cogent account of
how the Sixth Amendment jury trial right and Winship's guarantee of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements of a crime are to be
implemented in a country with fifty-plus sentencing systems boasting
every conceivable combination of discretionary judicial sentencing,
modified determinate sentencing, post-conviction sentence enhancements, mandatory minimums, and several varieties of more- and lessbinding sentencing guidelines. By sticking doggedly to a position that
is historically unsustainable and invites dilution of constitutional protections, the dissenters effectively exclude themselves from a discussion of how to balance the Constitution with the procedural innovations they want to preserve.
Conversely, the fatal flaw in Stevens's majority opinion was the
failure to take seriously the very real problem of how the Constitution
should treat facts that influence judicial sentencing choices within the
range bounded by the statutory maximum and minimum. Stevens
quite properly emphasized the importance in defining an "element" in
terms of the restrictions it placed on judicial sentencing discretion. But
he denigrated the concept of a "sentencing factor". and blithely insisted that Apprendi did not affect judicial sentencing discretion within
ranges.m Yet he knew judges had to find facts as a precondition of an
intelligent exercise of discretion within range, and he knew that some
structured sentencing schemes use post-conviction judicial factfinding
to place varying degrees of constraint on that discretion. Because he
never grappled squarely with the subtler problems presented by structured sentencing, or even admitted their existence, he could not draw
the dissenters into his majority (or even into a meaningful dialogue)
and he had to make his devil's bargain with Scalia. The result was a confusing opinion, pregnant with the potential for future mischief

one that has long been thought consistent with the Constitution; why, then, would the Constitution
treat sentencing statutes any differently." Apprendi, 530 US at 559 (Breyer dissenting).
184 See id at 494 (referring to "the constitutionally novel and elusive distinction between
'elements' and 'sentencing factors"').
185 See id at 481 ("We should be clear that nothing in this history suggests that it is impermissible for judges to exercise discretion-taking into consideration various factors relating both
to offense and offender-in imposing judgment within the range prescribed by statute.").
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III. AFTER APPRENDI:THE COURT LOSES ITS WAY IN
HARRIS AND BLAKELY
A.

Harrisv United States

The seeds of mischief planted in Apprendi began to sprout in
Harris v United States." Harris involved a challenge to a federal fire-

arms statute that imposed a five-year minimum sentence for using or
carrying a firearm during a drug offense or violent crime,M but increased the mandatory minimum to seven years if the firearm was
"brandished."... The defendant claimed that, per Apprendi, the section
raising the mandatory minimum from five to seven years upon proof
of brandishing described an element of a separate, more serious,
crime. The government maintained that brandishing was a mere sentencing factor permissible under McMillan.'
The Supreme Court ruled 5-4 for the government." The key vote
was cast by Justice Scalia, who joined Justices Anthony Kennedy,
Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Breyer-the four dissenters in Apprendi.
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy framed the question squarely, "The principle question before us is whether McMillan stands after
Apprendi."M He answered the question equally squarely-with a
yes 2-but his justifications for that answer are serpentine and unconvincing. Kennedy argued that because the Constitution and historical
usage permit legislatures to give judges sentencing discretion within
designated ranges, and allow judges to exercise that discretion based
on facts not subject to trial-like procedural protections,"' then the
Constitution must also permit legislatures to set a floor on the ranges
within which judicial discretion may be exercised, also based on facts

536 US 545 (2002).
18 USC § 924(c)(1)(A)(i).
188 18 USC § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Under either subsection, the maximum possible sentence
remained the same.
186

1

189 Harris; 536 US at 551.
19 Id at 548, 568.

550.
Id at 557.
193 Kennedy characterized McMillan's result as stemming from "certain historical and
doctrinal understandings about the role of the judge at sentencing," and contended that because
nineteenth-century criminal statutes commonly provided judges with sentencing discretion
within a permissible range, statutory limits on the range of sentencing are also in accordance
with the Constitution. Harris, 536 US at 558 ("Judicial fact finding in the course of selecting a
sentence within the authorized range does not implicate the indictment, jury-trial, and reasonable doubt components of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.").
191 Id at
192
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not subject to trial-like proceduralprotections.'9 That simply does not

follow. There is a categorical difference between granting authority to
judges to exercise discretion and setting the boundaries within which
that discretion is to be exercised. Indeed, Kennedy seemed to endorse
just this view when he wrote, "Read together, McMillan and Apprendi
mean that those facts setting the outer limits of a sentence, and of the
judicial power to impose it, are the elements of the crime for the pur-

poses of the constitutional analysis."'
Yet somehow, for Kennedy, a fact that sets a hardfloor on judicial
power to impose sentences does not count. He said, "If the facts
judges consider when exercising their discretion within the statutory
range are not elements, they do not become as much merely because
legislatures require the judge to impose a minimum sentence when
those facts are found-a sentence the judge could have imposed absent

the finding."" The implication is that such statutes do not materially
alter the position of either judges or defendants. But, of course, nothing could be further from the truth. Legislatures pass mandatory minimum statutes, judges dislike them, and defendants dread them not
because they re-empower judges to impose an already available sentence at or above the designated minimum, but because they prohibit
judges from imposing any lower sentence. A mandatory minimum
statute is neither a redundancy nor a grant of additional judicial power, but a restriction of-in Kennedy's own phrase, an "outer limit"
on-that power.
Kennedy seems so painfully conscious of the weakness of his argument that, like Justice Rehnquist in McMillan,' he blurs the line
between regulating or guiding judicial discretion and eliminating it
altogether. His crowning effort is this passage:
If the grand jury has alleged, and the trial jury has found, all the
facts necessary to impose the maximum, the barriers between
government and defendant fall. The judge may select any sentence within the range, based on facts not alleged in the indictment or proved to the jury-even if those facts are specified by
the legislature and even if they persuade the judge to choose a
much higher sentence than he or she otherwise would have im-

See id at 662.
195Id at 567 (emphasis added).
196 Id at 560 (emphasis added).
197 See notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
19
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posed. That a fact affects the defendant's sentence, even dramatically so, does not by itself make it an element.*9
The suggestion that a statute imposing a mandatory minimum sentence "persuades" judges to "choose" the sentence it makes legally
mandatory is a risible mischaracterization.
Kennedy is no more successful in dealing with Apprendi's adoption of the principle that facts increasing a defendant's punishment are
constitutionally different than facts that decrease it.'" As he effectively
concedes, a fact triggering an increased minimum often imposes a
greater disadvantage on the defendant than a fact triggering an increase
in the permissible maximum."' In the end, unable to formulate a coherent effects-based distinction between elements and non-elements that
would accommodate the result he wanted, Kennedy simply repudiated
the very idea that elements can be identified by their effects on either
judicial discretion or outcomes for defendants.
Having eschewed effects, Kennedy intimated that his preferred
result has something to do with the notice function of criminal statutes, proclaiming, "The Fifth and Sixth Amendments ensure that the
defendant 'will never get more punishment than he bargained for
when he did the crime,' but they do not promise that he will receive
'anything less' than that."2 But he never explains why the Fifth
Amendment Due Process and Indictment Clauses require a defendant
to be put on notice of the sentence he might get, but not of the sentence he must get. Nor does he explain what notice has to do with determining Fifth Amendment burden of proof standards or Sixth
Amendment jury trial rights.
A good many observers have expressed puzzlement over Scalia's
vote in Harris.3 But, as we have seen, Scalia's position remained con198

Harris,536 US at 566 (emphasis added).

199 Apprendi,530 US at 486.
200 Harris,536 US at 566.

Kennedy wrote:
Why, petitioner asks, would fairness not also require [facts triggering mandatory minimum
sentences] to be alleged in the indictment and found by the jury under a reasonable doubt
standard? The answer is that because it is beyond dispute that the judge's choices of sentences within the authorized range may be influenced by the jury, a factual finding'spractic-

201

al effect cannot by itself control the constitutionalanalysis.

Id at 566 (emphasis added).
2
Id at 566, quoting Apprendi, 530 US at 498 (Scalia concurring).
203

See, for example, Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum:Judges, Prosecutors and the Exer-

cise of Discretion, 117 Yale L J 1420, 1495 n 329 (2008) (noting with apparent wonderment that
only Justice Scalia was able to reconcile Apprendi and Harris); Benjamin J. Priester, The Canine
Metaphor and the Future of Sentencing Reform: Dogs Tails and the ConstitutionalLaw of Wag-

2010]

How the Supreme Court Has Mangled Sentencing Law

407

sistent, from his dissents in Almendarez-Torres and Monge through his
carefully worded concurrences in Jones and Apprendi. He has never
deviated from the rule he derived from McMillan-facts that increase
maxima are elements, facts that increase minima are not. The effect of
Scalia's bulldog tenacity (or unreasoning intransigence, depending on
your point of view) was successive exercises in judicial logrolling. In
Apprendi, Stevens secured Scalia's vote by waffling on the fate of
McMillan. In Harris, Kennedy brought Scalia aboard by writing an
opinion purporting to reconcile Apprendi and McMillan, an opinion
so intellectually indefensible that Justice Breyer could bring himself to
concur only by disavowing its logic and reiterating his view that Apprendiwas wrongly decided."
B.

The Court Finally Confronts Guidelines: Blakely v Washington

One of the peculiarities of the McMillan-Harrissequence is that
much of the debate in these cases was plainly driven by their potential
0 yet
effect on guidelines and other structured sentencing systemsm
none of these cases involved such systems. Every case from McMillan
in 1986 to Harrisin 2002 involved a statute in which a legislature designated a fact or bundle of facts that, once proven, set a range with
hard limits outside of which a judge could not sentence, but within
ging, 60 SMU L Rev 209, 233-34 (2007) (explaining the "Scalia conundrum" by arguing that
Scalia believes that any sentence beneath the maximum, regardless of how it is determined is a
"windfall to which the defendant has no constitutionally cognizable entitlement"); Avery Bryce
Pardee, Are Booker and Blakely FatalBlows to Judicial Fact-Findingfor Mandatory Minimums

or Will Harris v. United States Go On Singing?, 32 Thurgood Marshall L Rev 27,41 (2006) (remarking that, "Justice Scalia's shift from writing the Court's decision in Apprendi to being a
silent member of the Harris majority was surprising"); Bibas, 15 Fed Sent Rptr (Vera) at 80-81
(cited in note 163) (proposing that Scalia was present in the Harris majority because Kennedy's
opinion was specifically tailored to three principles Scalia likes: limits on judicial discretion,
historical analysis, and a bright-line rule providing notice to defendants).
204 Harris,536 US at 569 (Breyer concurring in part and concurring in the judgment):
I cannot easily distinguish Apprendi ... from this case in terms of logic. For that reason, I
cannot agree with the plurality's opinion insofar as it finds such a distinction.... I continue
to believe that the Sixth Amendment permits judges to apply sentencing factors-whether
those factors lead to a sentence beyond the statutory maximum . . . or the application of a
mandatory minimum.
205 See, for example, McMillan, 477 US at 86 (pointing out that "we should hesitate to conclude that due process bars the State from pursuing a chosen course in the area of defining
crimes and prescribing penalties"); Apprendi, 530 US at 544 (O'Connor dissenting) (noting that
the Court's decision could apply to all "determinate-sentencing schemes"); Harris,536 US at 570
(Breyer concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (pointing out that "[aipplying Apprendi in this case would not, however, lead Congress to abolish, or to modify, mandatory minimum sentencing statutes").
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which a judge could exercise discretion." These were, in short, the
easy cases. Yet the Court emerged from them with a series of logically
discordant holdings and no accepted theory about how to define
"crimes" and "elements." When the justices finally faced the more subtle constitutional problems presented by sentencing systems that
sought to regulate the exercise of judicial discretion within the ranges
generated by findings of traditional elements, they were crippled by
the absence of a shared intellectual framework.
Blakely v Washington, decided in June 2004, involved a challenge
to the Washington State Sentencing Guidelines. In Washington, a defendant's conviction of a felony rendered him legally subject to a sentence within the upper and lower boundaries set by the statutory minimum and maximum sentences for the crime of conviction; m however,
the judge's decision about what sentence to impose within those boundaries was constrained by the Washington State Sentencing Guidelines." These statutory guidelines were similar to (though simpler than)
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. They were based on a "sentencing
grid." 9 The horizontal axis measured criminal history and the vertical
measured offense seriousness.2 o Following conviction, the judge identified the value on the vertical axis corresponding to the offense of conviction and also determined the defendant's "offender score" by finding the number and type of his prior convictions." The intersection of
these two values on the grid produced a "standard range" expressed in
months. By statute, the standard range became the "presumptive sentence."212 However, the judge had the "discretion" to impose a sen206 One might argue that Apprendi was an exception to this categorization. But the New
Jersey hate crimes statute in Apprendi was overturned precisely because it purported to allow a
judge to sentence outside the hard upper limit set by the separate New Jersey firearms statutes
to which defendant pled guilty. See text accompanying notes 155-59.
207 Wash Rev Code Ann § 9A.20.021 (West 1998). Some Washington offenses were subject
to mandatory minimum sentences. Wash Rev Code Ann § 9.94A.505 (West) (setting minimum
sentences for certain homicides and sex offenses); Wash Rev Code Ann § 9.92.090 (West) (setting minimum terms for habitual offenders).
208 Washington Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, recodified at § 9.94A.310-320 (West)
(mandating, on the facts of the offense in Blakely, a sentence between forty-nine and fifty-three
months). See also Blakely, 542 US at 299 (summarizing the sentence Ralph Howard Blakely, Jr,
was mandated to receive under the Washington Sentencing Reform Act).
2
Washington Sentencing Guidelines Commission, Adult Sentencing Guidelines Manual
1997 1-2 table 1 (1997).
210 Id.
211 Wash Rev Code Ann § 9.94A.360 (West 1998), recodified at § 9.94A.525 (West). See also
generally State v Ammons, 713 P2d 719 (Wash 1986) (discussing the determination of defendant's
criminal history at sentencing hearing).
212 Wash Rev Code Ann § 9.94A.370 (West 1998), recodified at § 9.94A.530 (West).
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tence above or below this range (an "exceptional sentence"),213 but not
outside the statutory minimum or maximum, so long as he found, "con-

sidering the purpose of [the Act], that there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence."'. The Act provided
lists of aggravating and mitigating factors that would justify exceptional sentences, 215 but emphasized that these lists are "illustrative only
and are not intended to be exclusive reasons for exceptional sentences."... The judge's exercise of discretion in imposing an exceptional
sentence was reversible on appeal only if "clearly erroneous."217
Blakely was convicted of second degree kidnapping, which, by statute, carried a maximum sentence of ten years."' Under the Washington
guidelines, the kidnapping conviction, plus a special jury finding that
Blakely committed the crime with a firearm which triggered a thirty-six
month sentence enhancement, plus a judicial determination that Blakely had an offender score of two, generated a "standard range" of fortynine to fifty-three months. However, the judge also found that Blakely
had committed the crime with "deliberate cruelty," a factor enumerated
Wash Rev Code Ann § 9.94A.390 (West 1998), recodified at § 9.94A.525 (West).
Wash Rev Code Ann § 9.94A.120 (West 1998), recodified at § 9.94A.505 (West) (mandating that "whenever a sentence outside the standard range is imposed, the court shall set forth
the reasons for its decision in written findings of fact and conclusions of law").
215 Wash Rev Code Ann § 9.94A.390(2) (West 1998), recodified at § 9.94A.525(2) (West)
(stating aggravating factors); Wash Rev Code Ann § 9.94A.390(1) (West 1998), recodified at
§ 9.94A.525(1) (West) (stating mitigating factors).
216 Wash Rev Code Ann §9.94A.390(1) (West 1998), recodified at § 9.94A.525(1) (West).
217 Wash Rev Code Ann § 9.94A.210(4) (West 1998), recodified at § 9.94A.585(4) (West)
(stating that a sentence outside the sentence range can only be reversed upon finding that "the
reasons supplied by the sentencing judge are not supported by the record," that those reasons do
not justify an enhanced sentence, or that the sentence was "clearly excessive or clearly too lenient"). See, for example, State v Gore, 21 P3d 262,277-79 (2001) (holding that "vulnerability" is
one of the statutory suggestions for an "exceptional sentence," and holding that a factual finding
concerning the small size of a rape victim can establish vulnerability despite the fact that it is not
specifically listed in the statute), citing Wash Rev Code Ann § 9.94A.210(4) (West 1998), recodified at § 9.94A.585 (West).
218 See Wash Rev Code Ann § 9A.40.030 (West 1998) (defining the crime of second degree
kidnapping and classifying it as a Class B felony); Wash Rev Code Ann §9A.20.021(1)(b) (West
1998) (specifying the maximum punishment for a Class B felony as imprisonment for a term or
ten years, a fine of $20,000, or both).
219 See Wash Rev Code Ann §9.94A.320 (West 1998), recodified at § 9.94A.515 (West)
(classifying the seriousness for second degree kidnapping as level five); Wash Rev Code Ann
§ 9.94A.310(1), box 2-V (West 1998), recodified at § 9.94A.510 (West) (mandating the standard
range of thirteen to seventeen months); Wash Rev Code Ann § 9.94A.310(3)(b) (West 1998),
recodified at § 9.94A.510(3)(b) (West) (mandating the thirty-six-month firearm enhancement).
See Wash Rev Code Ann § 9.94A.310(3)(f) (West 1998), recodified at § 9.94A.510 (West) (describing a "firearm enhancement" as "[p]ossession of a machine gun, possessing a stolen firearm,
drive-by shooting, theft of a firearm, unlawful possession of a firearm in the first and second
degree, [or] use of a machine gun in a felony").
213

214
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in the guidelines that permitted imposition of a sentence above the
standard range," and imposed a sentence of ninety months. In an opinion by Justice Scalia, joined by the other members of the Apprendi
gang-Justices Thomas, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg-the Supreme
Court found that imposition of the exceptional sentence violated the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury.222
The three defects in Justice Scalia's majority opinion can be
summarized concisely: First, the majority erred by conceiving of the
Washington guidelines as presenting only a narrow Sixth Amendment
jury trial problem, rather than an intersection of Sixth Amendment
and procedural due process issues. Second, even if only the Sixth
Amendment were at issue, Scalia found in the Washington sentencing
regime a problem it did not have. Third, he then tried to fix the nonexistent problem with a simplistic formula whose implications he had
not fully considered.
1. The missing due process analysis in Blakely.
It is important to emphasize both what the Washington legislature was trying to accomplish with its guidelines and the simplicity,
modesty, and rationality of its remedy. The legislature and its sentencing commission sought a solution to the problem of judicial arbitrariness inherent in systems in which conviction confers on judges unfettered power to select penalties within broad statutory sentencing
ranges. They were trying to balance competing imperatives of ensuring
sentencing consistency- treating similarly situated offenders similarly-and of preserving discretionary judicial authority to account for
defendant individuality. After considerable intelligent work, the legislature approved simple guidelines that codified the commonsense notion that the ordinary or average offender ought to get a sentence
roughly in the middle of the statutory range for the crime he committed, and that when deciding whether to go above or below that middle,
judges should treat commonly occurring aggravators and mitigators in
a consistent way. To assure procedural fairness, the guidelines limited
the judge to consideration of facts admitted by the defendant, proven
at trial, or proven by the government at the sentencing hearing by a
220 See Wash Rev Code Ann § 9.94A.390(2)(h)(iii)
(West 1998), recodified at
§ 9.94A.535(2)(h)(iii) (West) (describing the aggravating circumstances related to domestic

violence as including an ongoing pattern of abuse, the sight or sound of the abuse occurring in
the presence of the offender's minor children, and "deliberate cruelty").
221 See Blakely,542 US at 298.
222 Id at 313-14.
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preponderance of the evidence.m At the same time, by conferring on
judges complete discretion to select sentences within the guidelines
range and leaving them substantial discretionary authority to sentence
outside the prescribed ranges based on factors unenumerated in the
guidelines, Washington provided room for adjustment of this norm in
individual cases.
The Supreme Court looked at this system and saw only a legislative effort to limit defendants' Sixth Amendment jury rights and, not
incidentally, to limit judicial sentencing power. The Court failed to
take account of the fact that standardless, and therefore arbitrary, exercise of judicial power over individual liberty is itself a problem of
constitutional dimension. Traditional discretionary sentencing arrangements that empower a sentencing judge to choose among a
range of disabilities from probation to decades in a cell, without requiring an evidentiary hearing, a reasoned explanation of the choice,
or substantive appellate review, are in tension with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' requirements that the state shall take neither life
nor liberty without due process of law. 4 It is true that in Williams v
New York, the Supreme Court upheld wholly discretionary judicial
sentencing against a procedural due process challenge.2' However, it
did so based on the historical claim that American judges had exercised such standardless power since the early days of the Republic226
and the assertion that imposition of due process protections would
impede the operation of "the prevalent modern philosophy" of individualized rehabilitative sentencing.
It is one thing to say, as Williams did, that deference to tradition
and a prevailing rehabilitative model of sentencing makes it permissible
for a legislature to create a highly discretionary sentencing scheme. It is
another thing altogether to suggest that the Constitution prohibits due
process limitations on judicial sentencing power, or that legislatures
may not try to solve procedural deficiencies through legislation. And
where a legislature creates a system that attaches sentencing weight to
specific facts, albeit not the same weight it attaches to elements, ordinary due process analysis suggests heightened procedural protections
should certainly be permitted, and perhaps ought to be required.2
223
224
225
226
227

Wash Rev Code Ann §9.94A.370(2) (West 1998), recodified at § 9.94A.530(2) (West).
US Const Amend V; US Const Amend XIV.
See notes 23 and 80.
Williams, 337 US at 245-46.
Id at 247-48.

228 See Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 335 (1976) (identifying three factors that determine the applicable level of due process: (1) the private interests affected by the proceeding,
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In Blakely, another of Justice Rehnquist's McMillan chickens
came home to roost. McMillan seemingly ruled out the possibility of
applying flexible due process standards to within-range sentencing
factors, which left Scalia, and indeed the entire Court, trapped in Sixth
Amendment analysis. Either the facts triggering increases in Washington guideline ranges were elements requiring jury proof or they were
nothing of constitutional consequence. Justices O'Connor and Breyer,
in dissent, bewailed the fact that Blakely's result had the perverse effect of diminishing the due process rights afforded Washington criminal defendants.22 But even they failed to recognize the need to combine Sixth Amendment and Due Process Clause analysis to form a
coherent theory distinguishing between those facts that must be tried
to a jury, those that trigger heightened due process protections because they channel judicial discretion within statutory ranges, and
those as to which no special protections apply.
2. Justice Scalia in the Sixth Amendment vise.
In Blakely, having no hammer but the Sixth Amendment, Justice
Scalia convinced himself that the Washington sentencing guidelines
looked like a nail. He held that the Court was "require[d]" to vacate
Blakely's sentence by the rule of Apprendi: "Other than the fact of a
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
jury, and proved beyond a reasopable doubt."2 3 But Blakely's sentence
presented no necessary conflict with the Apprendi rule because, before Blakely, "statutory maximum sentence" was generally understood
to mean the maximum sentence a statute defining a crime allowed a
judge to impose, regardless of the number or severity of aggravating
facts found by the judge post-conviction.m Indeed, we know that this is
(2) the risk of error created by the state's chosen procedure, and (3) the countervailing government interest supporting the use of the challenged procedure). See generally Richard Singer and
Mark D. Knoll, Elements and Sentencing Factors:A Reassessment of the Alleged Distinction, 12

Fed Sent Rptr (Vera) 203, 204-05 (2000) (discussing the application of enhanced burdens of
proof in criminal sentencing).
229 Blakely, 542 US at 316-17 (O'Connor dissenting); id at 343-44 (Breyer dissenting).
23o Id at 301, quoting Apprendi, 530 US at 490.
231 It seems clear, for example, that Justice Stevens understood the term in just this way
when writing the Apprendi opinion. He denigrates the distinction between "elements" and "sentencing factors," but is at pains to observe that the term "'sentencing factor' ... appropriately
describes a circumstance, which may be either aggravating or mitigating in character, that supports a specific sentence within the range authorized by the jury's finding that the defendant is
guilty of a particular offense." Apprendi, 530 US at 494 n 19. While Stevens's language is ambiguous
enough to accommodate the later Blakely holding, a more natural reading is that he recognized and

2010]

How the Supreme Court Has Mangled Sentencing Law

413

precisely how the Washington legislature understood the term because
it specified in its Sentencing Reform Act that, "If the presumptive sentence duration given in the sentencing grid exceeds the statutory maximum sentence for the offense, the statutory maximum sentence shall be
the presumptive sentence."m' Thus, until Blakely was decided, the "prescribed statutory maximum" for the Class B felony of second degree
kidnapping to which Blakely pleaded guilty was the maximum sentence
of ten years prescribed for Class B felonies by the Washington legislature. 3 And Blakely was sentenced to a term less than ten years.
Not only was Blakely's particular sentence consistent with the
plain language of the Apprendi rule, but the Washington guidelines
system as a whole exhibited no necessary conflict with the vision of
the Sixth Amendment Justice Scalia articulated in Blakely. According
to Justice Scalia, the principle upon which Blakely rested was the constitutional imperative of giving "intelligible content to the right of jury
trial," a right that "is no mere procedural formality, but a fundamental
reservation of power in our constitutional structure." What Scalia
presumably meant by this ringing encomium was that juries, not
judges, should find the facts that set the legal boundaries on criminal
punishments (with the qualification imposed by McMillan and Harris
that the jury right extends only to facts that set the upper legal boundary of punishment). One should, therefore, be able to recognize a
sentencing scheme that violates Scalia's Sixth Amendment jury right
by one of two signs-either (a) it confers on judges the power to impose, based on a post-conviction judicial finding of fact, a higher sentence than would formerly have been possible, or (b) it deprives juries
of the authority to decide sentence-enhancing facts that were previously within their province.
Neither form of Sixth Amendment transgression was present in
Blakely. In Apprendi, the constitutional flaw in the challenged hate
crime statute was its grant to judges of the power to impose a longer
sentence than allowed by the separate statute he was convicted of violating, based on a post-conviction finding of racial motivation. The
Washington guidelines granted judges no such power. A Washington
defendant convicted of second degree kidnapping was exposed to no
greater penalty after the guidelines were passed than before. The
accepted the propriety of identifying aggravating and mitigating facts that provide legal support for
judicial assignment of a sentence high or low in a statutorily authorized range.
232 Wash Rev Code Ann § 9.94A.420 (West 1998), recodified at § 9.94A.599 (West).
233 Wash Rev Code Ann § 9A.20.020(1)(b) (West 1998).
23
Blakely, 542 US at 305-06.
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guidelines merely formalized the common sense proposition that a
court should sentence a typical offender in roughly the middle of the
statutory range generated by conviction unless it articulates fact-based
reasons for sentencing above or below the middle. Likewise, no sentence-affecting fact that was committed to juries before the guidelines
was withdrawn from them by the guidelines. In short, the Washington
guidelines neither granted judges additional sentencing power, nor
deprived juries of power they formerly possessed.
To be fair to Justice Scalia, this test for Sixth Amendment transgression is essentially historical. That is, it assumes the structured sentencing regime at issue is an overlay on a preexisting system with already-defined statutory crimes correlating to established statutory
sentencing ranges, thus permitting an easy before-and-after comparison. Such a test would be harder to apply to a complete recodification
in which a legislature simultaneously redefined the elements of many
traditional offenses, set new sentencing ranges, and identified a separate set of sentencing factors intended to guide judicial sentencing
discretion within the new ranges. It would also be more difficult to
apply to the federal system inasmuch as the federal criminal code is
such a disorganized hodgepodge that the Federal Guidelines
amounted to a de facto recodification of federal criminal law.' A
comparative historical rule therefore might be seen as leaving the
door open to legislative evasion, although as Justice Stevens rightly
observed in Apprendi, there are "structural democratic constraints" on
blatant legislative alterations of traditional criminal law norms.Moreover, a purely historical test would impose an implicit, and arguably unjustifiable, limitation on the legislative power to define crimes
by suggesting that significant deviation from traditional definitions of
crime is constitutionally suspect. Thus, while historical analysis suggests that the Washington sentencing guidelines presented little or no
threat to the Sixth Amendment interests the Court sought to protect,
Scalia was not wrong in seeking a test for identifying "crimes" and
"elements" that set constitutional limits on legislative authority re-

235

Stith and Cabranes, Fear of Judging at 148 (cited in 25). See also Frank 0. Bowman, III,

The 2001 Economic Crime Sentencing Reforms: An Analysis and Legislative History, 35 Ind L

Rev 5, 12-23 (2001) (describing the disarray in federal economic crime statutes and the effort by
the US Sentencing Commission to impose structure through the Guidelines mechanism).
23 Apprendi, 530 US at 490 n 16. See also Blakely, 542 US at 322 (O'Connor dissenting)
("The pre-Apprendi rule of deference to the legislature retains a built-in political check to prevent lawmakers from shifting the prosecution for crimes to the penalty phase of lesser included
and easier-to-prove offenses.").
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gardless of whether the legislature was amending an old regime or
writing on a clean slate.
Scalia's attempt at such a generally applicable test required constructively amending the Apprendi rule by redefining "statutory maximum sentence" to mean something it had never meant before. Justice
Scalia decreed that "the 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is
the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the
7
facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant."m

As many have observed (beginning with Justice O'Connor in dissentn), Scalia's rule is weirdly asymmetrical and absurdly formalistic.
As often as this feature of Blakely has been remarked upon, the familiarity conferred by the passage of years should not be allowed to obscure its surpassing oddity. The broad principle that supposedly actuates Blakely is that juries, not judges, should find the facts that set
the legal boundaries on criminal punishments.3 Yet Scalia's rule does
not apply to facts that establish or increase minimum sentences,240
those that reduce maximum or minimum sentences,241 or those relating
to criminal history.m Thus, many of the facts that determine how much
time a defendant must serve, and many that determine how much he
may serve, need never be considered by a jury.
Moreover, Scalia's rule leaves odd gaps that invite legislatures to
draft around Blakely to keep sentence-affecting facts away from juries
and in the hands of judges. For example, Justice Breyer noted in his
dissent that the legislature could decree that all defendants are presumptively subject to the statutory maximum sentence absent proof of
mitigating factors, and guidelines could be written to work downward
from the presumptive maximum.24 Alternatively, Blakely would be
satisfied by guidelines identifying facts that, when found by a judge
post-conviction, triggered presumptive minimum, but not maximum,
sentences below the statutory maximum sentence. Because the maximum sentence in such a regime would always be the statutory maximum, the Blakely rule would not be implicated.
237

Blakely, 542 US at 303.

Id at 321 (O'Connor dissenting) ("[I]t is difficult for me to discern what principle besides doctrinaire formalism motivates today's decision.").
23 See note 230 and accompanying text.
240 See Harris, 536 US at 568-69 (2002).
241 See Blakely, 542 US at 339-40 (Breyer dissenting).
242 See Almendarez-Torres, 523 US at 226-27.
243 Blakely, 542 US at 339-40.
244 For a further description of this possibility, and references to various critiques of it, see
Frank 0. Bowman, III, Memorandum Presenting a Proposal for Bringing the Federal Sentencing
238
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Other methods of drafting around Blakely can be easily devised.
For example, the Washington guidelines themselves only fall foul of
Scalia's rule due to the fortuity that, as written, they assign a convicted
defendant to a "standard range" based purely on the fact of conviction,
without any other post-conviction judicial finding of fact.24 Consequently, Scalia can characterize the conviction as having generated a maximum sentence (the top of the standard range), which cannot legally be
exceeded absent post-conviction judicial factfinding. However, the
Washington legislature might just as easily have written the guidelines
to say: (1) conviction exposes a defendant to the entire range of punishments within the statutory minimum and maximum sentences; and
(2) the defendant will be assigned a guideline range somewhere inside
the statutory limits only after a set of post-conviction judicial findings
regarding aggravating and mitigating factors.2* So long as there was no
guideline range to which a defendant could be assigned based on the
conviction alone, then no post-conviction judicial finding of a nonelement fact necessary to assigning a guideline range would increase
the potential maximum sentence higher than it stood at the moment of
conviction. In short, the Washington legislature could have kept exactly
the same system voided in Blakely, with exactly the same distribution of
sentencing authority between legislature, judge, and jury, if they had
only thought to word it differently.
Even given the new rule, the Blakely majority need not have read
Washington's Sentencing Reform Act in a way that created a constitutional issue. Whether Scalia's rule applies to any given sentencing regime depends entirely on what one takes to be the original position of
a defendant at the moment he is convicted of a crime under that reGuidelines into Conformity with Blakely v. Washington, 16 Fed Sent Rptr (Vera) 364, 367-68
(2004); Frank 0. Bowman, III, Train Wreck? Or Can the FederalSentencing System Be Saved? A

Plea for Rapid Reversalof Blakely v. Washington, 41 Am Crim L Rev 217,262-63 (2004).
245 Actually, the judge must make post-conviction findings regarding the defendant's criminal history to determine his standard range, but this was decreed constitutionally permissible
under Almendarez-Torres. See 523 US at 243-44.
246 Washington might have said that, upon conviction, the defendant was eligible to be
sentenced to any punishment up to the statutory maximum, but that, before sentencing, the court
must examine non-element facts relating to offense and offender to determine whether a defendant
should be assigned to the "low," "middle," or "high" range. The guidelines would specify particular
facts as indicative of each status, and contain rules for assigning ranges. The only difference between
this hypothetical system and the real one would be the requirement of a post-conviction affirmative
finding of enumerated non-element facts indicating suitability for the "middle range," as opposed to
an automatic relegation to the "standard range" upon conviction. Since only a post-conviction
finding of non-element facts would place the defendant in the "middle range," and that range would
have a presumptive maximum less than or equal to the statutory maximum, as would the low and
high ranges, such a regime would seemingly not violate Blakely.
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gime. In Washington, Scalia's rule applies if the original position of a
defendant is that his conviction legally entitles him to a sentence no
higher than the top of the presumptive standard range created by the
guidelines, an entitlement that can only be disturbed by proof of certain non-element facts. But if the original position is that the defendant's conviction exposes him to punishment anywhere within the
entire statutory range, and that the presumptive standard range
created by post-conviction application of the guidelines operates as a
restriction on judicial discretion that can never increase his legal maximum sentence and usually reduces his presumptive maximum sentence, then Scalia's rule should not come into play.M
One can view the Washington sentencing scheme as falling into
the first category-if you cock your chin at the proper angle and
squint your eyes just so-but the second better describes both what
the Washington legislature intended and what it achieved. Its object in
passing guidelines (in common with the designers of virtually all other
sentencing guidelines systems around the country) was not to create
new crimes with new elements triggering different statutory penalty
ranges, but to structure discretionary judicial sentencing choices within
the existing ranges for the old crimes!" Yet given a choice between
(a) an interpretation of Washington law that gave legal terms their accepted meanings, embodied the legislature's intent as clearly articulated
in the statute and manifested in its effects, and would have sustained the
Washington sentencing scheme as constitutional, and (b) a completely
novel interpretation uncompelled by the text which required a tortured
redefinition of a well-understood term of art, the Blakely majority
opted to torture the statute into unconstitutionality.

247 Dissenting in Rita v United States, 551 US 338,387-90 (2007) (Souter dissenting), Justice
Souter recognized precisely this point, but justified the result in Blakely on the questionable
ground that, had the Court decided otherwise, legislatures might "bypass Apprendi by providing
an abnormally spacious sentencing range for any basic crime . . . then leaving it to a judge to
make supplementary findings not only appropriate but necessary for a sentence in a subrange at
the high end." Justice Souter justified both a strained reading of the Washington statute and a
very odd formalistic rule, not to prevent a present evil, but to prevent future legislatures from
enacting a statute aimed at getting around the Court's formalistic rule.
248 The Washington Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 states that its "purpose ... is to make
the criminal justice system accountable to the public by developing a system for the sentencing
of felony offenders which structures, but does not eliminate, discretionary decisions affecting
sentencing." Wash Rev Code Ann § 9.94.010 (West).
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3. Why Blakely? The determinative influence of the Federal
Guidelines experience.
Viewed in isolation, the Court's decision to rule as it did in Blakely is nearly incomprehensible. Why would five justices strain so hard
to craft a silly rule to overturn a sensible state sentencing system? A
big part of the answer is surely that, while Justice Rehnquist was at
pains in his 1986 McMillan decision to maintain constitutional space
for the novelty of structured sentencing,249 by 2004, structured sentencing was commonplace and in the minds of federal judges had become
conflated with the Federal Guidelines and their characteristic set of
problems. It is revealing that the second question posed (by Justice
O'Connor) during the Blakely oral argument was, "Well, I assume that
if your position were adopted it would invalidate the Federal sentencing scheme that we have."m Indeed, it is fair to conclude that Blakely
was, at bottom, never about Washington law, but was primarily driven
by attitudes shaped by the Court's encounters with the federal sentencing system. As explained next, the Federal Guidelines era conditioned federal judges to associate structured sentencing with legislative and executive assaults on judicial power, acute manifestations of
the "tail wags the dog" problem, and very high sentences.
a) The federal experience and judicialperceptions of the relationship between structured sentencing and judicial power. All forms of

structured sentencing shift power away from judges and toward the
legislatures and sentencing commissions who make sentencing rules
and the prosecutors who control proof of the facts upon which the
application of the rules depends."' Nonetheless, the degree of both the
actual and perceived power shift varies tremendously depending on
the structured system a jurisdiction adopts, and on the prior experiences and settled expectations of its judges. A detailed comparison
of the Federal Guidelines and the many state variants of structured
sentencing reform is beyond the scope of this Article, but it is plain
that the changes in federal sentencing that began with the Sentencing

See notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
Oral Argument of Jeffrey L. Fisher on Behalf of Blakely, Blakely v Washington, No 021632, *3 (Mar 23, 2004) (available on Westlaw at 2004 WL 728362) (noting that counsel responded to Justice O'Connor's question by arguing that Washington's system is distinct from the federal system because Washington's system is a series of legislative mandates, while the federal
system is a system of court rules).
251 See Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural
Analysis, 105 Colum L Rev 1315,1318 (2005).
249
250
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Reform Act were, and were perceived by federal judges to be, more
profound than anything experienced in the states.
In the pre-SRA world, federal judges enjoyed virtually unchecked authority to impose sentences anywhere within the minimum
and maximum sentences associated with the crime(s) of conviction."'
In 1984, the SRA abolished parole and created the US Sentencing
Commission.- The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 19865 (ADAA) increased
drug penalties across the board, and most importantly, created an unprecedentedly tough quantity-based regime of mandatory minimum
sentences for most illegal drugs.26 In 1987, the Commission promulgated, and Congress approved, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.2
With this sequence of enactments, Congress and the US Sentencing
Commission erected the most complicated, fact-dependent, and restrictive set of sentencing mechanisms ever devised. Although the new
regime never came as close to stripping judges of all discretion as the
Guidelines' harshest critics sometimes claimed m the interlocking
mesh of mandatory minimum statutes and binding guidelines placed
real, detailed constraints on judicial sentencing authority. Moreover,
everyone involved in federal sentencing policy understood that limiting judicial discretion was not merely the regrettably unavoidable incident of a rationalizing reform. Rather, one of the avowed objectives
of federal sentencing reform was to limit the power of sentencing
judges and thus to impose law on the assertedly lawless realm of sen-

See text accompanying notes 10-12.
See SRA § 218(a)(5), 98 Stat at 2027 (repealing Chapter 311 of Title 18, United States
Code, relating to parole).
254 SRA § 217, 98 Stat at 2017-26, codified at 28 USC §H 991-98 (establishing the Sentencing Commission as an independent body in the judicial branch and detailing its purposes, duties,
and powers).
255 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (ADAA), Pub L No 99-570, 100 Stat 3207 (declaring that
the Act is designed "to strengthen Federal efforts to encourage foreign cooperation in eradicating illicit drug crops and in halting international drug traffic" and "to improve enforcement of
Federal drug laws and enhance interdiction of illicit drug shipments").
256 See, for example, 21 USC § 841(b) (imposing mandatory minimum sentences for possession with intent to distribute a variety of illegal drugs).
257 See 28 USC § 994(p). For a detailed history of the approval of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, see Stith and Koh, 28 Wake Forest L Rev 223,288-89 & n 406 (cited in note 8) (noting that "no substantive hearings or detailed consideration of the Guidelines" occurred in Congress before the Guidelines came into effect).
258 See, for example, Charles J. Ogletree, Jr, The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101 Harv L Rev 1938, 1960 (1988) (arguing that the Sentencing
Commission's "obsession" with producing justice in the aggregate has severely inhibited judges'
ability to use their discretion in sentencing and that "blind justice is injustice").
252
253
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tencing.25 Particularly when the Guidelines were new, federal judges
viewed them as a direct challenge to judicial power, a challenge to
which the majority of lower courts responded by declaring them unconstitutional.m
Nonetheless, after the Supreme Court upheld the Guidelines'
constitutionality in Mistretta in 1989,6 judges learned to live with
them. Trial courts continued to struggle for at least some relaxation of
the Guidelines' strictures and for a restoration of more of their traditional discretion, a struggle that sometimes put them at odds with
Congress and the Sentencing Commission.262 However, by the mid1990s the Guidelines were settling in as an accepted, if never universally admired, feature of the federal legal landscape23 Yet even as familiarity slowly increased judicial acceptance of the Guidelines, a
complex array of factors was coming together to imperil that accep-

259 As federal judge Marvin Frankel, one of the first and most influential critics of federal
sentencing before the Guidelines, wrote, "[T]he almost wholly unchecked and sweeping powers
we give to judges in the fashioning of sentences are terrifying and intolerable for a society that
professes devotion to the rule of law." Marvin E. Frankel, CriminalSentences: Law without Order
5 (Hill and Wang 1973).
260 Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise, and Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on the

Judicial Mind:An EmpiricalStudy of Judicial Reasoning,73 NYU L Rev 1377, 1399-1403 (1998)

(finding that in 1988, 61 percent of the nearly three hundred federal judges who ruled on the
constitutionality of the Guidelines found them unconstitutional as a violation of the separation
of powers doctrine, an excessive delegation of legislative power, or on other grounds).
261 488 US at 412.
262 Ile history of the twenty-year triangular relationship between judges,
the Commission,
and Congress is too tangled for detailed recounting here. In rough outline, for some years after
the Guidelines were promulgated, the Commission was often at odds with district judges as it
sought to establish its authority. In this early contest, the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals generally backed the Commission, holding that the Guidelines were indeed legally binding.
Early in the Guidelines era, Congress stayed largely aloof from the details of Guidelines sentencing policy. The confluence of two events-the Republican takeover of the House of Representatives in 1995 and the Supreme Court's decision in Koon v United States, 518 US 81 (1996), loosening the standard of appellate review of guidelines departures-brought a marked change.
Congress began to recognize the political utility of tweaking the Guidelines to raise sentences
for the crime du jour, and Republicans in particular found it convenient to castigate as "soft"
those judges who imposed sentences below the guideline range. See notes 265-72 and accompanying text. See also David M. Zlotnick, The War within the War on Crime: The Congressional
Assault on Judicial Sentencing Discretion, 57 SMU L Rev 211, 218-20 (2004) (discussing how

Congress in the 1990s increased punishments for drug crimes).
263 One factor contributing to the increased acceptance of Guidelines among judges was the
ever-increasing proportion of judges who had known no other system. This phenomenon is even
more pronounced today. By 2008, "[s]lightly more than 90% of active federal judges were appointed after the Guidelines became effective; even including senior district judges, more than
two-thirds were appointed during the Guidelines regime." Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum:
Judges; Prosecutors;and the Exercise of Discretion,117 Yale L J 1420, 1496 n 333 (2008).
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tance and to place the judiciary once again at odds with those who
made federal sentencing policy
The interbranch tension re-escalated, slowly at first but then
more rapidly, between 1995 and 2004 as conservative Republicans
gained increasing control over Congress and the Executive. Particularly after the Bush Administration took office in 2001, the Republican Congress began producing a steady stream of legislation increasing statutory maximum penalties, adding mandatory minimum sentences, urging higher Guideline ranges on the Commission, and imposing greater constraints on judicial sentencing discretion.2 66The legislation was accompanied by ever-sharper rhetoric asserting congressional
hegemony over sentencing and attacking judges as soft on crime. The
high-water mark of this trend was the Feeney Amendment to the
PROTECT Act of 2003,m which initially sought to strip judges of virtually all power to depart below the applicable guideline range, and
even in its final form, legislatively overturned the Supreme Court's decision in Koon v United States2 9 liberalizing the law governing departures from the Guidelines,27 and directly amended the Guidelines to
restrict departures.l By 2003, the highly structured federal sentencing
system once again seemed to be infringing steadily on judicial authority
and was emerging as a major front in a broader power struggle between
2
the judiciary and the elected federal branches.72
264 For a brief description of the Sentencing Commission's composition, see Mistretta, 488
US at 368-69.
265 As a result of the 1994 midterm elections, Republicans gained control of both House
and Senate in January 1995. President George W Bush won the presidency in the 2000 election,
though the Democrats held the Senate. In the 2002 midterm elections, Republicans regained
control of both congressional chambers.
266 See Zlotnick, 57 SMU L Rev at 226-27 (cited in note 262).
267 See, for example, F James Sensenbrenner, Jr, Remarks before the US Judicial Conference Regarding Congressional Oversight Responsibility of the Judiciary (Mar 16, 2004), online
at http://judiciary.house.gov/legacy/news031604.htm (visited Dec 11, 2009) (impliedly threatening
impeachment of judges who impose "illegal" sentences).
268 Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act
of 2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub L No 108-21,117 Stat 650.
269 518 US 81 (1996).
270 Id at 95-100 (changing the standard of appellate review for Guidelines departures from
de novo to abuse of discretion, an alteration that afforded greater deference to the sentencing
judge's decision to depart and thus conferred additional sentencing discretion on the judge).
271

See generally Douglas A. Berman, Locating the Feeney Amendment in a Broader Sen-

tencing Reform Landscape, 16 Fed Sent Rptr (Vera) 249 (2004). See also United States Sentencing Commission, Report to the Congress: Downward Departures from the Federal Sentencing

Guidelines, B-31-33 (Oct 2003), online at http://www.ussc.gov/departrpt03/departrpt03.pdf (visited Dec 11, 2009).
272 See Bowman, 41 Am Crim L Rev at 260-62 (cited in note 244).
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b) The federal tail-wags-dogproblem. The year before the Feder-

al Guidelines went into effect in 1987, the Supreme Court had expressed concern in McMillan about the "tail wags the dog" problem
presented by systems in which sentencing facts rival elements in their
effect on defendants' final sentences."' The post-SRA federal system
differs from state systems in at least six ways that combine to make
the "tail wags dog" phenomenon dramatically more pronounced in
federal court.
First, federal judges must find many more sentencing facts than
state judges. Over the past twenty years, Congress and the Commission have sought to identify virtually every type of fact potentially
relevant to the imposition of a criminal sentence and make a statute
or rule about whether the sentencing judge should consider it, and if
so, how. The number of mandatory minimums and factual add-ons in
federal law has crept steadily upward. The Federal Guidelines and
accompanying commentary and policy statements started out long in
1987 and have subsequently almost doubled in size.75 No state, even
among those which have adopted guidelines systems, has attempted so
exhaustive a catalogue.
Second, only the federal system has meticulously quantified the
effect of virtually all the facts identified in its guidelines as relevant to
sentencing. The Washington and California structured systems that
were the subject of Blakely and the later case of Cunningham v Californian provide an illustrative comparison. Washington sentencing
guidelines prescribed a "standard range" of forty-nine to fifty-three
months for Blakely's crime of second degree kidnapping with a firearm.2 7 California statutes prescribed a "middle term" sentence of
twelve years for John Cunningham's conviction of sexual abuse of a
8 In both states, the sentencing judge could imchild under fourteen.m
pose a higher or lower sentence than the "standard range" or "middle
term" if he found one or more aggravating or mitigating facts, most of
2

273 477 US at 87-88.
274 Stith and Cabranes, Fear of Judging at 75 (cited in note 25).
275 Including appendices, the Guidelines in 1987 totaled 384 pages, while the Guidelines in
2007 totaled 659 pages. Compare United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual
(1987) with United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (2007).
276 549 US 270 (2007). For further discussion of Cunningham, see Part IVB.
7 The standard range for the offense of second degree kidnapping alone for someone with
Blakely's criminal history was thirteen to seventeen months, with a thirty-six month enhancement
for use of afirearm. Blakely entered a guilty plea in which he admitted both guilt of the offense and
use of the firearm. Blakely, 542 US at 299. See notes 208,218-19, and accompanying text.
278 Cunningham, 549 US at 275.
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which were enumerated in a nonexhaustive list created by the state
sentencing commission (Washington) or Judicial Council (California).m However, neither the Washington guidelines nor the California
Judicial Council rules assigned any numerical value to these facts. If
found, they permitted the judge to impose a nonstandard sentence,
but they bore no necessary or recommended quantitative relationship
to the magnitude of any departure from the standard sentence. By
contrast, the federal system assigns specific weights to most of the facts
identified in the Federal Guidelines. A finding of forty grams of powder
cocaine equates to a fourteen-level increase in offense level, while three
hundred grams generates a twenty-two-level increase.m A timely guilty
plea reduces the offense level by three,m while a finding of a minimal
role in a multidefendant offense provides a four-level reduction.M
Third, unlike all but a very few states, the Federal Guidelines not
only identify and quantify myriad sentencing facts, but they mandate
cumulation of the assigned values. To return to the Washington and
California examples, both states empowered a judge to impose a higher-than-standard sentence if he found one or more aggravating factors
enumerated in the statute. They did not, however, require, presume, or
even suggest that a judge should impose a higher sentence on a defendant with two or three aggravating factors rather than one.m And
they certainly did not attempt to quantify the precise amount by
which a case with two specified aggravators should differ from a case
with one or three. By contrast, once Federal Guidelines facts are
found, their prescribed quantitative values must be added and subtracted according to detailed Guidelines rules.m

279 See Wash Rev Code Ann § 9.94A.120(2) (West 1998), recodified at § 9.94A.505(2)
(West). Another Washington statute provided a list of "illustrative factors which the courts could
consider in the exercise of their discretion to impose an exceptional sentence." See Wash Rev
Code Ann § 9.94A.390 (West 1998), recodified at § 9.94A.535 (West). In California, the California Penal Code specified a lower, middle, and upper term for specified crimes and instructed
courts to impose the middle term "unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of
the crime." Cal Penal Code § 1170(b) (West). The California Judicial Council, pursuant to Cal
Penal Code § 1170.3 (West), adopted a nonexclusive list of circumstances in aggravation and
mitigation. Cal Ct Rules 4.421, 4.423. In California, each crime has only a single lower, middle,
and upper term. See Blakely, 542 US at 299 (explaining the Washington sentencing guidelines'
application to Blakely).
2
USSG §2D1.1(c) Drug Quantity Table.
28 USSG § 3E1.1 (acceptance of responsibility).
USSG § 3B1.2(a).
m See note 279.
2
See, for example, USSG § 3B1.1.
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Fourth, the Federal Guidelines are a so-called "modified real offense system.,,m That is, they require the sentencing judge to take into
account not only the facts of the offense(s) of conviction, but also all
"relevant conduct." Relevant conduct includes unconvicted crimes
and misconduct aided and abetted by the defendant or committed by
co-conspirators during the offense of convictions or as part of the
same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of
convictionW The judge must factor relevant conduct into his guideline
calculation so long as it is proven to a preponderance of the evidence. m Because of the difference between the preponderance standard for sentencing facts and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard
for element facts, the federal system permits judges to rely on acquitted conduct in determining a guideline sentencing range.2
Fifth, the pre-Booker Guidelines- because of their level of fac-

tual detail, the quantification of the value of sentencing facts, the required cumulation of those values, and the strong presumption
created by statute and subsequent judicial rulings that a Guideline
sentence is the correct one -bound judicial sentencing discretion into
a web of rules more tightly than any state structured sentencing system. The binding effect of the Guidelines was enhanced by the numerous (and steadily proliferating) statutory mandatory minimum
sentences that interacted with Guidelines rules.
Sixth, the Federal Guidelines system has a unique directional bias. Most state structured systems are like those of Washington and
California in that the fact of conviction alone puts the defendant presumptively in the middle of the statutory seriousness scale, with judicial findings of fact roughly equally likely to produce upward or
downward adjustments from the middle. However, under the Federal
Guidelines, conviction of the crimes most common in federal court

285

See Julie R. O'Sullivan, In Defense of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines' Modified Real-

Offense System, 91 Nw U L Rev 1342, 1349-51 (1997) (describing and defending the Guidelines'
modified real offense model). See also Herman, 66 S Cal L Rev at 311-14 (cited in note 49)
(contending that the modified real offense model contributes to the tail-wags-dog problem).
286 Conduct of co-conspirators is attributable to the defendant only if reasonably foreseeable. USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).
2
USSG § 1B1.3(a)(2).
288 See, for example, United States v Tejeda, 481 F3d 44,57 (1st Cir 2007) (rejecting the beyond
a reasonable doubt standard); United States v Grier, 475 F3d 556,561 (3d Cir 2007). But see Roger
W Haines, Jr, Frank 0. Bowman, III, and Jennifer C. Woll, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Handbook
1785-87 (West 2008) (suggesting that some courts may require a higher standard of proof when the
relevant conduct has an "extremely disproportionate effect on the sentence").
M
See United States v Watts, 519 US 148,153-54 (1997).
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produces a very low base offense levelm (or in the case of most drug
offenses no base offense level at all2), and the vast majority of judicial
findings of sentencing facts generate increases in offense level and
thus increase the prescribed sentencing range. Thus, unlike in the
states, most federal sentencing proceedings have the feel of unstructured mini-trials in which a judicial finding of virtually any of the contested facts equates to "guilt" of a more serious, and more severely
punished, grade of the offense of conviction.
These six attributes of the Federal Guidelines combined to produce a system in which conviction of a crime sometimes seemed disquietingly less important than the subsequent sentencing proceeding,
and proof of the elements of the crime less important than proof of
the Guidelines facts that generated a sentencing range. Not only did
defendants receive no jury trial on these surpassingly important sentencing facts, but the level of due process available even in the sentencing proceeding before the judge was strikingly low.
c) Sentencing process in an era of mass incarceration. Between

1974 and 2005, the number of inmates in federal and state prisons
jumped from approximately 216,000 to 2,186,230.292 In the same period, the rate of imprisonment more than tripled, from 149 inmates to
488 inmates per 100,000 population.M From 1977 to 2004, the number
of federal inmates increased sixfold, from 32,088 to 180,328.294 None of
the Supreme Court's recent sentencing process cases turns, at least
expressly, on the severity of sentences. But at least several justices are

290 For example, conviction of an economic crime sentenced under USSG § 2B1.1 (which
governs most federal theft and fraud cases) generates a base offense level (BOL) of either six or
seven. For a first-time offender, the guideline range associated with a BOL of six or seven is zero
to six months. USSG § 5A Sentencing Table.
291 USSG § 2D1.1. For further explanation of this distinction, see note 316.
292 Compare Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prevalence of Imprisonment
in the U.S. Population,
1974-2001 *2 table 1 (Aug 2003), online at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdflpiuspOl.pdf (visited

Dec 11, 2009) with Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prison and Jail Inmates at Midyear2005 *2 table 1

(May 2006), online at http//www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdflpjimO5.pdf (visited Dec 11,2009).
293 Compare Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prevalence of Impisonment at *2 table 1 (cited in
note 292) (showing that the rate of incarceration has risen dramatically from 1974 to 2001) with
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Midyear 2005 at *4 table 3 (cited in note 292) (showing that rates of
incarceration have risen steadily over ten years).
294 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prisoners under State or FederalJurisdiction, Federal and
State-by-State,
1977-2004
(Dec
2005),
online
at

http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/datacorpop02.csv (visited Dec 11, 2009). For other statistics
on recent trends in American incarceration policy, see Adam M. Gershowitz, An Informational
Approach to the Mass Imprisonment Problem, 40 Ariz St L J 47, 52-54 (2008) (observing that

between 1972 and 2003, the nation's prison population increased 500 percent).
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plainly uneasy about the punitive trend of American criminal law,"
and it is reasonable to conclude that federal judges have come to associate structured sentencing with severe sentences.
First, despite the moderate intentions of many structured sentencing pioneers,9 the simultaneous evolution of structured sentencing and a more punitive national crime policy has led many to assume
a causal relation between the two. Second, criminal justice hard-liners
have sometimes found in the procedural mechanisms of structured
sentencing an array of tools well suited to their ends. From crude devices like the mandatory minimum sentence to more complex and
subtle arrangements like the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, toughon-crime legislators recognized that structured sentencing allowed
them (or sentencing commissions acting at their behest) to craft rules
requiring, or at least strongly urging, judges to impose ever higher sentences. Third, the federal system, with Guidelines at its center, has become a one-way ratchet in which penalty levels are raised easily and
often, but lowered only rarely and with the utmost difficulty.2 Since
the advent of the Guidelines, the number of federal prisoners has exploded.298 In the states, guidelines and other structured sentencing mechanisms have sometimes been used to increase penalties, but have
also been used to focus scarce resources on the most serious offenders
and thereby to limit the expansion of prison populations.2 99 Nonethe295

See Anthony M. Kennedy, Speech at the American BarAssociation Annual Meeting (Aug

9, 2003), online at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp-08-09-03.html (visited
Dec 11, 2009) ("Our resources are misspent, our punishments too severe, our sentences too
long."); Stephen Breyer, FederalSentencing Guidelines Revisited, 11 Fed Sent Rptr (Vera) 180,

184 (1999) (expressing opposition to mandatory minimum sentences).
296 See, for example, Andrew Von Hirsch, Doing Justice: The Choice of Punishments 98-102
(Hill and Wang 1976) (advocating short but definite terms of incarceration for most crimes, and
urging structured sentencing in part because it could restrain the punitive impulses of judges).
297 See Bowman, 105 Colum L Rev at 1319-20 (cited in note 251) (explaining how the
complex structure of the Federal Guidelines system, the institutional interests of the main sentencing policy actors, and the absence of fiscal restraint at the federal level have combined to
produce the one-way upward ratchet phenomenon).
298 From 1988, the first full year in which the Guidelines were in effect, to 2005, the number
of prisoners in federal custody quadrupled from 46,714 to 184,484. Compare Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Correctional Populations in the United States, 1993 *12 table 1.10 (1995), online at

http://www.ojp.usdoj.govlbjs/pub/pdf/cpop93bk.pdf (visited Dec 11, 2009) with Bureau of Justice
Statistics, 2005 Midyear at *1 (cited in note 292).
299 See, for example, Ronald F Wright and Susan P. Ellis, A Decade of Sentencing Guidelines: Revisiting the Role of the Legislature,A Progress Report on the North CarolinaSentencing

and PolicyAdvisory Commission, 28 Wake Forest L Rev 421,422-23 (1993); Wright, 29 Crime &
Just at 39 (cited in note 13). In part because states have used structured sentencing more constructively, state guidelines systems are generally considered a qualified success. See, for example,
Reitz, Reporter'sIntroductory Memorandum at xxxi (cited in note 52).
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less, the Federal Guidelines experience has cemented the correlation
between structured sentencing and long sentences3 in the minds of
federal judges for whom the Guidelines are a daily preoccupation.
In sum, by the summer of 2004 when Blakely was decided, federal
judges, including, I suspect, those on the Supreme Court, had come to
associate the era of structured sentencing with four features: (1) a decrease in the discretionary sentencing authority of trial judges; (2) a
pervasive encroachment on federal judicial power generally by an
alliance of Congress and the Executive; (3) a perception of procedural
unfairness arising from the tail-wags-dog phenomenon; and (4) a general increase in sentencing severity.
The influence of these considerations on Blakely is not unambiguously clear. For example, while one strongly suspects that the severity concern was at least a subliminal motivator for the more liberal
justices in the Blakely majority (Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter), the one
justice who has spoken out most publicly about the length of federal
sentences, Justice Kennedy' was in dissent both in Blakely and in the
subsequent Booker decision invalidating the Federal Guidelines. And
the two other members of the Blakely majority, Scalia and Thomas,
have not been notable for their sympathy to convicted criminals."'
My sense is that some interplay of the perception that federal
judges were under siege by Congress and the Executive, and the
prominence of the tail-wags-dog problem in the federal system, did
influence some justices. To a degree now difficult to recall, by 2004,
federal judges felt themselves under relentless assault.03 And the
300 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are in such bad odor among criminal justice professionals nationally that pre-Blakely proponents of structured sentencing reforms for state systems
were forced to begin their sales pitch with an express disavowal of the Federal Guidelines and a
detailed explanation of how the federal experience is an atypical outlier among structured systems. See Michael Tonry, Sentencing Commissions and Their Guidelines,17 Crime & Justice 137,

138-39 (1993) (observing that sentencing commissioners in North Carolina, Texas, and Ohio
explicitly rejected the Federal Guidelines as a model for their own practices).
301 Kennedy, ABA Speech (cited in note 295) ("Courts may conclude the legislature is permitted to choose long sentences, but that does not mean long sentences are wise or just.").
302 Consider In re Davis, 130 S Ct 1, 2 (2009) (Scalia dissenting) ("This Court has never held
that the Constitution forbids the execution of a convicted defendant who has had a full and fair
trial but is later able to convince a habeas court that he is 'actually' innocent.").
303

See Shelley Murphy, Judge Wolf Raps Focus on Guns, Drugs in US Docket, Boston

Globe A27 (Feb 6, 2004) (reporting that Judge Mark Wolf became upset with the portrayal of
federal judges as being soft on crime); Linda Greenhouse, ChiefJustice Attacks a Law as Infringing on Judges, NY Times A14 (Jan 1, 2004) (quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist as saying that the
Feeney Amendment "could appear to be an unwarranted and ill-considered effort to intimidate
individual judges"); Ian Urbina, New York's FederalJudges Protest Sentencing Procedures, NY
Times B1 (Dec 8, 2003) (observing that numerous federal judges expressed disapproval of the
Feeney Amendment).
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Guidelines-centered federal sentencing regime really was the apotheosis of a system in which sentencing factors had come to overshadow
elements. This reality not only seemed to devalue the jury, but Congress was employing the dog-wagging Guidelines, interlocked with
proliferating mandatory minimum sentences, to disempower the judiciary in the criminal arena. The federal system felt wrong. The Court
was receptive to a rule that upended it.
Deputy Solicitor General Michael Dreeben, the superb advocate
who appeared for the United States in both Apprendi and Blakely,
argues that the Blakely decision cannot really be about substance because it neither ensures juries a significant role in deciding sentencingdeterminative facts nor effectively prevents legislatures from limiting
judicial sentencing discretion without using the jury as a factfinder.,
He suggests Blakely "is really about Justice Scalia's view of constitutional interpretation, [which] prefers tests that are grounded in constitutional text, bright-line rules, history[,] and other ways of deciding a
case that do not require judges to do much subjective thinking about
the way the Constitution works."35 But while Justice Scalia employed
his approach to constitutional interpretation to fashion the Blakely
rule, his methodological preferences cannot explain the embrace of
that rule by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter-justices who ordinarily have no affinity for Scalia's interpretive methods.3 It seems to
me more probable that those justices thought the rule generated by
Scalia's methods would solve, if perhaps imperfectly, the substantive
problems that concerned them. The fact that, as we will see, Scalia's
rule accomplished very little does not mean those who embraced it
hoped for no substantive effects. It means only that they failed to appreciate the implications of Scalia's formula.

304

Robert Weisberg, ed, Excerpts from "The Future of American Sentencing: A National

Roundtable on Blakely," 2 Ohio St J Crim L 619,627-28 (2005) (Michael Dreeben).
305 Id at 628.
3
For a detailed discussion of these justices' approaches to constitutional and statutory
interpretation, see generally Lackland H. Bloom, Jr, Methods of Interpretation: How the Supreme
Court Reads the Constitution (Oxford 2009).
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IV. THE OTHER

SHOE (FINALLY) DROPS: UNITED STATES V BOOKER
AND THE COURT'S JUDICIAL REVISION OF
FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW

A.

United States v Booker

I have told elsewhere" the story of the confusion that reigned in
federal courts in the six months between Blakely and the January 2005
decision in Booker. During the interregnum, some observers were
distressed." Others were jubilant." But all recognized that the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines seemed to violate the new Blakely rule. The
surprise in Booker was not that the same five justices who prevailed in
Apprendi and Blakely found the Guidelines unconstitutional in their
original binding form," but that the defection of Justice Ginsburg allowed Justice Breyer and the Apprendi-Blakely dissenters to fashion
the remedy for the constitutional violation." The remedial majority
transformed the Guidelines into what it deemed a constitutionally
acceptable system in two steps. First, it excised two statutory subsections-18 USC §3553(b)(1), which "requires sentencing courts to impose a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range (in the absence of circumstances that justify a departure),".. and 18 USC
§ 3742(e), which sets forth standards of review on appeal for sentences
imposed under the Federal Guidelines. Second, it substituted its own
standard of appellate review-that of "reasonableness"

-for

the stan-

dard in excised §3742(e)."'
The Booker opinions have been dissected at length.' I will not
repeat the more commonly expressed criticisms. Rather, I want to exSee Bowman, 41 Am Crim L Rev at 262-64 (cited in note 244).
See, for example, id at 264 (expressing concern that Blakely could be extended to hold
that structured sentencing is unconstitutional).
307

308

309

Nancy Gertner, Sentencing Reform: When Everyone Behaves Badly, 57 Me L Rev 569,

579 (2005) (describing the reaction of federal judges and describing one camp as the "free at
last" group).
310 Booker, 543 US at 225-44 (2005). Justice Stevens wrote the "merits" majority opinion,
joined by Justices Scalia, Souter,Thomas, and Ginsburg.
311 Id at 244-68. Justice Breyer wrote the "remedial" majority opinion, joined by Justices
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsburg.
312 Id at 259-60.
313 Id at 258-62 (holding that if Congress had been aware of the constitutional jury requirement, they would not have passed the Act in its present form).
314 Booker, 543 US at 260-62.
315 See, for example, David C. Holman, Note, Death by a Thousand Cases: After Booker,
Rita, and Gall, the Guidelines Still Violate the Sixth Amendment, 50 Wm & Mary L Rev 267,

274-77 (2008) (pointing out that it is unclear how courts will interpret the remedial requirement
of "reasonableness" review in conjunction with an advisory Federal Guidelines system, and that
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plore a point that has not hitherto been explored, which is that, read
together, the merits and remedial opinions left an opening (however
narrow) for a sensible solution of the interlocking problems of jury
rights, due process rights, and distribution of institutional sentencing
authority posed by structured sentencing systems. Sadly, in the cases
since Booker, the Court has shut the door on good sense. But we
should at least understand the opportunity lost.
The Booker merits majority is a straightforward application of
the Blakely rule. For both Freddie Booker and Ducan Fanfan, it was
possible to determine a guideline range based purely on the facts
316
found by the jury at trial, and the Federal Guidelines required a
judges may revert to pre-Booker practices of enforcing the Federal Guidelines rigidly); Graham
C. Mullen and JP. Davis, Mandatory Guidelines:The Oxymoronic State of Sentencing after United States v. Booker, 41 U Richmond L Rev 625,630-31 (2007) (noting that while the Court made
the Guidelines "advisory" and adopted a reasonableness standard of review, it did not provide
any guidance in interpreting these standards); Ronald J. Allen and Ethan A. Hastert, From Winship to Apprendi to Booker: ConstitutionalCommand or ConstitutionalBlunder?,58 Stan L Rev
195, 208 (2005) (noting that the Court's reasoning from Apprendi to Booker leads to a conclusion that the same result that was overturned in Booker as unconstitutional could be reached by
"tweaking" the sentencing system to make the statutory maximum sentence the mandatory
sentence, and then allowing judges to mitigate downwards from this statutory maximum); M.K.B.
Darmer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines after Blakely and Booker: The Limits of CongressionalTolerance and a GreaterRole for Juries, 56 SC L Rev 533, 558-65 (2005) (asserting that by
striking down the mandatory nature of the Federal Guidelines, the Court has, in essence, returned to a world of "open-ended discretion").
316 Interestingly, this need not have been the case. The Federal Guidelines designate a "Base
Offense Level" (BOL) for almost all commonly occurring federal crimes, and then add or subtract
offense levels based on facts found after conviction. See, for example, USSG § 2B1.1(a)(1) (assigning base offense levels to economic crimes); USSG §2B1.1(b) (identifying "Specific Offense Characteristics" associated with increases or decreases in offense level). The process of determining a
defendant's ultimate Guidelines range is not legally complete until the judge makes all the factual
findings called for by the Guidelines. USSG § 1B1.1 (listing the order in which the provisions of the
Guidelines Manual are to be applied). However, a sentencing range can be calculated using only
the BOL and the defendant's criminal history score. Therefore, for most federal crimes, at the moment of conviction, one can identify a range analogous to Washington's "standard range," and any
post-conviction judicial finding of fact increasing the offense level can be viewed as increasing the
Scalian "statutory maximum sentence," thus violating Blakely.
However, the main federal drug guideline, USSG § 2D1.1, has a different structure. Under
§ 2D1.1, unless the offense of conviction involves death or serious bodily injury, the fact of conviction itself generates no base offense level. Rather, the base offense level is determined by the
type and quantity of drugs attributable to the defendant. Except in cases involving drug quantities triggering simultaneous increases in both maximum and mandatory minimum sentences,
drug quantity is not charged in the indictment or found by the jury at trial, but is determined
only at the sentencing hearing after conviction. Thus, at the moment of conviction, whether by
plea or jury verdict, no guideline range can be calculated, the only ascertainable sentencing
range is the one created by statute for the crime of conviction, and the "statutory maximum
sentence," even by Justice Scalia's reckoning, is the statutory maximum sentence in its traditional
sense. Therefore, application of the drug guidelines in a great many, perhaps most, federal cases
does not offend Blakely.
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judge to find additional facts to justify a sentence above the top of
that range. Therefore, per Blakely, the Guidelines were unconstitutional as applied.' More importantly, the merits majority reaffirmed a
critical-but I think tragically mistaken-aspect of the Blakely holding: the premise that there is no constitutional difference between a
sentencing rule that imposes absolute limits on judicial sentencing
discretion and one that creates a presumptively correct sentencing
318
range from which a judge possesses discretionary authority to vary.
Justice Stevens's merits opinion emphasized that the availability of
judicial discretion to sentence outside of the applicable guidelines
range did not save the Washington guidelines from unconstitutionality,
and thus could not be invoked to preserve the federal scheme.
However, the remedial majority reintroduced the possibility of a
constitutionally acceptable sentencing scheme in which jury-found
facts ("elements") set hard outside limits on judicial sentencing authority, while judge-found facts produced Guidelines ranges with some
degree of presumptive weight.3' The SRA made the original Guidelines fairly strongly presumptive by requiring in § 3553(b)(1) that the
sentencing judge "shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the
range" determined under the Guidelines, "unless the court finds that
there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to
a degree, not adequately taken into account by the Sentencing CoinBy chance or design, the Solicitor General sought review of two drug cases that differed
from the norm. The indictments of Booker and Fanfan charged-and the jury found-threshold
amounts of drugs triggering statutory mandatory minimum sentences. In these cases, therefore,
the defendants could plausibly argue that because some drug amount had been found by the jury
and thus some guideline range could be calculated based solely on the facts established at the
time of conviction, then any additional post-conviction findings that increased the range would
violate Blakely. Had the Solicitor General's office sought certiorari in one case with a charged
mandatory minimum and one without, it could have illustrated graphically the absurd artificiality
of the Blakely rule. In the case where the jury was asked to find a minimum drug quantity, application of the sentencing guidelines would violate the Sixth Amendment jury right, while in the
case in which the jury was given no role in finding drug quantity, the guidelines would infringe on
the jury trial right not at all. Sadly, the Solicitor General missed his chance.
317 The merits majority rejected all three arguments advanced by the government to distinguish the Federal Guidelines from the Washington guidelines. It found that the origin of the
Federal Guidelines in a sentencing commission rather than a legislature was immaterial, Booker,
543 US at 237-39, that none of its prior cases upholding various provisions of the Federal Guidelines against constitutional attack on other grounds barred a Sixth Amendment challenge, id at
239-41, and that its result was not inconsistent with the Mistretta decision upholding the Federal
Guidelines against separation of powers challenges, id at 241-43.
318 Booker, 543 US at 233-35.
319 Id (recognizing that because judges could depart from the Guidelines only after finding
some aggravating or mitigating factor not considered by the Sentencing Commission, departures
would be unavailable in most cases given the comprehensive nature of the Guidelines).
320 Id at 259.
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mission in formulating the Guidelines that should result" in a sentence
outside the range.32 Over time, the Commission strengthened the presumption favoring a within-range sentence by including more and
more facts in the offense level calculation" and by expressly excluding
from consideration in awarding departures a great many classes of
facts judges have historically used to distinguish defendants from one
another at sentencing. The Supreme Court made the Guidelines
slightly less binding with its 1996 Koon decision holding that the standard of review for departures was abuse of discretion.324 But Congress
stepped in with the PROTECT Act of 2003 to retighten the Guidelines' hold by restoring a de novo standard of appellate review for
departures." Hence, by 2005, the Guidelines were strongly presumptive, both in theory and in practice.*
Unlike the Booker merits majority, the remedial opinion does not
denude the Guidelines of all presumptive weight. Section 3553(a) remained in effect, 3 and although it merely lists factors the court "shall
consider" in imposing a sentence, the Guidelines loom large on that
list.'" Sections 3553(a)(4) and (a)(5) require judges to consider the
sentencing range established by the Guidelines and any policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.32 And since the Guidelines were written by the Commission with the objective of incorpo-

321
322

18 USC § 3553(b)(1).
See, for example, Frank 0. Bowman, 1II, Pour Encouragerles Autre? The CuriousHisto-

ry and Distressing Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
Sentencing Guidelines Amendments That Followed, 1 Ohio St J Crim L 373,426-28 figures 5A &

5B (2004) (identifying many of the amendments to the economic crime Guidelines between 1987
and 2003).
323 See generally USSG ch 5, pt H (designating as "not ordinarily relevant" to imposing a
sentence outside the guideline range factors such as age, § 5H1.1; education and vocational skills,
§ 5H1.2; mental and emotional conditions, § 5H1.3; physical condition and drug and alcohol
dependence, § 5H1.4; employment record, § 5H1.5; family ties and responsibilities or community
ties, § 5H1.6; military, charitable, or public service, or record of prior good works, § 5H1.11; and
lack of guidance as a youth, § 5H1.12).
324 518 US at 98-100.
325 See note 271 and accompanying text.
326 In 2004, 72 percent of all federal sentences imposed were within the applicable Guidelines range. Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Year of Jubilee... or Maybe Not: Some Preliminary Observations about the Operationof the FederalSentencing System after Booker, 43 Houston L Rev

279,297, 300 figure 2 (2006). Of those not imposed within the range, roughly 22 percent were the
beneficiaries of a government-requested downward departure, and only 5.2 percent received
non-Guidelines sentences as a result of departures not sanctioned by the government. Id at 306
figures 3A & 3B.
327 Booker, 543 US at 259-60.
328 18 USC § 3553(a)(4).
329 18 USC § 3553(a)(4)-(5).
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rating the remainder of the factors listed in § 3553(a), at the very least
the Guidelines embody the Commission's best judgment (flawed
though it may have been) on how to account for those factors in the
ordinary case. If § 3553(a) means anything at all, it means that the
Guidelines are supposed to carry significant, even if not absolutely
determinative, weight in the sentencing decision of the district court.
Moreover, as Justice Breyer was at pains to observe, the "reasonableness" standard created by the remedial majority for appellate review
of sentences is not reasonableness in the abstract, but reasonableness
in carrying out the statutory commands of § 3553(a).m Thus, a sentencing decision that accords the Guidelines no weight cannot be a reasonable one.
One plausible reading of Justice Breyer's remedial opinion is that
by striking § 3553(b) and replacing the de novo standard of review in
§ 3742(e) with reasonableness, he was attempting to restore the Guidelines to the form he thought they should have taken all along-a set of
mildly to moderately presumptive guides for judicial sentencing behavior. I hold no brief for Justice Breyer's juridical methods in Booker.
The severability analysis he employs to justify remedial surgery on the
SRA deserves all the scorn that the dissenters and numerous subsequent commentators332 have heaped upon it. Nonetheless, I am disposed
Justice Breyer wrote:
[T]he text [of § 3742(e)] told appellate courts to determine whether the sentence "is unreasonable" with regard to § 3553(a). Section 3553(a) remains in effect, and sets forth numerous factors that guide sentencing. Those factors in turn will guide appellate courts, as they
have in the past, in determining whether a sentence is unreasonable.

330

Booker, 543 US at 261.
331 See id at 271-304 (Stevens dissenting):

Neither the Government, nor the respondents, nor any of the numerous amici has suggested that there is any need to invalidate either provision in order to avoid violations of
the Sixth Amendment in the administration of the Guidelines. The Court's decision to do so
represents a policy choice that Congress has considered and decisively rejected.
Id at 303-13 (Scalia dissenting) ("The majority's remedial choice is thus wonderfully ironic: In
order to rescue from nullification a statutory scheme designed to eliminate discretionary sentencing, it discards the provisions that eliminate discretionary sentencing.").
332 See, for example, Frank 0. Bowman, III, "The Question Is Which Is to Be Master- That's
All": Cunningham, Claiborne, Rita, and the Sixth Amendment Muddle, 19 Fed Sent Rptr (Vera)

155, 161 (2007) (referring to the effort to square the Booker remedy with congressional intent as
"a comically solemn exercise in counterfactual absurdity-an attempt to divine what Congress
would have intended if it had intended to enact a statute it did not enact"); Craig Green, Booker
and Fanfan: The Untimely Death (and Rebirth?) of the FederalSentencing Guidelines,93 George-

town L J 639,665 (2005) (skewering Breyer's analysis as having "no basis in statutory law and no
basis as legislative policy"); David H. Gans, Severability as Judicial Lawmaking, 76 Geo Wash L
Rev 639, 665 (2008) (arguing that Breyer's opinion viewed the severability doctrine in binary
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to forgive the use of extraordinary measures in a rearguard action
against Scalia's arid Blakely formalism. As the cases following Booker
would prove, Scalia's rule is both intellectually unsupportable and
pragmatically undesirable. Conversely, if extrapolated beyond the confines of the federal system, the structure of Breyer's remedy implied a
sensible and generally applicable Sixth Amendment rule: juries must
find facts that set impermeable outside limits on judicial sentencing
discretion, but judges may find facts that set presumptive constraints on
their own discretion within those limits, so long as the presumption is
not so strong that it becomes, de facto, the sort of hard limit on judicial
discretion that only jury factfinding should generate.
B.

Cunningham v California:The Court Goes Irrevocably Astray

The Booker decision left the Court divided (more closely than
ought to be possible for a nine-member body) between Scalia's mechanical rule and Breyer's flexible remedy. The question was whether
the Court would explore the path suggested by Breyer or cling to Scalia's seductive simplicity. In January 2007, in Cunningham, the Court
was seduced.
Cunningham tested the constitutionality of the California state
sentencing system. Under California law, the statute defining an offense prescribed three precise terms of imprisonment-a lower, middle, and upper term. 3 California Penal Code § 1170(b) provided that
"the court shall order imposition of the middle term, unless there are
circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime."3 ' The aggravating or mitigating circumstances were to be determined by the
judge. The State Judicial Council promulgated rules defining "circumstances in aggravation [or mitigation]" as "facts that justify the imposition of the upper [or lower] prison term." The rules went on to provide a nonexhaustive list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
and provided that the "judge is free to consider any 'additional criteria
reasonably related to the decision being made.'"3 Upon finding aggravating or mitigating facts, the judge was permitted, but not required, to
impose either an upper or lower term sentence. In an opinion by Justice
Ginsburg, the Supreme Court found this system in violation of the Sixth
terms and that it was an "extraordinarily bad way" to mix supposed congressional intent with the
Sixth Amendment).
333 See, for example, Cal Penal Code § 288.5.
334 Cal Penal Code § 1170(b).
335 Cal Ct Rule 4.405.
33

Cunningham, 549 US at 278-79.
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Amendment because a precondition for a sentence above the middle
term was a post-conviction judicial finding of fact.
In one sense, this was hardly a surprising outcome since the California law was functionally indistinguishable from the Washington
statute voided in Blakely. Cunningham is nonetheless significant, in
part because it was the debut appearance on the Sixth Amendment
sentencing stage of Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel
Alito, who, during the two years since Booker, had taken the seats of
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor." Chief Justice Roberts
seemingly altered the Court's delicate equipoise by joining the five
justices who had formed the Booker merits majority in voting to void
the California statute, in effect moving Justice Rehnquist's vote from
the Breyer camp to the Scalia/Stevens bloc. But it was Justice Alito's
dissent from Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion that crystallized the
questions left unresolved by the dueling Booker majorities.
The Cunningham opinion might also have been notable had Justice Ginsburg used it to explain the rationale for her straddle in Booker, but her opinion for the Cunningham majority is a straightforward
application of the Blakely rule."' In California, a sentencing judge only
acquires the discretionary authority to impose an upper-term sentence
if he finds a non-element aggravating fact.339 Therefore, said Ginsburg,
the California law violates the Sixth Amendment.4 Justice Alito responded by pointing out that the presence of appellate reasonableness
review in the Booker remedy necessarily means that, even after Booker, there remains some class of federal sentences that cannot legally be
imposed without a post-conviction judicial finding of fact.M Accordingly, contends Alito, the California sentencing scheme is not constitutionally distinguishable from the federal remedial regime prescribed

337 Justice O'Connor retired on January 31, 2006, and Justice Samuel Alito assumed her seat
on the same day. Chief Justice John Roberts was sworn in on September 29, 2005, to replace
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, who died on September 3,2005. Members of the Supreme Court
of the United States, online at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf (visited
Dec 11, 2009).
338 Cunningham,549 US at 288.
339 Cal Penal Code § 1170(b) (2004).
310 Cunningham,549 US at 291.
341 Id at 301-02 (Alito dissenting):
[U]nder the post-Booker system, there will be cases-and, in all likelihood, a good many
cases-in which the question whether a defendant will be required to serve a greater or
lesser sentence depends on whether a court of appeals sustains a finding of fact made by
the sentencing judge.
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in Booker and thus should not be voided unless the Court is also prepared to abandon the Booker remedy. '
Justice Alito's argument has implications far beyond the question
of the validity of the California statute. First, Alito illuminates the inconvenient truth that the rule of Blakely is logically incompatible with
the Booker remedy. Second, although Alito does not make the connection himself, the incompatibility stems from the central flaw in Scalia's Blakely rule, which is that it amounts to a declaration that, in any
system incorporating judicial sentencing discretion, such discretion
3 A full understanding of Alicannot be subjected to the rule of law.m
to's argument and its implications requires some elaboration.
1. Judicial discretion, appellate review, and the rule of law at
sentencing.
If conviction of Crime X generates a range of possible penalties
from which a judge may choose, then a judge sentencing defendants
convicted of Crime X can either declare that all persons convicted of
Crime X in his courtroom will receive the same penalty or try to distinguish among those who have committed Crime X. If he takes the
latter course and does so on any basis other than a lottery, he must
identify-at least in his own mind-facts that distinguish the case before him from the universe of other cases involving convictions of
Crime X. The facts deemed important by the judge might be facts
about the offender (age, prior criminal record, prior good works, family ties, and the like) or facts about the offense that make this instance
of Crime X more or less troublesome than other instances (violence,

342 "Unless the Court is prepared to overrule the remedial decision in Booker, the California sentencing scheme .. .should be held to be consistent with the Sixth Amendment." Cunningham, 549 US at 311 (Alito dissenting).
343 See Carissa Byrne Hessick and F Andrew Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing
Decisions, 60 Ala L Rev 1, 36-40 (2008) (suggesting that the Booker remedy "cannot achieve the
uniformity necessary for its legitimacy, while at the same time maintaining the discretion necessary for its constitutionality"). Professors Hessick and Hessick argue, correctly, that in its Rita v

United States, 551 US 338 (2007), and United States v Kimbrough, 552 US 85 (2007), decisions

addressing the "reasonableness review" of federal sentences created by the Booker remedial
opinion, "the Court concluded that to preserve the Booker remedy, it was necessary to sacrifice
the two central functions of appellate courts: error correction and lawmaking." Id at 37. But the
Court's abandonment of law as a limitation on judicial discretion is not limited to the peculiar
federal world created by Booker,it is instead a logically unavoidable feature of Justice Scalia's
Blakely rule and thus constrains state sentencing systems as well.
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quantity of drugs, amount of loss, role in the offense, and so forth).4
But a judge making rational distinctions among those who have committed Crime X must do so by finding facts, and those facts cannot be
the elements of Crime X, because by definition all members of the
defendant class committed those elements.
Moreover, in every existing sentencing system in which conviction presents the judge a choice of more and less severe punishments
for the same crime, a rational sentencing judge must find the existence
of aggravating non-element factors in order to justify imposition of
some subset of the legally available sentences." If, as in California, the
law provides for a lower, middle, and upper term upon conviction, a
rational judge would be obliged to find some non-element fact to justify imposition of the upper term even if the law did not affirmatively
require it. Similarly, if the law provides a presumptive, aggravated, and
mitigated range upon conviction, as was true in the Washington guidelines invalidated in Blakely, a rational judge is obliged to find some
non-element aggravating fact to justify imposition of a sentence in the
aggravated range. Even in a system that specified no middle term or
presumptive middle range but instead, upon conviction, presented the
sentencing judge with an undifferentiated range within which to exercise sentencing discretion, a rational judge would nonetheless have to
identify some non-element aggravating factor to justify a sentence at
the upper end of the range.
Thus far, law does not enter the analysis. We are merely defining
the minimum requisites of rational decisionmaking by a judge possessing sentencing discretion. Law enters only when two additional conditions exist: (1) rules that correlate non-element facts with some required or preferred sentencing outcome, and (2) a mechanism for enforcing those rules. Rules of this correlating sort can emerge from a
variety of sources, including statutes, administratively enacted guidelines, or common-law judicial rulemaking. Likewise, they may take a
wide variety of forms. They may, for example, say that if the judge
finds Fact A, he must impose a particular sentence; or that if he finds
Fact B, he may, but need not, impose a higher (or lower) sentence than
would otherwise have been possible in the absence of Fact B; or that if
34 See, for example, Cunningham, 549 US at 296-97 (Kennedy dissenting), citing Berman
and Bibas, 4 Ohio St J Crim L at 55-57 (cited in note 171) (arguing for a constitutional distinction between offense and offender facts).
34 As Justice Breyer noted in Blakely, 542 US at 339-40 (Breyer dissenting), it would be
possible to create a system in which conviction of an offense generates both a sentencing range
and a presumption that the sentence should be imposed at the top of the range absent proof of
mitigating factors, but no such system exists in the real world.
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he finds Facts A, B, and C, he should sentence within a particular elevated (or reduced) range; or that if he finds one or more facts of a
general type (for example, "aggravating" or "mitigating"), he may, or
should, or must impose a different sentence than he would in the absence of such facts. What makes these correlations "law" is the presence of an enforcement mechanism with legal power to overturn the
sentencing judge's decision if he fails to adhere to the rule correlating
facts with outcomes. Just as traffic law is a body of rules governing the
conduct of drivers, sentencing law is a body of rules governing the conduct of sentencing judges. If a judge is absolutely at liberty to impose
sentences in contravention of sentencing rules without ever being reversed, those rules are no more law than traffic regulations would be if
no tickets could be issued or fines collected. The only available enforcement mechanism for sentencing rules is appellate review.

Note that sentencing rules imposing quite different kinds and degrees of constraint on judicial sentencing discretion may properly be
considered law. Compare, for example, a rule requiring the sentencing
judge to impose a sentence of ten years' imprisonment, no more and
no less, upon the finding of Fact X, with another rule that declares that
a judge may, but need not, impose a sentence of more than ten years
only if Fact X is found. The first rule simultaneously empowers and
requires the judge to impose ten years upon a finding of Fact X, whereas the second empowers him to do so without requiring it. Both
rules are forms of "law" so long as a court of appeals is empowered to
vacate a sentence violating the rule, either because the judge did not
find the required fact or because, having found it, the judge imposed a
sentence different from that required by the rule. Similarly, a rule correlating a set of judge-found facts to a range of permissible sentences
is a law so long as an appellate court can vacate a sentence imposed
within the range for failure to find the facts generating the range, or
vacate a sentence imposed outside the permissible range for failure to
abide by the rule requiring a sentence within it.
Likewise, in sentencing, as elsewhere, a rule creating a presumption may be a form of law. Consider a rule stating that a judicial finding of Fact X creates a presumption that a sentence of ten to twelve
years is proper, but that some other sentence may be imposed if there
exist extraordinary aggravating or mitigating circumstances sufficient
to overcome the presumption. Such a rule is a rule of law so long as an
appellate court can overturn a sentence outside the range, either on
the ground that the sentencing judge found no aggravating or mitigating circumstance or on the ground that the circumstances found were
not sufficiently "extraordinary" to overcome the presumption. Finally,
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and critically to the present discussion, even a rule that grants the sentencing judge an array of choices upon conviction, subject only to the
constraints that he explain his choice and that the choice be a reasonable one, allows for the operation of law within the array so long as an
appellate court has the power to reverse a sentence on the ground
that the judge's decision to impose it was unreasonable.
2. The Blakely rule versus the Booker remedy.
This last type of sentencing rule deserves particular attention because it is the system prescribed by the Booker remedial majority.
Booker found the Federal Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional
because they prohibited a judge from imposing a sentence above the
range created by the Guidelines' base offense level unless the judge
found some additional aggravating fact that would either increase the
sentencing range or permit an upward departure.3 Justice Breyer
sought to circumvent this difficulty by making the Guidelines advisory.
However, declaring the Guidelines advisory does not alter the fundamental requirements of rational decisionmaking. After Booker, a sentencing judge is still presented with a statutorily created range of sentencing choices, and a sentence at the upper end of such a range cannot be rationally justified unless the judge finds some fact in addition
to the elements of the crime.
In the case of federal sentencing, the logical imperatives of rational
decisionmaking are reinforced by specific statutory commands. Section
3553(a)(4)(A), which was left intact by Booker, requires that judges at
least consider the range produced by application of the Sentencing
Guidelines and thus requires that judges find the facts necessary to determination of that range. 7 Section 3553(c) requires that the court provide a statement of the "specific reason for the imposition of a sentence" outside the Guidelines range, a requirement that obliges the
court to find non-element facts to justify a sentence above the Guidelines range but below the statutory maximum.8 Additionally, although
Booker surely reduced the importance of the Guidelines in the final
sentencing calculus, all the non-Guidelines factors and purposes listed
in 18 USC §3553(a)(1) and (2) also require, expressly or by necessary
implication, findings of one or more facts not necessary to conviction of
the underlying crime. Finally, the SRA's so-called parsimony provision

3
347
318

See text accompanying notes 316-27.
See 18 USC § 3553(a)(4)(A).
See 18 USC § 3553(c).
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provides that the sentencing court "shall impose a sentence sufficient,
but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in
[18 USC § 3553(a)(2)].". At a minimum, the parsimony rule would appear to require that a sentence greater than the minimum required by
law be justified by reference to some case-specific consideration, or in
Blakely terms, some non-element finding of fact.
In short, the judicially amended post-Booker remainder of the
SRA expressly mandates what rationality would in any case require fact-based justifications, at least for sentences at the high end of the
legally available range, and, if one gives a strong reading to the parsimony provision, for any sentence above the legal minimum. But what
transforms the provisions of the SRA requiring rational fact-based
explanations of sentencing choices from a set of suggestions into law
subject to constitutional regulation is precisely the Booker Court's
imposition of reasonableness review. Without appellate authority to
reject some sentences as unreasonable correlations between facts and
outcomes, the sentencing power of judges would be unconstrained
within the wide boundaries set by statutory minimum and maximum
penalties and thus not subject to the rule of law. Booker's imposition
of reasonableness review means that it is a violation of the law, for
which there is a remedy, for a judge to impose an unreasonable sentence. As Justice Alito observed, "although the post-Booker Guidelines are labeled 'advisory,' reasonableness review imposes a very real
constraint on a judge's ability to sentence across the full statutory
range without finding some aggravating fact.,"'
Justice Alito is thus correct that the California sentencing scheme
at issue in Cunningham cannot be distinguished from the federal remedial regime prescribed in Booker-at least on the basis of the
Blakely rule.35' But Alito proves too much. He is right that "the Court's
remedial holding in Booker . . . necessarily stands for the proposition

that it is consistent with the Sixth Amendment for the imposition of
an enhanced sentence to be conditioned on a factual finding made by

349 18 USC § 3553(a) (listing a variety of factors for judges to consider when sentencing a
defendant, including but not limited to: the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history
and characteristics of the defendant, the need for incapacitation and rehabilitation, and the kinds
of sentences available). See also Marc L. Miller and Ronald E Wright, Your Cheatin' Heart(land):

The Long Search for Administrative Sentencing Justice, 2 Buff Crim L Rev 723, 745-49 (1999)

(examining the legislative history of the parsimony provision).
350 Cunningham, 549 US at 309 (Alito dissenting).
351 "Unless the Court is prepared to overrule the remedial decision in Booker, the California sentencing scheme ... should be held to be consistent with the Sixth Amendment." Id at 311.
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a sentencing judge and not by a jury."... But if that is so, then one of
three conclusions necessarily follows: either the Federal Guidelines in
their original form should have been upheld in Booker; or the Booker
remedy is fatally inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment as interpreted in Blakely; or there is some constitutionally critical distinction
between the pre- and post-Booker Guidelines that invalidates the
former and preserves the latter.
The basic distinction between the pre- and post-Booker Guidelines is obvious. The pre-Booker Guidelines were strongly presumptive while the Booker remedial opinion made them dramatically less
so. Or to phrase the point in terms of judicial discretion, the preBooker Guidelines severely constrained judicial sentencing discretion,
while the Booker remedial opinion markedly relaxed controls on that
discretion. Justice Ginsburg's Cunningham opinion vigorously denies
that generous grants of judicial sentencing discretion can save a system that violates the "bright line" rule of Blakely.' Given that Ginsburg was the sole justice in both Booker majorities, this denial borders
on the bizarre. What factor did she think distinguished the old Guidelines from the new? As for Justice Alito, the curious gap in his otherwise admirable dissent is that he either overlooks or declines to engage on this critical question.
Despite its lacunae, the implications of Cunningham for subsequent cases were clear. If the Court's Sixth Amendment doctrine was
to become intellectually coherent, it would have to pursue one of
three courses: (a) reverse Blakely; (b) deny guidelines rules all presumptive effect by abandoning or eviscerating appellate reasonableness review in federal cases; or (c) attempt to define constitutionally
permissible degrees of restriction on judicial sentencing discretion.
C.

Rita v United States: Just When You Thought It Couldn't Get
Weirder

In Rita v United States,"' the Court began trying to deal with the
contradictions exposed by Justice Alito in Cunningham. In Rita, the
Fourth Circuit upheld a sentence imposed within the applicable guideline range in reliance on its general rule that "a sentence imposed
'within the properly calculated guideline range ... is presumptively
352

Id at 310.

"We cautioned in Blakely, however, that broad discretion to decide what facts may support
an enhanced sentence, or to determine whether an enhanced sentence is warranted in any particular case, does not shield a sentencing system from the force of our decisions." Id at 290.
354 551 US 338 (2007).
353
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reasonable.'"'. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on the question of whether, after Booker, federal sentencing
ranges should enjoy such a presumption.'- Justice Breyer wrote the
majority opinion, joined by Justices Roberts, Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Alito, and joined in part by Justices Scalia and Thomas. Justices Stevens and Ginsburg filed one concurrence, Justices Scalia and
Thomas another, and Justice Souter dissented.' One might have
thought a majority opinion that secured the unqualified votes of six
justices and the partial support of two more would resolve a great
many questions. It did not.
1. The circuit split.
When the Supreme Court grants certiorari to resolve a circuit
split, the presumable point is to decide which position adopted by the
lower courts is right, or in unusual cases where none of the lower courts
is right, to articulate the correct position. In Rita, Justice Breyer simply
refused to resolve the split. Instead, he defined the question in a way
that permitted him to avoid a definitive answer. He wrote: "The first
question is whether a court of appeals may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a district court sentence that reflects a proper application of the Sentencing Guidelines. We conclude that it can."358 He emphasized that his ruling merely "permits" appellate courts to adopt a
presumption of reasonableness, but does not require them to do so.5 9 In
short, the Court held that courts of appeals are at liberty to presume the
reasonableness of within-range sentences or not, as suits them.

355 United States v Rita, 177 Fed Appx 357,358 (4th Cir 2006), quoting United States v Green,
436 F3d 449,457 (4th Cir 2006).
356 Rita, 551 US at 341. The Supreme Court originally granted certiorari in Rita intending
that it comprise one of a pair of cases, along with United States v Claiborne, 439 F3d 479 (8th Cir
2006), cert granted as Claiborne v United States, 549 US 1016 (2006), presenting two aspects of
the central question regarding what legal weight should be accorded to properly calculated
Federal Guidelines ranges. However, the petitioner in Claiborne died during the pendency of the
appeal, see Claiborne v United States, 551 US 87,87-88 (2007), leaving only Victor Rita's case for
decision by the Court. The issues raised in Claiborne were decided the next term in Gall v United
States, 552 US 38 (2007). For a description of the issues presented by Claiborne, see Bowman, 19
Fed Sent Rptr (Vera) at 158-59 (cited in note 332) (noting that the distinctive feature in Claiborne was that the Court ruled that an extraordinary deviation from the Federal Guidelines
must be accompanied by extraordinary circumstances).
357 Rita, 551 US at 340.
358 Id at 347 (emphasis added).
359 Id at 354 ("The fact that we permit courts of appeals to adopt a presumption of
reasonableness....").
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Breyer's opinion is a striking abdication of responsibility. The
question presented to the Court in Rita was not whether the law
"permits" a court of appeals to apply a presumption of reasonableness
to a Guidelines sentence if it feels like it, but whether, after Booker,
the legal nature of the Guidelines is such that they command such a
presumption." In Booker, Breyer and the other members of the remedial majority took it upon themselves to rewrite federal sentencing
law, but in Rita they refuse to provide an authoritative interpretation
of their own creation. The Court thus expressly sanctions a federal
sentencing system in which different rules apply in different circuits.
2. Trial court versus appellate court presumptions.
Breyer hastens to insist that the optional "presumption of reasonableness" may be applied only by appellate courts and not by sentencing judges 61 This holding rests on two points, one semantic and
the other substantive. First, under Booker, the question of whether a
sentence is "reasonable" is only presented on appeal, after the district
court has calculated the Guidelines range, considered the other
§ 3553(a) factors, and imposed a sentence. At the district court level,
therefore, a properly calculated Guidelines range might enjoy a presumption of correctness, but not of "reasonableness."362 Second, Breyer
justifies an appellate presumption of reasonableness as a form of deference to the confluence of judicial and administrative judgment that
is presented whenever a sentencing judge imposes a sentence within
the range recommended by the Sentencing Commission.
Interestingly, Justice Breyer strongly implies, but never quite says,
that sentencing judges may not accord Guideline ranges presumptive
weight.34 At the same time, he is at pains to disparage the argument
advanced by petitioner that a de jure appellate presumption of reasonableness necessarily creates a de facto trial court presumption of

36o See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Rita v United States, No 06-5754, *5 (filed July 28,
2006) (available on Westlaw at 2006 WL 4114065) (arguing that the circuit split is over "whether
a sentence within the guideline range is presumptively reasonable," not whether it could be)
(emphasis added). But the question certified by the Court was whether it is "consistent with
[Booker], to accord a presumption of reasonableness to within-Guidelines sentences." See Rita v
United States, 549 US 1016 (2006) (granting certiorari) (emphasis added).
361 Rita, 551 US at 351 ("We repeat that the presumption before us is an appellate
presumption.").
362 See id at 354.
363 Id at 355-56.
364 See id at 351-56.
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correctness.' He is plainly struggling with the central conflict embedded in the Booker remedy-since judges are obliged to make Guidelines calculations, the results will have some weight, and yet formal
acknowledgement that they have weight highlights their incompatibility with the Blakely rule.
Among all the justices, only Justice Souter was prepared to label
the Court's nice distinction between appellate and trial court presumptions the arrant nonsense it is:
Without a powerful reason to risk reversal on the sentence, a district judge faced with evidence supporting a high subrange
Guidelines sentence will do the appropriate fact finding in disparagement of the jury right and will sentence within the high subrange. This prediction is weakened not a whit by the Court's description of within-Guidelines reasonableness as an "appellate
presumption." What works on appeal determines what works at
trial, and if the Sentencing Commission's views are as weighty as
the Court says they are, a trial judge will find it far easier to make
the appropriate findings and sentence within the appropriate
Guideline, than to go through the unorthodox fact finding to justify a sentence outside the Guidelines range.
3. Justice Scalia's concurrence in Rita.
The most intriguing of the Rita opinions is Justice Scalia's concurrence. This is Scalia at his best and worst. He begins by accepting, on
stare decisis grounds, the Booker remedial revisions of the Guidelines,"' and by acknowledging Justice Alito's insight in Cunningham
that in any system where the sentencing judge's discretionary sentencing decision is subject to substantive appellate review, some set of enhanced sentences will be legally justifiable only in the presence of
judge-found, non-element facts.'6 He then argues that because the
3s Rita, 551 US at 350-54 (emphasizing that it is the duty of a sentencing judge to determine "an appropriate sentence for a given offender" rather than to presume that the Guidelines
sentence is correct).
366 Id at 391 (Souter dissenting) (citations omitted).
367 Id at 368 (Scalia concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
368 Id at 369-70:
Under the scheme promulgated today, some sentences reversed as excessive will be legally
authorized in later cases only because additional judge-found facts are present; and, as Justice Alito argued in Cunningham, some lengthy sentences will be affirmed (i.e., held lawful)
only because of the presence of aggravating facts not found by the jury, that distinguish the
case from the mine-run.
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Booker remedial structure as described by Justice Breyer in Rita envisions substantive appellate review, it must also violate the Sixth
Amendmenti6 This would seem to present Justice Scalia with an insoluble dilemma-how can the Booker remedy he just accepted survive
if appellate review renders it constitutionally invalid?
Scalia's solution is simply to declare that no substantive review of
a sentence imposed within the statutory minimum and maximum is
constitutionally permissible. "I would hold that reasonableness review
cannot contain a substantive component at all."" The implications of
this statement are genuinely breathtaking. This is the architect of the
Blakely formula declaring that the Constitution prohibits appellate
review of the substance of trial judges' discretionary sentencing choices. In other words, if Congress were to abolish the Guidelines tomorrow and replace them with a sentencing regime that permitted judges
to sentence defendants anywhere within the statutory minimum and
maximum, subject only to the limitation that the sentence be reviewable by appellate courts for substantive reasonableness, such a statute
would, according to Justice Scalia, violate defendants' constitutional
right to a jury trial."' Scalia's Sixth Amendment comes to this: a legislature can make sentencing rules triggered by jury factfinding that
place absolute limits on judicial sentencing discretion, but within the
limits set by jury-found facts, the discretionary power of the sentencing judge must be absolute and unreviewable.
One is tempted to a certain reluctant admiration for Scalia's tenacity. Confronted with the absurd, but logically inescapable, implications of his Blakely formula, he endorses the reductio ad absurdum
refutation of his own thesis as a serious real world result. However,
one's admiration for Scalia's tenacity is sensibly diminished by two
considerations.
First, as extreme as Scalia's position is, it does not solve the logical dilemma created by the Blakely rule. His problem is that the dictates of rational decisionmaking require sentencing judges to find
facts beyond those found by juries in order to have a rational basis for
the sentences they impose. This means that federal trial judges must
Rita, 551 US at 368-74 (Scalia concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id at 370,374.
Id at 376:
[T]he Sixth Amendment would be violated even if appellate courts really were exercising
some type of common law power to prescribe the facts legally necessary to support specific
sentences ... It makes no difference whether it is a legislature, a Sentencing Commission,
or an appellate court that usurps the jury's prerogative.

369

370
371
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sometimes do the very thing Scalia says is constitutionally impermissible - find facts beyond the jury verdict to justify high sentences. Scalia
obviously cannot bar judges from finding facts in the sentencing
process.m Nor can he ban them from relying on those facts to determine the proper sentence. Nor, one presumes, would he ban judges
from publicly explaining exactly what facts they found and how those
facts justified a high sentence. What he wants to declare unconstitutional is any grant of power to an appellate court to determine whether the use to which the facts were put by the trial judge was reasonable. Because he cannot ban logic from the sentencing process, Scalia
would simply conceal the fact that logic is at work by banning law.
Second, a careful reading of the portion of Scalia's opinion endorsing "procedural" review of trial court sentencing decisions shows that
even he flinches from a constitutional requirement of completely lawless sentencing discretion. Scalian "procedural review" would permit
appellate reversal where the district court "appears not to have considered § 3553(a); considers impermissible factors; selects a sentence
based on clearly erroneous facts; or does not comply with § 3553(c)'s
requirement for a statement of reasons."3 The problem, of course, is
that appellate review of even these "procedural" matters would inevitably require substantive evaluation of the district court's sentence.
Consider, for example, appellate review of a district court's failure to provide an explanation for a sentence. If all this entails is determining whether the judge wrote or said something in the form, "I
impose this sentence because

...

,"

the requirement is meaningless and

achieves none of the Act's objectives for such statements. Presumably,
Scalia means that there must be an explanation that actually explains,
that is, provides rational reasons for, the judge's choice. And presumably even Scalia would require that the explanations meet some minimal standard of rationality. He concedes as much in his footnote
disagreeing with Justice Stevens's argument that "a district court
which discriminates against Yankee fans is acting in a procedurally
'impeccable' way."3" But he elides the real issue by characterizing that
hypothetical as relying on an "impermissible" factor. However, the
reason being a Yankee fan is an impermissible factor in increasing a
sentence is not that being a Yankee fan is a status like race or religion,
but because it is difficult to see how being a Yankee fan could ever be
372 "To be clear, I am not suggesting that the Sixth Amendment prohibits judges from ever
finding any facts." Id at 373.
373 Rita, 551 US at 382 (Scalia concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
374 Id at 382 n 6.
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logically relevant to length of sentence. Thus, the task of discriminating between permissible and impermissible factors necessarily involves assessing the rationality of the connection between a fact and a
sentence imposed in reliance on that fact. Which means that, despite
Scalia's protestations, "procedural" reasonableness review requires
some appellate evaluation of the rationality of the sentencing judge's
choices. Such an evaluation-a sort of rational basis test-might be a

weaker form of substantive review than the "reasonableness" review
endorsed by Justice Breyer's majority opinion, but it would be substantive review nonetheless. It would still require a judge to provide a
reason that offered at least a rational connection between a judgefound fact and a high sentence, and thus it would still violate Justice
Scalia's model of what the Sixth Amendment requires.
The very dilute rationality test necessarily implied by Scalia's
opinion would surely reduce the number of cases in which an appellate court would find a high sentence improper for want of a judgefound fact justifying the sentence. But Scalia himself is insistent that
reducing the number of constitutional violations created by a sentencing system is no defense against the system's unconstitutionality so
long as some sentences it would impose are unconstitutional."' Squirm
how he will, Scalia cannot escape from his own logical box.
The Court Pushes On: Kimbrough, Gall,Nelson, Spears, and Ice

D.

The Supreme Court decided five more Sixth Amendment sentencing cases in the two years after Rita. With each case, the Court
bound itself more firmly to the mast of the leaky Blakely-Booker vessel, even as each opinion plumbed new depths of logical incoherence.
1. Kimbrough v United States.

On December 10, 2007, the Court decided Kimbrough v United
States,36 which dealt with the degree to which a district court is obliged
to defer to the policy judgments of the Sentencing Commission and
Congress embedded in the Guidelines. Derrick Kimbrough pleaded
guilty to four charges involving possession and distribution of crack and
powder cocaine." He was therefore subject to a ten-year mandatory

375
376
37

Id at 375-78.
552 US 85 (2007).
Id at 91.
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minimum sentence based on the quantity of crack he possessed,m plus a
consecutive five-year mandatory minimum term for possessing a firearm in connection with a drug crime. 9 However, his Guidelines range
was even higher-228 to 270 months, or 19 to 22.5 years.m The district
judge determined that a sentence in the Guidelines range would be
"greater than necessary," in large measure because the high Guideline
range was driven by the controversial 100-to-1 powder-to-crack weight
ratio that prescribes far harsher punishments for crack defendants than
for those who possess an equivalent amount of powder cocaine."" Accordingly, the court sentenced Kimbrough to the fifteen-year statutory
minimum 3 The Fourth Circuit reversed on the ground that a belowGuidelines sentence based on judicial disagreement with the crackpowder disparity was "per se unreasonable."3p
The question presented to the Supreme Court was whether a district court could justify a downward variance from a properly calculated Guidelines range based, not on any circumstance peculiar to the
defendant, but on the judge's disagreement with a policy judgment
embedded in the Guidelines. The Court, in an opinion by Justice
Ginsburg, found that, at least in the case of the crack-powder ratio, a
sentencing judge could do just that.m In one sense, this result is an
unsurprising, and indeed logically necessary, consequence of the
Booker remedy. If a judge cannot legally deviate from a properly calculated range based on disagreement with the Guidelines themselves,
then in a case where neither the crime nor the defendant possesses
any notable feature distinguishing the case from the ordinary run, the
Guidelines would in such a case be mandatory rather than "advisory."
A notable feature of the Kimbrough opinion, however, is the degree to which it emphasizes the ongoing importance of the Sentencing
Commission and the weight that must still be accorded the Guidelines.
Justice Ginsburg insisted that "[w]hile rendering the Sentencing
378 Possession with intent to distribute more than fifty grams of crack cocaine carries a
mandatory minimum sentence of ten years to life imprisonment. 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii).
379 The sentence for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense is
five years to life, which must run consecutively to the underlying drug offenses. 18 USC
§ 924(c)(1)(A).
38o Kimbrough, 552 US at 92.
381 18 USC §3553(a) (mandating that every sentence should be "sufficient" but not "greater
than necessary" to offer just punishment, deter criminal conduct, and protect the public from the
defendant).
W Kimbrough, 552 US at 93.
3
Id.
3
United States v Kimbrough, 174 Fed Appx 798,799 (4th Cir 2006) (per curiam).
3
Kimbrough, 552 US at 109-10.
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Guidelines advisory, we have nevertheless preserved a key role for the
Sentencing Commission," in consequence of which "in the ordinary
case, the Commission's recommendation of a sentencing range will
'reflect a rough approximation of sentences that might achieve
§ 3553(a)'s objectives."'3' She then set up a differential standard of
review for different types of variance from the Guidelines. She quoted
Rita for the proposition that "a district court's decision to vary from
the advisory Guidelines may attract greatest respect when the sentencing judge finds a particular case 'outside the heartland' to which
the Commission intends individual Guidelines to apply,"nm but observed that "closer review may be in order when the sentencing judge
varies from the Guidelines based solely on the judge's view that the
Guidelines range fails to properly reflect § 3553(a) considerations even
in a mine-run case.",38 Moreover, the Kimbrough opinion seems to have
relied heavily on the peculiar history of the crack-powder disparity. To
make a long story short, the Court plainly implied that the district court
was justified in deviating from the Guidelines here primarily because
the Commission itself had repeatedly expressed doubts about the rationality of the 100-to-1 ratio. The opinion exuded reluctance to signal a
green light for variances based purely on differences between a judge's
personal sentencing philosophy and the policy judgments of the Commission in cases other than those involving crack.3
2.

Gall v United States.

On the same day it issued Kimbrough, the Court also decided
Gall v United States, which addressed the weight a court of appeals
can accord a properly calculated Guidelines range as part of reasonableness review. In Gall, the defendant admitted to having trafficked
in significant quantities of ecstasy and marijuana while in college, but
asserted (without contradiction from the government) that he had
Id at 109, quoting Rita, 551 US at 350.
387 Kimbrough, 552 US at 109, quoting Rita, 551 US at 351.
386

388 Kimbrough, 552 US at 109 (clarifying, however, that in the case of the crack-powder
sentencing disparity, the Commission based its Guidelines ranges not on "empirical data and the
national experience" but instead on the mandatory minimum sentences set by Congress in the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986) (quotation marks omitted). See also Comment, Deviations Based

on Policy Disagreements, 122 Harv L Rev 326,331-36 (2008).
389 Indeed, Kimbrough strongly implies that judges should give greater deference to the policy
judgments of the Sentencing Commission than those of Congress itself Consider Kimbrough, 552 US
at 108-)9 (recognizing that the Sentencing Commission "fills an important institutional role" in that it
isstaffed by experts who rely on data in making sentencing recommendations).
390 552 US 38 (2007).
391 See note 356.
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abandoned involvement with drugs three-and-one-half years before
his indictment, graduated from college, and become a productive
member of the community.' Based on Gall's voluntary withdrawal
from the drug conspiracy and his post-offense conduct, the district
court imposed a sentence of thirty-six months probation instead of a
term within the applicable Guidelines range of thirty to thirty-seven
months imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit reversed. It invoked a
general rule that a sentence imposed within a properly calculated
Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable, while one outside the
Guidelines range must be justified by one or more considerations exterior to the Guidelines and "proportional to the extent of the difference between the advisory range and the sentence imposed."'9 It ruled
that Gall's probationary sentence was a "100% downward variance"
from the Guidelines, which must be, but was not, justified by "extraordinary circumstances."39 5
The Supreme Court reversed." Had the Court limited itself to
finding that Gall was an ideal candidate for probation and that the
Eighth Circuit should, under an abuse of discretion standard, have
deferred to the district court, no one could reasonably have disagreed.
However, its purpose in Gall was not to right an individual wrong, but
to further develop Blakely-Booker doctrine-and so it stepped into
the Twilight Zone.' Justice Stevens, writing for a 7-2 majority, insisted
Gall,552 US at 41-42.
Id at 44.
39
United States v Gall, 446 F3d 884, 889 (8th Cir 2006) (explaining that the farther away
from the Federal Guidelines a sentence is, the more exceptional the circumstances must be),
quoting Claiborne,439 F3d at 481.
395 Gall, 446 F3d at 889-90.
396 Gall,552 US at 59-60 (holding that "it is not for the Court of Appeals to decide de novo
whether the justification for a variance is sufficient or the sentence reasonable" and finding that the
district court reached a "reasoned and reasonable decision" that a sentence of probation was justified).
39 The first peculiar aspect of Gall is that neither the Guideline applied to Gall nor the
sentence imposed on him violated the Blakely rule. This was a drug case in which the applicable
Guideline was USSG § 2D1.1. Therefore, as explained above-see notes 291, 316, and accompanying text-the mere fact of conviction generated no base offense level and no Guidelines range,
and hence conviction exposed Gall to a sentence up to the traditional statutory maximum. No
fact thereafter found by a judge could increase Gall's maximum sentencing exposure and thus
the Guideline at issue did not violate Blakely. Moreover, Gall admitted to a drug amount as part
of his plea colloquy, so the range from which the judge departed was not based on a postconviction judicial finding of fact, but on facts admitted by the defendant in the process of entering a plea. Regardless of how one defines "statutory maximum sentence," it was not increased
here by any post-conviction judicial finding of fact. Finally, the dispute in this case arose because
the district court departed downward and imposed a sentence that was not only below the statutory maximum, however defined, but below the Guideline minimum. In sum, the case arose, not
because the Guideline employed or the sentence imposed violated the Blakely rule, but because
392
393
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that an appellate rule "requiring 'proportional' justifications for departures from the Guidelines is not consistent with" Booker.",
Stevens's first contention is that a rule of proportionality comes
"too close to creating an impermissible presumption of unreasonableness for sentences outside the Guidelines range."'" In this, Stevens
echoes Justice Breyer's insistence in Rita that an appellate presumption of reasonableness for a within-range sentence does not imply a
presumption of unreasonableness for an out-of-range sentence." The
problem is that, as Stevens repeatedly admits, district judges are legally obliged to explain sentences imposed outside the range and appellate courts are obliged to reverse if no explanation is offered.4" Perhaps this explanation requirement need not be characterized as a
"presumption of unreasonableness," but it does mean that withinrange and out-of-range sentences will be treated differently on review.
The Guidelines correlate specified facts to particular sentencing
ranges. In order for a Guideline range to be assigned, specified factscall them Facts A, B, and C-must be established by verdict, defendant
admission, or post-conviction judicial determination. For a post-Booker
appellate court to presume that a sentence within range is reasonable is
for the court to say that the work of the Sentencing Commission in correlating facts to sentencing ranges carries sufficient legal weight that no
fact other than Facts A, B, and C need be shown to establish the reasonableness of the sentence. The necessary logical corollary to this conclusion is that in a case where Facts A, B, and C are proven, but the district
court imposes a sentence outside the range, some special explanation
other than the presence of Facts A, B, and C is required. Logically, that
explanation can come in only one of two forms-either the sentencing
judge found and relied upon some non-element, non-Guideline fact
that rationally supports an out-of-range sentence, or as in Kimbrough,
the judge disagreed with the policy judgments of the Commission and
Congress embodied in the Guidelines.

the Supreme Court in Booker had invalidated the Guidelines in toto, even those portions and
applications that did not violate Blakely. This fact was not lost on Justice Thomas, who in dissent
in Kimbrough rescinded his earlier acceptance of Booker on stare decisis grounds, Kimbrough,
552 US at 114-16 (Thomas dissenting), and dissented in Gall because "the District Court committed statutory error when it departed below the applicable Guidelines range." Gall, 552 US at
61 (Thomas dissenting).
398 Gall, 552 US at 46.
399 Id at 47-48.
4o
See Rita, 551 US at 354-55 ("The fact that we permit courts of appeals to adopt a presumption of reasonableness does not mean that courts may adopt a presumption of unreasonableness").
41
Gall, 552 US at 46,50.
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Although Stevens dissented from the Booker remedy of advisory
Guidelines,4 in Rita, he accepted the Booker remedy as a matter of
stare decisis," and in Gall, he took up the task of defending it. Therefore, he had to deny that a post-Booker, within-Guidelines-range sentence enjoys any presumption of correctness, however mild, or indeed
that a within-range sentence is to be legally preferred to any degree
over other outcomes. To admit that within-range sentences enjoy any
legal preference is to concede Alito's point that there will be some
out-of-range sentences that can be rationally justified only by reference to a judicially found, non-element fact. And if that is so, then the
Booker remedy violates the Blakely rule. But this dogged insistence
that within-range sentences enjoy no privileged status and out-ofrange sentences are not legally disfavored is not only incompatible
with an appellate presumption of reasonableness for within-range
sentences, but represents an about face for Stevens himself. In Rita,
Stevens wrote of the appellate presumption of reasonableness that,
"presumptively reasonable does not mean always reasonable; the presumption, of course, must be genuinely rebuttable."" In short, in Rita,
Stevens implicitly recognized the inescapable point that his new role
as defender of advisory Guidelines forces him to deny in Gall: a presumption of reasonableness for within-range sentences (whether trial
or appellate) confers a privileged status on such sentences in the absence of some rebutting non-element, non-Guidelinesfact, and the dis-

trict court must find such a fact for it to become part of the appellate
record and thus a proper consideration in reasonableness review.
Stevens's denial that the Guidelines have presumptive effect becomes even less convincing in the segment of his opinion rejecting the
Eighth Circuit's holding that a district court's justification for an outof-range sentence must be "proportional to the extent of the difference between the advisory range and the sentence imposed"0 as an

impermissibly "mathematical approach."4 As Justice Alito notes in
dissent, Q Stevens mischaracterizes the Eighth Circuit's position as
requiring some rigid arithmetic relationship between the strength of
the justification and degree of variance,4 when the court of appeals
42 Booker, 543 US at 272-303 (Stevens dissenting in part).
403 Rita, 551 US at 360-67 (Stevens concurring).
Id at 366-67.
Gall, 446 F3d at 889, quoting Claiborne, 439 F3d at 481.
40
Gall, 552 US at 47-48.
4M Id at 71 (Alito dissenting).
48 "[T]he mathematical approach assumes the existence of some ascertainable method of
assigning percentages to various justifications." Id at 49.
4N

4s
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plainly meant only that the extent of the variance from the range must
be considered in assessing the adequacy of the justification.4 But the
most remarkable feature of Stevens's opinion is that, having rejected
the Eighth Circuit's rule of proportionality, he then embraces the exact same rule recast in slightly more opaque language. Stevens writes
that a district court must properly calculate the Guidelines range, must
take that range into account when setting a sentence, must explain
why a sentence deviates from the Guideline range, and "must consider
the extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is suffi4 0
ciently compelling to support the degree of the variance.,,"
He goes
on to say, "We find it uncontrovetsial that a major departureshould be
supported by a more significantjustification than a minor one.".. As for

the reviewing court, Stevens instructs that a district court's failure "to
adequately explain a sentence -including an explanationfor any deviation from the Guidelines range" constitutes reversible procedural

error.41 Appellate courts are then to review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence "including the extent of any variance from the

Guidelines range.".. If these passages do not amount to an embrace of
at least a mild rebuttable presumption of the correctness of a withinrange sentence at both the trial and appellate levels, and of a rough
proportionality standard for the review of out-of-range sentences,
then language has no meaning.
One can reasonably draw three conclusions from this double-talk.
First, the majority of the Court now understands perfectly well that it
is perpetuating a federal sentencing regime that accords the Guidelines some presumptive effect in contravention of the Blakely rule.
Second, the Court refuses to admit the obvious because doing so
would endanger the whole Sixth Amendment house of cards that now
rests on Blakely. Third, the Court is satisfied enough with the mildly
presumptive federal system that has emerged from its thrashings (and
sufficiently weary of the whole subject) that it is deeply reluctant to
invest any additional intellectual capital in straightening out the mess
it has made of Sixth Amendment doctrine. This perhaps cynical view
seemed to be confirmed by the Court's two 2009 federal sentencing
opinions, Spears v United States' and Nelson v United States."'
40 Id at 71.
410 Gall, 552 US at 50-51.

411Id at 50 (emphasis added).
412 Id at 51 (emphasis added).
413 Id (emphasis added) (emphasizing that the "fact that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal").
414 129 S Ct 840 (2009) (per curiam).
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3. The 2009 federal sentencing cases: Nelson and Spears.
In Nelson, the Court issued a per curiam decision, the sole point
of which was to reiterate that a sentencing judge may not say or suggest that he presumed a within-range sentence to be reasonable, even
if he is in a circuit like the Fourth which applies an appellate presump416
tion of reasonableness to within-range sentences.
Spears, a notably cranky and peremptory per curiam opinion, "
summarily reversed the Eighth Circuit and held that a district judge
can sentence a crack defendant based on a crack-powder ratio personally devised by the judge and applied to all defendants in his court,
but different than the ratio adopted by the Sentencing Commission."
Spears has been hopefully viewed in the defense community as a suggestion from the Court that district judges are now at liberty to substitute their policy predilections for those of the Commission whenever
it suits them.' But, read closely, the Court's opinion leaves open the
most difficult problem raised by Kimbrough-whether district courts
are equally free to disagree with the Commission in all classes of cases,
or whether crack cases are sui generis because the 100-to-1 crackpowder ratio remained in the Guidelines due to congressional intransigence and despite the Commission's expert judgment that it should
be changed.'" The Court repeated its observation in Kimbrough that
the general question of whether a non-Guidelines sentence based on a
policy disagreement with the Guidelines "may be entitled to less respect" than a non-Guidelines sentence based on factors peculiar to the
129 S Ct 890 (2009) (per curiam).
Id at 891-92.
129 S Ct at 845. Justices Roberts and Alito dissented on the ground that the petition
presented a genuinely difficult question inappropriate for plenary review. Two other circuits
supported the Eighth Circuit's interpretation and there was no circuit split. Id at 846 (Roberts
dissenting). Roberts noted,
There is at least some language in Kimbrough that seems to support the Court of Appeals'
holding. In Kimbrough, we noted with apparent approval that the District Court "did not
purport to establish a ratio of its own." Rather, we held, the District Court "appropriately
framed its final determination in line with § 3553(a)'s overarching instruction to impose a
sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary to accomplish the sentencing goals advanced in § 3553(a)(2)."
Id at 845.
418 Id at 843-44.
415
416
417

419

See, for example, Clare Freeman, Spears v. US -Getting the Kinbrough Point Across, Sixth

Circuit Blog (Jan 22,2009), online at http/circuit6.blogspotcom/2009_01_01_archive.html (visited Dec
11, 2009). Others have been more cautious. See Paul M. Rashkind, Spears v. United States: Kimbrough
Means What It Says, U.S. Supreme Court Blog (Jan 21, 2009) online at
http-//ussc.blogspotcom/2009/01/spears-v-united-states-kimbrough-means.html (visited Dec11, 2009).
420 See Part IV.D.1.
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particular case need not be addressed in the crack-powder context because the crack guidelines "do not exemplify the Commission's exercise
of its characteristic institutional role."421' Accordingly, we really do not
know what authority district courts have to disagree with Guidelines
the Commission has not merely enacted, but continues to believe in.
And the Court gives no guidance on the critical question of the sort of
record a district court must create when grounding a sentence on disagreement with the government's expert sentencing agency.
However perfunctory their reasoning, Spears and Nelson seem to
signal the Court's determination to soldier on with the advisory federal system it created in Booker.
4. Oregon v Ice: It really was all about the Federal Guidelines.
But just when you have concluded that the Supreme Court has
reached a point of intellectual equilibrium, however awkward, you read
Ice-decided on January 14, 2009, a week before Spears-and your
head explodes. Ice raises the question of whether the rule of Apprendi
applies to imposition of consecutive sentences for separate counts of
conviction. Many jurisdictions confer unrestricted discretion on trial
judges to impose either consecutive or concurrent sentences." Some
jurisdictions presume that sentences for multiple counts of conviction
should run consecutively absent a judicial finding of cause for imposing
concurrent sentences.2 And some jurisdictions, including Oregon, "constrain judges' discretion by requiring them to find certain facts before
imposing consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences." 424
Eugene Ice was convicted by a jury of six felony counts in connection with two incidents of sexual assault on a minor. At sentencing,
the judge found statutorily enumerated factors permitting him to impose consecutive sentences, and then did so.425 Ice appealed, arguing
that the Apprendi line of cases required a jury rather than a judge to
find facts permitting imposition of a sentence longer than the maxi-

Spears, 129 S Ct at 843.
422 129 S Ct at 714 (asserting that the majority of states fall into this category). See, for
421

example, Conn Gen Stat § 53a-37 (2005); Neb Rev Stat § 29-2204 (1995).
423 See Ice, 129 S Ct at 714. The Court also notes that some jurisdictions presume that sentences for multiple counts of conviction should run concurrently, but allow a judge to order
consecutive sentences in "almost all" cases. See id at 715 (identifying Florida, Kansas, and Mississippi as falling into this category). See, for example, Fla Stat § 921.16(1) (2007);
Kan Stat Ann § 21-4608 (2007); Miss Code Ann § 99-19-21(2) (2007).
424 Ice, 129 S Ct at 714.
425 Id at 716.
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416

mum for any single count. One would have thought that this case
would be a slam-dunk winner for Ice. In Cunningham, Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion voided California's sentencing system because
it violated the rule that, "under the Sixth Amendment, any fact that
exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence must be found by
a jury, not a judge."4 " Oregon law on consecutive sentencing unambiguously offended the same rule. Yet, astonishingly, in Ice, Justice Ginsburg, writing for a five-justice majority including Stevens, Kennedy,
Breyer, and Alito, upheld the Oregon statute.
If one were innocent of any exposure to the Court's journey from
Blakely to Spears and Nelson, the result in Ice would seem unremarkable. No one had previously suggested that the Sixth Amendment
placed any limitation on states' power to systematize judicial decisions
to impose consecutive or concurrent terms of imprisonment. The
strangeness of the opinion flows both from the rationales it advances
for its result and from the composition of the five-member majority.
According to Justice Ginsburg, the key distinction between Ice
and all the other cases in the Apprendi line is that all the previous decisions "involved sentencing for a discrete crime, not-as here-for
multiple offenses different in character or committed at different
times."429 This declaration is peculiar in at least two ways. First, the consistent theme of the voting block that gave us Blakely, the Booker merits majority, and Cunningham-a block that included Justices Ginsburg and Stevens-was that jury involvement in factfinding should be
based on the effects of particular facts on sentencing outcomes, rather
than on the names legislatures gave facts or clusters of facts." But in
Ice, Ginsburg and Stevens vote to reintroduce legislative nomenclature as a decisive factor in Sixth Amendment analysis.4" Legislatures
are now effectively precluded from structuring judicial discretion
within the range assigned to a single "discrete crime," but are appar-

Id.
549 US at 281.
428 129 S Ct at 714-15.
429 Id at 717.
430 For example, in his Booker merits majority opinion, Justice Stevens wrote: "In Ring v
Arizona, we reaffirmed our conclusion that the characterization of critical facts is constitutionally irrelevant." Booker, 543 US at 231 (citation omitted). As Justice Scalia observed in his Ice
dissent, "We have taken pains to reject artificial limitations upon the facts subject to the jury-trial
guarantee. We long ago made clear that the guarantee turns upon the penal consequences attached to the fact, and not to its formal definition as an element of the crime." 129 S Ct at 720
(Scalia dissenting).
431 See 129 S Ct at 714,717.
426
427
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ently at liberty to structure judges' control over the interaction between sentences for different "discrete crimes.",43
Assume, for example, a defendant convicted of robbery, assault,
and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Blakely and Booker
make it extraordinarily difficult, and perhaps practically impossible,
for a legislature to create legally binding guidelines based on judicial
findings of fact for sentencing these offenses. 433 However, Ice would
apparently permit legislative imposition of detailed, legally binding
guidelines circumscribing a judge's discretion on whether and to what
extent sentences for each of these separate crimes should run consecutively to one another. Such guidelines might, for example, prescribe
that the assault sentence may be imposed consecutively if the victim
suffered bodily injury, but must be imposed consecutively if the victim
suffered severe bodily injury.'" Or they might prescribe that the sentence for the felon-in-possession charge should be imposed concurrently to all other sentences unless the firearm was flourished during
the course of another offense, in which case it may be imposed consecutively to the sentence for the particular offense in which the flourishing occurred, but that if the firearm was discharged during the
course of another offense, then the felon-in-possession sentence must
be imposed consecutively to all other sentences imposed on the de3
fendant.'4
An almost infinite variety of even more complicated rules
can be imagined. And given the prevalence of cases with multiple
counts, such rules could be crafted to drive sentencing outcomes for a
substantial fraction of defendants.436
Justice Ginsburg is sufficiently alert to the complications that
might ensue from a renewed reliance on legislative categories to define
Sixth Amendment rights that she tries to distinguish Ice, which involved
"multiple offenses different in character or committed at different
times,"'" from previous cases in the Apprendi line, which, she asserts,
dealt only with limits on sentences for a "discrete crime."',4 But this disId at 717.
As noted above, see notes 243-46 and accompanying text, guidelines based on judicial
factfinding can be written to comply with Blakely; however, the contortions necessary to make such
guidelines Blakely-compliant make most available means of doing so practically undesirable.
434 Consider USSG § 2A2.1(b).
435 Consider USSG § 2A2.2(b)(2).
436 Particularly if rules governing imposition of consecutive sentences were combined with
rules requiring minimum sentences, as permitted by Harris,536 US at 567-68, one could create a
substantial web of constraint on judicial discretion.
437 Ice, 129 S Ct at 717.
438 Id.
432
433
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tinction implies that there may still be a right to jury determination of
facts necessary to the imposition of consecutive sentences for offenses
that are not different in character or are not committed at different
times. It thus raises a whole new set of questions. How "different in character" must two crimes be before a legislature is free to create rules
based on judicial factfinding governing the imposition of consecutive
sentences for them? If legislatures can regulate imposition of consecutive sentences for crimes committed at different times, but not at the
same time, when are two crimes committed at the same time? Must
they be simultaneous? Part of the same transaction? Part of the same
scheme or conspiracy? In seeking to avoid one pothole, Justice Ginsburg condemns the Court to traverse a new definitional morass.439
As potentially troublesome as Justice Ginsburg's rule is, the most
jaw-dropping feature of the Ice opinion is the list of justifications for
its result.4' As Justice Scalia takes obvious pleasure in noting in dissent,"' the explanatory section of the Ice opinion is little more than a
compilation of the arguments rejected by the majority opinions in
Apprendi, Blakely, and Cunningham-allopinions joined (Blakely) or
written by Justices Ginsburg (Cunningham) and Stevens (Apprendi).
Ginsburg contends that traditionally judges, not juries, controlled imposition of consecutive or concurrent sentences and, therefore, regulating judicial discretion in this area is constitutionally permissible.44
But, as Justice Scalia correctly notes, in Blakely, the Court voided
Washington's sentencing guidelines and proclaimed irrelevant the fact
that judges, not juries, had traditionally controlled determination of
sentence length within the prescribed statutory maximum. ' Justice
Ginsburg reminds us that "the authority of States over the administration of their criminal justice systems lies at the core of their sovereign
status," parades the chestnut about states being "laboratories for devising solutions to difficult legal problems," and cautions against federal judicial incursions into this traditionally state concern." But this
solicitude for state sovereignty was completely absent when Stevens

439 For a discussion of the complications involved in determining whether a criminal incident ought to be charged as one or multiple crimes, see Jeffrey Chemerinsky, Note, Counting
Offenses, 58 Duke L J 709,711-30 (2009).
440 Ice, 129 S Ct at 717-20.
44 Id at 721-22 (Scalia dissenting).
442 Id at 717-18.
43 Id at 721-22 (Scalia dissenting).
4"4 Ice, 129 S Ct at 718-19.
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and Ginsburg voted to void New Jersey, Washington, and California
sentencing statutes in Apprendi, Blakely, and Cunningham."'

Justice Ginsburg then defends the Oregon consecutiveconcurrent sentencing scheme on policy grounds. She writes:
It bears emphasis that state legislative innovations like Oregon's
seek to rein in the discretion judges possessed at common law to
impose consecutive sentences at will. Limiting judicial discretion
to impose consecutive sentences serves the "salutary objectives"
of promoting sentences proportionate to "the gravity of the offense," and of reducing disparities in sentence length.4
But, of course, reining in unfettered judicial discretion, promoting sentences proportional to offense seriousness, and reducing sentencing
disparities were precisely the objectives of the state and federal structured sentencing regimes voided by the Supreme Court in Blakely,
Booker, and Cunningham. Finally, Ginsburg worries about the potentially disruptive consequences of voiding the Oregon statute, observing that "it is unclear how many other state initiatives would fall under" such a new rule, and fretting that such a new rule would "be difficult for States to administer." 7 Surveying the nationwide festival of
confusion that has been the primary product of the Court's Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence since Apprendi, one does not know
whether to laugh or cry.
V. THE MESS THEY'VE MADE ... AND How JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR
MIGHT HELP THEM FIX IT

A. Assessing the Court's Sixth Amendment Sentencing Work
Has the Supreme Court's labyrinthine journey from McMillan to
Ice accomplished anything of value or has it been the debacle my title
suggests? And if, as I think, it has been a nearly unmitigated failure,
how might a "wise Latina"" help guide the Court to a better place?

44
The Washington legislators who worked long and hard to devise that state's truly innovative guidelines system must find Ginsburg's faux-federalist platitudes in Ice particularly galling.
446
Id at 719 (citations omitted).
447 Id.
448 Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge's Voice, 13 Berkeley La Raza L J 87,92 (2002):
Justice O'Connor has often been cited as saying that a wise old man and wise old woman
will reach the same conclusion in deciding cases... I would hope that a wise Latina woman
with the richness of her experiences would more often than not reach a better conclusion
than a white male who hasn't lived that life.
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The core task the Court set itself beginning in McMillan was to
articulate a simple, logical, constitutionally grounded rule for identifying facts that are "elements" of crimes and thus subject to the requirement that they be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
The current status of nearly twenty-five years of work towards this
goal amounts to this: (1) The Sixth Amendment Jury Clause requires
that a jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt, or the defendant
must admit, any fact that, if proven, exposes the defendant to an increase in his maximum theoretically possible sentence, unless (a) the
fact relates to criminal history,"' or (b) the fact increases the maximum
sentence by empowering a judge to impose consecutive sentences on
counts of conviction arising from conduct different in character or
committed at separate times (but the jury right may still apply to facts
permitting consecutive sentences for counts relating to conduct similar in character or committed at the same time)."O (2) The defendant

has no right to jury determination either of facts that increase his required minimum sentence or of facts that reduce his possible maximum sentence.' (3) Legislatures or sentencing commissions may
create guidelines or other rules that correlate judge-found facts to
sentencing ranges within the space between statutory minimum and
statutory maximum sentences, if they meet the following conditions:
(a) If these rules can increase the maximum sentence above that legally authorized based purely on the fact of conviction, then the rules
must be "advisory," rather than "mandatory" or "presumptive,"452
which means that the ranges the rules prescribe can be of sufficient
legal consequence that a sentence imposed outside such a range may
be reversed on appeal unless accompanied by a rational explanation
453
for the deviation, but a trial judge may not refer to such a range as
"presumptively correct,'.. even though a court of appeals may treat a
sentence within it as "presumptively reasonable";.. (b) If these sentencing rules are drafted so that their application does not increase the maximum sentence above that legally authorized based purely on the fact of
conviction-as, for example, by writing guidelines that only raise or
lower minimum sentences, or by assigning no intermediate range based
purely on conviction to the typical offender so that judicial factfinding
449

See
450 See
451 See
452 See
453 See
454 See

Part
Part
Part
Part
Part
Part

II.C.1.
IV.D.4.
III.A.
IV.A.
IV.D.2.

IV.C.2.
455 See text accompanying notes 354-59.
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never increases maximum exposure-then mandatory or presumptive
guidelines appear constitutionally unobjectionable.
This tangle of rules and exceptions is obviously neither simple
nor, as illustrated at length above, logical. Nonetheless, a line of cases
supposedly rooted in the Sixth Amendment's Jury Trial Clause might
be deemed a success if it had achieved Justice Scalia's stated objective
of reasserting the centrality of the jury to determination of facts essential to the determination of criminal punishments.'" But it has done
nothing of the kind.
So far as can be determined, the advent of the Blakely-Booker
sentencing era has neither increased the number of criminal jury trials
nor materially expanded the number of sentence-affecting facts decided by juries in those trials that do occur. In the federal system, as
indicated in Figure 1, the percentage of federal criminal cases resolved
by trial has actually decreased since Blakely was decided, and the 2008
trial rate was the third lowest recorded since the Federal Guidelines
became effective in 1987." As for sentence-affecting facts, in federal
cases, virtually the only class of facts now pleaded and proven to juries
that was not always pleaded and proven is drug quantity in cases involving amounts that trigger simultaneous increases in statutory maximum and minimum sentences under Title 21- and the Justice Department made that change in charging practices back in 2000 in response to Apprendi."' In short, all of the Court's agonized thrashing in
the nine years and more than a dozen Sixth Amendment cases decided since Apprendi has not enhanced the influence of federal juries
on federal sentencing one iota.

456

457

See Blakely, 542 US at 305. See also text accompanying note 234.
United States Sentencing Commission, 2008 Sourcebook of FederalSentencing Statistics

22 figure C; United States Sentencing Commission, 2003 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics 22 figure C; United States Sentencing Commission, 1998 Sourcebook of FederalSentencing

Statistics 20 figure C; United States Sentencing Commission, 1993 Annual Report 68 figure C. For
discussion of the decline in federal criminal trials, see Frank 0. Bowman, III, American Buffalo:
Vanishing Acquittals and the GradualExtinction of the American Trial Lawyer, 156 U Penn L

Rev PENNumbra 226, 239-40 (2007), online at http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/112007/Bowman.pdf (visited Dec 11,2009).
458 United States v Swatzie, 228 F3d 1278, 1282 (11th Cir 2000), cert denied, 533 US 953 (2001)
(noting a change in the Justice Department charging policies in 2000 in response to Apprendi).
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FIGURE 1: FEDERAL TRIAL RATE
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Source: United States Sentencing Commission, 2008 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics 22 figure C;
United States Sentencing Commission, 2003 Sourcebook ofFederalSentencing Statistics22 figure C.

In the states, the effect of Blakely and Cunningham on the sen-

tencing influence of juries has been comparably minimal. According
to a recent survey by Professors Stephanos Bibas and Susan Klein, all
or parts of the sentencing schemes of nineteen or twenty states ran
afoul of Blakely;... however, only nine of these states have modified

their systems by judicial interpretation or legislative enactment to require jury determination of aggravating sentencing facts for some or
all offenses."' The others have either returned to systems of discretionary judicial sentencing or made their guidelines advisory. Among the
nine that altered their sentencing regimes, the real world effects on

jury participation seem to be de minimis. Where statistics are availa459 Stephanos Bibas and Susan Klein, The Sixth Amendment and Criminal Sentencing, 30
Cardozo L Rev 775, 797 table 1 (2008) (reporting that all or parts of the sentencing systems of
Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maine,
Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, and possibly New York have been found to violate Blakely). See also Barbara Tombs and
Jeffrey R. Edblad, The Application ofBlakely v.Washington in Minnesota:An Analysis ofState v.
Shattuck and State v.Houston, 32 Wm Mitchell L Rev 1263, 1266-67, 1275-79 (2006) (discussing
how the state courts and legislatures in Minnesota, Kansas, North Carolina, Oregon, and Tennessee have responded to Blakely).
46o Bibas and Klein, 30 Cardozo L Rev at 801 table 4 (cited in note 459) (reporting that
Alaska, Arizona, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington
changed their statutes to require aggravating facts that raise a defendant's maximum sentence
must be proved to a jury).
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ble, they show no observable effect on jury-trial rate in these states
from the enactment of measures making sentencing Blakelycompliant. For example, North Carolina enacted a change to its guidelines requiring jury determination of aggravating facts in 2005, but as
shown in Figure 2, the jury trial rate actually declined slightly in succeeding years.
FIGURE
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2: NORTH CAROLINA TRIAL RATE
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online
at
Felonies
and
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Report
for
http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Councils/spac/Publication/Statistical/Annual/Default.asp (visited Dec
11, 2009). The absolute number of jury trials was also unaffected by the legislation. Beginning in 20012002, the annual numbers of jury trials in North Carolina were 2001-2002: 743; 2002-2003: 684; 2003-2004:
693; 2004-2005: 633; 2005-2006: 604; 2006-2007: 634; 2007-2008: 629. Id.

Not only did Blakely have no observable effect on the number of
jury trials, but when jury trials occur, only a few of such trials appear
to involve sentence-affecting facts that would not have been decided
by juries before Blakely. For example, Minnesota's guidelines system
was always configured so that fewer than 10 percent of all felony cases
might theoretically involve sentence enhancements subject to the
Blakely rule, and both before and after Blakely, more than 90 percent

461 Act of June 30,2005, NC Sess Laws 145, codified at NC Gen Stat Ann § 15A-1340.16(a)(1)
(changing the statute to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all aggravating circumstances
and the submission of these aggravating circumstances to a jury in a bifurcated hearing).
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of such cases resulted from pleas. Since Blakely, the number of aggravated departures has declined slightly while the percentage of such
cases resulting from plea bargains has increased.46 By 2007, only 859,
or 5.3 percent, of all felony convictions resulted in aggravated departures and only 27 of those cases, or 0.16 percent, resulted from trials."
Thus, in Minnesota, Blakely's "product" is jury findings of sentenceaffecting facts in perhaps twenty-seven cases per year.
The story in North Carolina is similar. In North Carolina, Blakely
had one immediate statistically observable effect-in 2004-2005, the
(already small) proportion of defendants receiving prison time who
were sentenced in the aggravated range promptly fell by more than
one-half.4' But as shown in Figure 3, despite the July 2005 law setting
forth a procedure for juries to find aggravating factors, the number of
aggravated sentences has never materially rebounded and prosecutors
are apparently using the new jury procedures to obtain "aggravated"
sentences only in rare cases. Instead, it appears that North Carolina
prosecutors either use other mechanisms to achieve higher sentences,
such as seeking consecutive non-aggravated sentences on multiple
counts, or forego the modest increases authorized by the aggravated
range altogether.4 6 Given that the North Carolina guilty plea rate is
around 98 percent, the number of cases in which North Carolina juries
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Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, The Impact of Blakely v. Washington on

Sentencing In Minnesota: Short Term Recommendations 6 (Aug

6, 2004),

online

at

http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/data-reports/blakely-shortterm.pdf (visited Dec 11, 2009) (reporting that in 2002 there were 1,002 aggravated departures potentially subject to the Blakely rule
out of a total of 12,978 cases, or 7.7 percent of the total, and that only 79 of the 1,002 aggravated
departure cases went to trial).
463 Beginning in 2004, the total number of cases with aggravated departures and the number of those cases tried to a jury were as follows: 2004: 968 departures, 59 trials; 2005: 978 departures, 48 trials; 2006: 904 departures, 31 trials; 2007: 859 departures, 27 trials. Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, Data on Aggravated Departures:2004-2007 (on file with author).
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In 2007, there were 16,168 felony convictions in Minnesota. Minnesota Sentencing

Guidelines
Commission,
Sentencing
Felony
Offenders
Sentenced
in

Practices: Annual
2007
12
figure

Summary
Statistics
1
(2008),
online

for
at

http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/data-reports/2007/data-summary_2007.pdf (visited Nov 20,2009).
46
According to Professor Ronald E Wright, who interviewed a number of North Carolina
prosecutors in the wake of Blakely, in the year between the 2004 Blakely decision and the 2005
legislation requiring jury findings of aggravating factors, prosecutors responded to the decision by
seeking fewer aggravated sentences and many judges instituted local procedures calling for special
interrogatories to juries seeking findings of facts authorizing aggravated sentences. Telephone
interview with Ronald F.Wright, Professor of Law at Wake Forest University (July 22,2009).
466 See Ronald F Wright, Blakely and the Centralizers in North Carolina,18 Fed Sent Rptr
(Vera) 19, 19-20 (2005) (describing the interaction of North Carolina sentencing actors following
the Blakely decision, noting that the number of aggravated sentences fell after Blakely, and
describing ease of using consecutive sentences to enhance penalties).
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now determine sentence-affecting facts they would not have addressed before Blakely cannot exceed a few dozen per year."
FIGURE 3: NORTH CAROLINA AGGRAVATED SENTENCES INCASES
WHERE PRISON IMPOSED
Total
Prison
Cases

# Sentences in
Aggravated
Range

% Sentences
in Aggravated
Range

Overall
Jury
Trial Rate

2007/08

11,114

365

3.3%

1.99%

2006/07

10,567

303

2.8%

2.05%

2005/06

10,004

285

2.8%

1.99%

2004105

9,471

292

3.1%

2.17%

2003/04

9,254

655

7.1%

2.49%

2002/03

9,229

619

6.7%

2.37%

2001/02

8,930

621

7.0%

2.58%

The data in the first three columns of Figure 3 is derived from the 2001-2002 through 2007-2008
Source:
editions of North Carolina Sentencing and Policy Advisory Commission, Structured Sentencing
at
table
2, online
D
Statistical Report for Felonies and Misdemeanors Appendix
http://www.nCcourts.org/Courts/CRS/Councils/spaclPublication/Statistical/Annual/Default.asp (visited Dec
11, 2009). The data in the fourth column of Figure 3 is derived from Table 2 of the same publications.

Even though the Blakely-Booker line of Sixth Amendment jury
right cases is neither simple nor logical and has effected no appreciable increase in the influence of actual juries on sentencing, perhaps it
could be defended as a solution to the "tail-wags-the-dog" problemthe complaint that structured sentencing systems accord disproportionate sentencing influence to facts found by judges with minimal due
process protections. But it is the tail-wags-dog problem that illustrates
most graphically the Court's conceptual and practical failures.
Structured sentencing systems create the tail-wags-dog concern,
not because judges in such systems necessarily identify and consider
more sentence-related facts than they would in a purely discretionary
467 There is no published data on the percentage of North Carolina aggravated sentences
resulting from plea bargains; however, there is no reason to think that North Carolina differs
from other jurisdictions in which agreement to an aggravated sentence is a common condition of
a plea. Even if the trial rate for cases with aggravated sentences were an improbable five times
higher than the overall rate, in 2007-2008, only thirty-nine such cases would have gone to trial.
See Figure 3 (showing that in 2007-2008, there were 365 sentences in the aggravated range and
an overall trial rate of 1.99 percent).
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system, but because the rules of structured systems assign legal
weight-in the form of mandatory or preferred sentencing effects-to

certain judge-found facts. The tails-wags-dog complaint originated
from an ill-defined combination of the intuition that the individual or
cumulative legal effect of these judge-found facts on sentencing outcomes ought not exceed the effects of jury-found element facts, and
the pragmatic observation that structured sentencing regimes customarily accorded defendants minimal due process rights in connection
with those judge-found sentencing facts that had newly acquired sentencing force. In constitutional terms, the tail-wags-dog issue combines
(1) the Sixth Amendment jury trial question of what facts are of sufficient sentencing consequence to be deemed "elements" reserved to
juries with (2) the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process
question of what due process rights attach to the determination of
sentence-affecting facts not reserved to juries. The fatal flaw in the
Court's work from McMillan forward has been its failure to acknowledge that it faced not one, but two interlocking constitutional issues
and that there is a separate due process component to the structured
sentencing problem. The result has been to trap the Court into a binary choice-a fact is either of a type that triggers the full panoply of
procedural protections that comes with the Sixth Amendment jury
trial right, or it is of no constitutional consequence and can be found
and relied on by a judge with virtually no procedural safeguards at all.
The consequences of the Court's framing the constitutional problem this way are clear. Justices Rehnquist, Breyer, O'Connor, and
Kennedy were afraid that according full jury trial rights even to
strongly sentence-affecting rules would place the Court on a slippery
slope that would in time destroy the structured sentencing movement.
And so they voted to deny Sixth Amendment protection even to facts
that placed hard constraints on judicial sentencing discretion and
created legally binding negative sentencing consequences for defendants, such as those facts that triggered mandatory minimum sentences (McMillan and Harris)4"or criminal history facts that raised
real statutory maximums (Almendarez- Torres). 9 Justice Alito now
seems to have replaced O'Connor in this camp. Conversely, Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, whose various concerns included a genuine solicitude for defendants' procedural rights in structured sentencing regimes, were initially seduced by the apparent simplicity of

4
469

See Parts II.B and III.A.
See Part II.C.1.
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Justice Scalia's Blakely test. But as its essential incoherence has become clear, they have had no graceful avenue of retreat and no alternative constitutional ground on which to construct a sensible regime
of intermediate due process protections for the factfinding necessary
to structured sentencing regimes. For Justice Scalia, who dislikes anything that smacks of balancing tests or sliding scales,'" the fact that his
ostensibly simple rule effectively precludes the introduction of intermediate forms of due process protection for judicial findings of nonelement sentencing factors is, as they say, a feature not a flaw."'
Because of the Court's fragmentation and the resultant concepthe constitutional jury right is now both too narrow and
failures,
tual
too broad. On the one hand, the Court denies defendants jury trials on
facts that plainly call for them -most saliently, facts triggering mandatory minimum sentences. On the other hand, the Court insists on jury
trials for many facts that merely create presumptions regarding the
exercise of judicial discretion within statutory limits, with the result
that by judicial construction or legislative enactment, most such presumptive rules have been rendered "advisory" or abandoned altogether. There exists a vocal body of opinion that applauds the effects
of the jury right's new overbreadth, particularly the transformation of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines into an "advisory" system.472 But
considered dispassionately, the current federal regime is the best illustration of the Court's failure.
The pre-Booker federal system was Exhibit A in the tail-wagsdog debate. Judge-found facts drove a complex system of mandatory
minimum sentences and guidelines ranges, which influenced sentencing outcomes to a degree that rivaled or exceeded the crime of conviction itself. But essentially the same description applies to the postBooker advisory system. The fact-dependent rules governing manda470

See, for example, Department of Revenue of Kentucky v Davis, 128 S Ct 1801, 1821

(2008) (Scalia dissenting) (expressing disdain for a Dormant Commerce Clause test that asks
whether a law "imposes burdens on interstate commerce that clearly outweigh the law's local
benefits" and arguing that such weighing should be left to the legislature).
471 Chief Justice Roberts's primary interest seems to be promoting institutional continuity
by maintaining the stare decisis effect of the Blakely-Booker rule he inherited. And Justice Thomas may currently have the most intellectually coherent position of anyone on the Court. After
changing his mind several times, he would now insist on the right to jury determination of any
fact that increases maximum or minimum sentences, including facts related to criminal history.
See Kimbrough, 552 US at 114-15 (Thomas dissenting).
472 See, for example, W. David Ball, Heinous, Atrocious, and Cruel: Apprendi, Indeterminate
Sentencing, and the Meaning of Punishment, 109 Colum L Rev 893, 924-32 (2009) (arguing that

juries should be involved in all findings of fact that lead to increased sentences given that juries
are the "moral representatives" of society).
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tory minimum sentences were unaffected by Booker. The Guidelines,
though advisory, remain in effect, requiring judges to make the same
factual findings and the same determinations of Guidelines ranges as
always. To all this, Booker added a new layer- determination of facts
relevant to any § 3553(a) factors not fully accounted for by the Guidelines." Thus, Booker's "solution" to the tail-wags-dog problem was not
to eliminate or even reduce the tail of sentence-affecting facts identified in federal statutes and the Guidelines, but was instead to imagine
that, by declaring the Guidelines advisory and thus theoretically legally nugatory, those facts would no longer move the dog of sentencing
outcomes. And yet the dog still moves.
As shown in Figure 4, the percentage of federal cases sentenced
within the applicable Guidelines range dropped by 10 percent in the
quarter following the January 2005 Booker decision, from 72 percent
to 62 percent, and drifted slightly further down over the next three
years to 58 percent. Nonetheless, the fact-driven Guidelines rules continue to determine the sentence for six out of ten federal defendants.
This judicial behavior is hardly surprising. Judges are trained to abide
by the law. The Federal Guidelines look and feel like law. They are
passed by an administrative agency whose expertise the Court continues to praise4 " and are approved by Congress. Their use remains mandatory." They assign preferred outcomes to identified facts. Although
the Supreme Court says they cannot have presumptive weight, it allows adherence to them to be a safe harbor from appellate reversal. In
consequence, regardless of what the Court may say, district judges still
treat Guidelines facts as creating a presumptively valid sentencing
zone, albeit a zone with perhaps 10 to 15 percent less gravitational pull
than before.

US at 259-60.
With apologies to Galileo. After being forced by the Inquisition to recant his heliocentric view of the solar system that held the Earth moved around the Sun, Galileo is supposed to
have muttered, "Eppur si muove," meaning "But it does move." See Elizabeth Knowles, ed, The
473 543
474

Oxford Dictionary of Quotations 338 (Oxford 6th ed 2004).
475 See, for example, Rita, 551 US at 347-52; Kimbrough, 552 US at 108-09.
476

See text accompanying note 329.
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FIGURE 4: SENTENCES RELATIVE TO GUIDELINE RANGE (2005-2009)
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Source: United States Sentencing Commission, Third Quarter FY09 Quarterly Sentencing Update 12 table 4
(2009), online at http:I/www.ussc.gov/linktojp.htm (visited Dec 11, 2009).

But because the Guidelines are now formally "advisory," the due
process component of the tail-wags-dog argument has less traction
than ever, or to put it more formally, the constitutional argument for
heightened due process rights for determination of the Guidelines
facts that continue to drive federal sentencing outcomes is deeply
compromised, if not completely demolished. Defendants are poorly
placed to demand new procedural protections for the determination
of Guidelines facts the Court insists have no legal consequence. If anything, the effect of Booker and its progeny will surely be to diminish
due process protections in federal sentencing as trial and appellate
judges become less and less concerned about accuracy in an "advisory" system. For anyone seriously concerned about the tail-wags-dog
problem, Booker has created the worst of all worlds-a complex system of fact-dependent rules, which in truth heavily influence outcomes, but in which judges are cavalier about facts because the rules
have no formal legal force.
Moreover, despite the Guidelines' reduced gravitational pull and
the increased percentage of sentences below the Guidelines range,
actual sentence lengths have scarcely budged. As shown in Figure 5,
the mean sentence for a federal defendant actually rose after Booker,
and despite a downtick in 2008 (almost surely due in large measure to

470
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the Sentencing Commission's November 2007 amendment to the
crack guideline and its January 2008 decision to make that amendment retroactive"), the mean remains higher than it was before Blakely and Booker. The current stringency of federal sentencing rules may
moderate slightly over the next several years in response to congressional action on issues like crack cocaine.478 And regardless of changes
in the formal rules, sentences imposed may decline fractionally if
judges reassert themselves a bit more in the new advisory world and if
the Obama administration's prosecutors relax their approach to sentencing in the same way the Clinton-era Justice Department did.4 " But
so long as the current Federal Guidelines remain in effect, advisory or
not, they will discourage any rapid or pronounced general decline in
sentencing severity while retaining their potential as a political vehicle
to increase sentences for whatever crimes enrage the public and inflame Congress.4 To the extent any members of the Court hoped the
Sixth Amendment would be a vehicle for a general softening of crime
policy, they are likely to be disappointed.

477 USSG Appendix C, Amend 715 (Supp 2009) (reducing the base offense level for crack
cocaine by two, mandating that one gram of crack would be equivalent to twenty kilograms of
marijuana, and making all reduced prison sentences retroactive for previous offenders). See

Office of Defender Services, Crack Cocaine Sentencing: GuidelineAmendments and the Elimina-

tion of the Crack/PowderDisparity, online at http://www.fd.org/odstbCrackCocaine.htm (visited
Dec 11, 2009).
478 Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney General, to All Federal Prosecutors *1-2 (May 1, 2009) (instructing federal prosecutors to inform their courts that the Obama
administration and Attorney General believe Congress and the Commission should eliminate
the crack-powder disparity but that until Congress acts, courts should exercise their discretion to
fashion a sentence consistent with 18 USC § 3553(a)).
479 Frank 0. Bowman, III, and Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II: An EmpiricalAnalysis of
Declining Federal Drug Sentences Including Data from the District Level, 87 Iowa L Rev 479,
560-61 (2002) (describing and analyzing the decline in federal drug sentences from 1991-2000);
Bowman, 43 Houston L Rev at 312 figure 7 (cited in note 326) (noting the upturn in federal drug
sentences with the advent of the Bush administration in 2001).
48 Bowman, 105 Colum L Rev at 1316-20,1350 (cited in note 251) (describing the structural and political factors that make the Federal Guidelines a one-way upward ratchet).
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FIGURE 5: FEDERAL MEAN SENTENCE LENGTH

54

51.1

52

50
48
46
44

51.8

51.8
49.6

50.1
47.9
45

46.3

42

140

Source:

United States Sentencing Commission, 2008 Sourcebook of FederalSentencing Statistics table 13.

Finally, while reducing disparity may have been overemphasized by
the designers and defenders of the Federal Guidelines to the detriment
of other values, judicial sentencing disparity is surely undesirable. Yet
Kimbrough, Gall, Nelson, and Spears have so thoroughly denatured ap-

pellate review that the federal system's ability to control regional and
judge-to-judge sentencing disparity has been effectively eliminated.4'
That anyone maintains the belief that Booker represents even a
qualified success is a testament both to the virulent dislike harbored
by many for the Federal Guidelines and to the surpassing importance
of professional psychology. The additional increment of flexibility accorded judges by Booker may have made relatively little difference to
average outcomes, but it has relieved judges who felt that the former
system provided them insufficient leeway in extraordinary cases and
has given defense lawyers the sense that their sentencing advocacy can
now affect results. These are not frivolous reactions, but it is difficult
to justify a constitutional revolution on the ground that it affords

41 See, for example, United States Sentencing Commission, Third QuarterFY09 Quarterly
Sentencing Update 2-8, table 2 (showing that across circuits, there are vast differences between
the percentage of sentences being given within the Federal Guidelines range-for example,
71.8 percent of the Fifth Circuit's sentences are within-range, while approximately 41 percent of
the Ninth Circuit's sentences are within-range).
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peace of mind to the relatively few judges and lawyers who populate
the federal criminal system.
Where does this leave the structured sentencing movement that
Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Breyer fought to save and even
Justice Scalia claimed to view with at least benevolent neutrality?
Probably the fairest way to put it is that Blakely and Booker did not
kill structured sentencing, but they have severely wounded it. Not only
have structured sentencing regimes in roughly a dozen states been
abandoned or downgraded to advisory status, Mbut more importantly,
the sheer incoherence and probable instability of the Court's Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence represents a daunting obstacle to any prudent legislator who might be considering adopting a structured system. The Court effectively prohibited the most sensible structured
sentencing architectures. And even if one were disposed to try to draft
around the peculiar outcroppings of Justice Scalia's Sixth Amendment, one could never be entirely sure that the Court will not suddenly add another bizarre wrinkle or come to its senses and give the
whole business up as a bad job.
The deep uncertainty the Court has created comes at a particularly bad time. One lesson that several decades of national experience
with structured sentencing teaches is that, while institutional structures and relationships are very important," the best-designed system
is ultimately at the mercy of the broader political culture. If the public
and the political classes demand punitive sentences, structured sentencing mechanisms will be employed to deliver just such sentences.'
But it is, I think, equally true that structured sentencing systems can
both mitigate the effects of periods of political hysteria and, when
calmer heads are in the ascendant, be used to moderate severity and
allocate resources wisely. There are hopeful signs that we are entering
a more moderate period.8' Yet the Court's regrettable misconstrucSee notes 459-67 and accompanying text.
See Frank 0. Bowman, III, Beyond Band-Aids: A Proposal for Reconfiguring Federal
Sentencing after Booker, 2005 U Chi Legal F 149, 210-11 (describing the importance of system
architecture and institutional relationships to building a sound sentencing system).
48
See, for example, Bowman, 105 Colum L Rev at 1345-46 (cited in note 251).
45 'Tere are several signs of moderation at the federal level. A bill was passed out of the
House Judiciary Committee on July 29, 2009, to eliminate the crack-powder disparity. See Fairness in Cocaine Sentencing Act of 2009, HR 3245, 111 Cong, 1st Sess (July 16, 2009). Senator
Richard Durbin introduced a similar measure in the Senate. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2009, S
1789, 111 Cong, 1st Sess (Oct 15, 2009). The House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security recently considered the problem of overcriminalization of conduct. See Hearing on Over-Criminalization of Conduct/OverFederalization of Criminal Law before the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
48

483
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tions of the Sixth Amendment have withdrawn useful tools from the
reformer's workbench.
B.

Glimmers of Hope: A Plan and Justice Sotomayor

Can anything be done? Or has the Court traveled so far into the
tortured terrain of Blakely Land that it can never return? Recovery
would require two things: first, an intellectually coherent and practically workable alternative to the current Sixth Amendment mishmash,
and second, a new voice in the inner counsels of the Court. Fortunately, both are available.
As will doubtless be clear by now, I believe that the solution to
the sentencing problems that have vexed the Court requires a combination of Sixth Amendment jury trial and procedural due process
principles. The Court should adopt essentially the following rules:
1. An "element" of a crime is a fact that, when proven alone or
in combination with other facts: (a) exposes the defendant to
criminal liability; (b) sets hard limits on judicial sentencing
discretion; and (c) increases the defendant's punishment in
the sense that it increases either the penalty a court may impose or the penalty it must impose.
2. An "element" must either be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt to a jury or, if the defendant waives jury trial, be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a judge, or admitted by the
defendant.
3. Within the impermeable upper and lower limits on judicial
sentencing discretion created by proof of elements, legislatures may create rules that channel or guide, but do not eliminate, judicial sentencing discretion. Such rules may be either
voluntary, advisory, or presumptive. However, presumptive
limits on judicial sentencing discretion must be genuinely rebuttable and must provide reasonable leeway for the exercise
of judicial discretion to vary from the presumptive limits, so
Security of the House Judiciary Committee, 111 Cong, 1st Sess (July 22, 2009), online at
http://judiciary.house.govIhearings/hear_090722_2.html (visited Dec 11, 2009). The same Subcommittee also recently considered measures to eliminate or reduce the effect of mandatory
minimum sentences. See Hearing on HR 2937, HR 834, and HR 1466 before the Subcommittee
on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the House Judiciary Committee, 111 Cong, 1st
Sess (July 14, 2009), online at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear_090714.html (visited
Dec 11, 2009). Finally, a task force was created within the Department of Justice to reexamine
the Department's approach to sentencing policy. See Ogden, Memorandum at *1 (cited in
note 478).
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long as the variation remains within the hard limits created
by proof of elements.
4. Flexible constitutional due process protections should apply
to the proof of the facts used in the application of guidelines."6 The precise constitutionally required procedures for
proof of such facts will be determined by the Supreme Court
and will, in general, depend on the degree to which the
guidelines constrain judicial sentencing discretion. Facts necessary to application of purely voluntary guidelines (such as
those in Virginia that judges are at liberty to ignore completely4 n) should probably be subject to minimal procedural requirements. Advisory guidelines should probably be subject to
requirements akin to those now applicable to the Federal
Guidelines.4 8 Presumptive guidelines should probably trigger
enhanced procedural protections in areas such as discovery
and confrontation rights, and perhaps burden of proof.
5. Federal Guidelines that trigger excessively narrow restrictions of judicial sentencing discretion upon the proof of specified facts would be deemed to violate the Sixth Amendment inasmuch as the guidelines facts in such a system would
too closely approximate true "elements."
This model has several notable advantages over the BlakelyBooker muddle. First, it would require jury determination both of
facts triggering mandatory minimum sentences and of facts raising
maximum sentences that happen to relate to criminal history. Thus it
requires reversal of both Harris and Almendarez-Torres. Abandon-

4 There is plain Supreme Court precedent for this approach. See Mathews v Eldridge, 424
US 319, 334 (1976) (holding that due process is not a "technical conception with a fixed content
unrelated to time, place and circumstances" but rather is "flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands").
487 See Va Code Ann § 19.2-298.01 (mandating that a sentencing court's decision not to follow
the guidelines "shall not be reviewable on appeal or the basis of any other post-conviction relief").
488 See, for example, United States v Fisher, 502 F3d 293, 306-07 (3d Cir 2007) (noting that

the Supreme Court has yet to fully define the relationship between "due process protections
applicable at sentencing and Booker reasonableness review" but holding that conduct relevant
to sentencing enhancements must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence); United States
v Ausbum, 502 F3d 313, 322 (3d Cir 2007) ("[D]ue process in criminal sentencing requires that a
defendant receive notice of and a reasonable opportunity to comment on, (a) the alleged factual
predicate for his sentence, and (b) the potential punishments which may be imposed at sentence."); United States v Silverman, 976 F2d 1502, 1511-12 (6th Cir 1992) (recognizing that while
hearsay evidence may be considered at sentencing, due process requires that this evidence possess "some minimal indicia of reliability").
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ment of those cases is essential if Sixth Amendment jurisprudence is
to be both intellectually coherent and genuinely respectful of the role
juries should play in setting criminal sentences. Second, it would readmit law to the interval between true statutory maximum and minimum
sentences by allowing legislatures and appellate courts to create ruleseither through the legislative process or by common law methods-that
would regularize, though not eliminate, the exercise of judicial discretion in that interval. Third, the readmission of law to the discretionary
interval, coupled with a constitutional prohibition on the complete or
near-complete elimination of discretion in that interval, would promote a healthy interaction between the institutions properly concerned with criminal punishment. Fourth, and relatedly, it would permit resumption of the beneficial use of structured sentencing mechanisms to reduce unwarranted disparity, focus correctional resources,
and enlarge procedural protections for defendants at sentencing.
The most obvious objection to this regime is that it provides no
bright-line rule for determining the boundary between permissibly
presumptive guidelines and guidelines so restrictive of judicial discretion that they become the de facto equivalent of elements that must
be decided by juries. One of the reasons the Court found Justice Scalia's Blakely formulation so seductive in the first place was surely that
it seemed to offer a means of avoiding this difficult boundary question. But, as we have seen, the Court's quest for a bright-line rule has
produced not certainty, but confusion and absurdity. And in the end,
the Court has been forced to answer the boundary question anyway,
but its answer-that there can be guidelines which are presumptive in
fact, but which must be treated as nullities in law-is logically ridiculous and pragmatically counterproductive. Rather than maintaining
this silly fiction, the Court should acknowledge that some reasonable
legislative guidance of judicial sentencing discretion is constitutionally
legitimate and practically beneficial, and devote its future energies to
the task of maintaining a reasonable balance between legislative, judicial, executive, and citizen-jury control over sentencing outcomes.
Similarly, those of Justice Scalia's turn of mind will doubtless object that introducing a flexible due process standard to sentencing
factfinding would commit the Supreme Court to an inevitably protracted project of creating, and then policing, a set of graduated due
process models correlating to more and less restrictive structured sentencing systems. But if the abortive effort to create a "bright line" test
for Sixth Amendment jury rights shows anything, it is that simplistic
rules rarely survive contact with real world complexity and are, if anything, more likely to generate work for the Court than careful, patient,
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incremental development of doctrine in response to the subtleties presented by individual cases.
Assuming one finds the foregoing model attractive, could the
Court be convinced to move toward it? A truism of the national conversation about Justice Sonia Sotomayor's appointment to the Supreme Court has been that replacing the moderate liberal Souter with
another moderate liberal is unlikely to change the balance of the Court
on most issues. But sentencing may be the exception to that generalization. Justice Souter, despite occasional expressions of doubt about the
value of the enterprise, has remained the most reliable vote for maintaining Justice Scalia's Blakely rule in its pure form. By contrast, as a
federal judge on either the district or appellate court bench throughout
the period since Apprendi, Justice Sotomayor has been personally involved in trying to navigate the sea of troubles the Court's work has
created for lawyers and courts."9 One suspects she would at least be
open to change, as she has no personal investment in the Blakely adventure and considerable experience in its practical deficiencies.
More to the point, although as an inferior court judge she has not
been in a position to say how she views the Blakely-Booker approach
to sentencing, at least one of her opinions, her dissent from the en
banc Second Circuit opinion in United States v Cavera,49 strongly suggests that she views the move to nearly unfettered trial court sentencing discretion as a bad thing. In Cavera,the Second Circuit addressed
the question of how much deference is due a district judge who varies
from the Guideline range based on disagreement with the Sentencing
Commission's policy choices in the wake of Kimbrough'"The majority concluded, in effect, that appellate deference ought to be nearly
489

As a district or appellate judge, Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote opinions or dissents in at

least nineteen cases construing the Apprendi-Blakely-Booker line of cases. See United States v

Draper,553 F3d 174, 184 (2d Cir 2009); United States v Cavera,550 F3d 180,216-24 (2d Cir 2008)
(Sotomayor concurring in part and dissenting in part); United States v Ganim, 510 F3d 134, 141
(2d Cir 2007); United States v Capoccia, 503 F3d 103, 116 n 18 (2d Cir 2007); Dulal-Whiteway v
United States Dept of Homeland Security, 501 F3d 116, 125 (2d Cir 2007); United States v Parker,

469 F3d 57,59 n 2 (2d Cir 2006); Burrell v United States, 467 F3d 160, 170 (2d Cir 2006); Brown v
Miller, 451 F3d 54, 56-58 (2d Cir 2006); United States v Sheikh, 433 F3d 905, 906 (2d Cir 2006);
United States v Hamdi, 432 F3d 115, 121 (2d Cir 2005); United States v Avello-Alvarez, 430 F3d

543, 545-46 (2d Cir 2005); United States v Vaughn, 430 F3d 518, 524-27 (2d Cir 2005); United
States v Estrada,428 F3d 387, 390-91 (2d Cir 2005); United States v Martinez, 413 F3d 239, 243-44
(2d Cir 2005); United States v Maloney, 406 F3d 149, 151-55 (2d Cir 2005); United States v Outen,

286 F3d 622, 634-41 (2d Cir 2002); United States v Santiago, 268 F3d 151, 153-57 (2d Cir 2001);
United States v Moreno, 2000 WL 1843232, *2-11 (SDNY). She has also served on panels considering innumerable other such cases.
49o 550 F3d 180,216 (2d Cir 2008) (Sotomayor dissenting).
491 Id at 186-87.
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absolute.4 9 Then-Judge Sotomayor disagreed vigorously, saying that
the "closer review" of judicial disagreements with the Commission
called for in Kimbrough
must amount to more than the majority's excessive deference to
the district court's decision, which risks a regression of the sentencing process to the "greatest deficiencies of the preGuidelines regime," namely "its failure to provide for review of
the decisions of sentencing judges and its failure to ensure that
the sentencing judge's exercise of discretion was informed by authoritative criteria and principles."'
One should not read too much into this opinion, but I find it suggestive of a healthy skepticism of what the Court has wrought.
At a bare minimum, it is fair to conclude that Justice Souter's replacement is resistant to the more extreme implications of Blakely
and Booker. Particularly at a moment when, as evidenced by Ice, enthusiasm for Justice Scalia's confounding simplicities may be waning
in Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, Justice Sotomayor's arrival could
start a discussion that, if we are all very lucky, will take the Court
down a new and more productive path. Perhaps, if that discussion begins, the analysis in the preceding pages may be of some value.

492 Id at 191 (emphasizing that appellate courts should not consider what weight they would
have given a particular sentencing factor but should rather determine whether a sentencing
"factor, as explained by the district court, can bear the weight assigned to it under the totality of
circumstances").
493 Cavera, 550 F3d at 217 (Sotomayor concurring in part and dissenting in part), quoting
Kate Stith and Jose A. Cabranes, Judging under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 Nw U L
Rev 1247, 1253-54 (1997).
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